Abstract
Relations in the Polish-Ukrainian-Russian triangle have never been simple. The history of the Polish-Soviet war of 1920 is one of the illustrative moments. Although the Polish offensive against the Bolsheviks in April 1920 was tactically beneficial to Petr Vrangel's Russian Army, the Russian white emigration was largely hostile to Józef Piłsudski's Ukrainian policy. The main reason for this hostility was the project of Poland's support for the independence of the Ukrainian People's Republic. Russian public opinion could not support either the Bolsheviks or the Poles with the Ukrainians in this war. The article examines a wide range of Russian non-Bolshevik political thought. Through the prism of Russian national identity, the article explains how a wide range of Russian anti-Bolshevik politicians and public figures, from monarchists to Mensheviks, perceived Polish policy toward Ukraine in 1920. This research is not a study of Vrangel's Ukrainian policy, although this is an important background, but rather a study of political thought and history of ideas.
Introduction
The Polish-Soviet War of 1920 had special significance for the Russian White movement. After the resignation of Anton Denikin,1 Petr Vrangel’2 took over the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of South Russia and, on April 28, 1920, renamed it the Russian Army. The course of the Polish-Soviet War could not leave “White” Russians indifferent. The common Polish-Ukrainian offensive against the Bolsheviks seemed to be in favor of the Russian Army, but the situation was complicated by the Polish-Ukrainian treaty of April 21, 1920. It demonstrated that Poland's goal was to restore the Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR). This made the Russian attitude to the Polish offensive very ambiguous and, to some extent, divided the views of the Russians.
Methodology
To understand the nature of this ambiguity, it is necessary to look at Russia's attitude to the Ukrainian national project. In Russian national mythology, Ukraine was perceived as an integral part of Russia, so the Ukrainian idea's construction inevitably deconstructed the Russian one. As Aleksei Miller noted:
Ukrainian nationalism denied the Little Russian identity, which could peacefully coexist with the Great Russian one, and created its own image of an ideal Motherland that conflicted with both the Polish and Russian ones. The Ukrainian idea ‘took away’ from Russia not just a part of the national territory, but ‘Kyiv—the mother of Russian cities,’ the place of the acquisition of the Orthodox faith and statehood and deprived of an ideological basis in the struggle against the Polish movement.3
Accordingly, the Little Russian, who accepted the Ukrainian identity, unlike other ethnic groups of the empire, became an apostate in the view of the All-Russian nation idea's supporters.4 The term “Polish-Ukrainian Alliance” in this article refers to the cooperation between the Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR), led by Symon Petliura,5 and the Republic of Poland, led by Józef Piłsudski,6 that was based on the Polish-Ukrainian treaty of April 21, 1920.
The purpose of the study is to analyze Russian anti-Bolshevik elites’ attitudes to Polish-Ukrainian cooperation against the Bolsheviks and Poland's support for Ukraine's independence. This research is a study of political thought, not a study of the politics of Whites, although the latter is undoubtedly an important context.
Review of Previous Research
The relations of the White movement with Poland have been partially examined by Vasili Tsvetkov.7 The Ukrainian question in Vrangel's policy is covered in Anna Procyk's monograph,8 which briefly considers the policy of the Russian Army on the Polish-Ukrainian offensive against the Bolsheviks. The relations between Poland and the White movement are studied in detail and thoroughly in the monograph of Adolf Juzwenko, which, despite its antiquity, does not lose its relevance. However, the events of the Polish-Soviet War were beyond the chronological boundaries of the study.9 Poland's relations with Russia in its three guises—communist, monarchist, and democratic—are covered in Andrzej Nowak's monograph;10 however, chronologically the study does not cover the period of the Polish-Ukrainian Kyiv campaign. The participation of Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian formations on the Polish side in the war of 1920 is covered in the monograph by Zbigniew Karpus.11 However, the attitude of the White Russian émigré to the Polish concept of support for the UPR has not previously been the subject of a separate study.
The Russian-Polish-Ukrainian encounter in 1920
The national program of the Whites included in Russia not only the former lands of the Russian Empire but also the Ukrainian territories formerly owned by Austria-Hungary. Based on the logic that the Ukrainian nation did not exist, but there were only Little Russians, Russian leaders postulated that Russia extended as far as the eastern Polish ethnic border.
As Polish emigrant historian Marian Dziewanowski aptly noted, Denikin was willing to negotiate with Galician Ukrainians, who were former citizens of Austria-Hungary and whom he considered a branch of the Russian people, but refused to negotiate with Petliura, whom he considered a “Russian subject,” and accordingly a rebel.12
The attitude of the White movement to the Ukrainian question was clearly stated at the Jassy Conference13 held between November 16 and 23, 1918. While power in Ukraine belonged to Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyi, who had the image of a Russophile, the Russian delegates hoped for a peaceful evolution of relations with Ukraine until its full return to Russia. For the same reason, Russian emigrants initially actively supported Ukrainians in their conflict with Poles over Galicia.14
However, after the anti-Hetman uprising and the Directory coming to power, the Russians became concerned. On November 19, the text of an address to the Entente was adopted in Jassy, which strongly condemned “Ukrainian nationalist elements” and rejected the possibility of even tactical cooperation with the UPR. Thus, from the very beginning, Russian politicians, as if “by default,” rejected the idea of a joint struggle with the Ukrainians against the Bolsheviks.15
It showed that the attitude towards “Ukrainianism” was generally worse than that towards Bolshevism. A monarchist and well-known publicist Vasily Shulgin16 in early 1919 in a letter to Vasily Maklakov17 expressed his attitude to this alternative:
The principle—United Russia—is to some extent accepted by the Bolsheviks, who recently expelled all sorts of Mazepists from Kyiv. Please do not think that we Kyivans are very upset. On the contrary, we definitely prefer the Bolsheviks to the Ukrainians, because Ukrainians are the same as the Bolsheviks, [. . .] but with the free addition of the cursed Ukrainian language [. . .]. Therefore, if we are going to be saved from the Bolsheviks with the help of Ukrainians, we categorically refuse.18
The question of the indivisibility of Russia also dominated the question of the struggle against the Bolsheviks in the view of Petr Savitskii,19 the future founder of the ideology of Eurasianism. He called all separatist movements within the territory of the former empire “curs of the revolution.” Savitskii considered Ukrainians the most dangerous of all.20 In 1919, after the first Polish-Ukrainian contacts, he wrote that “Poland must give up interest in Petliura's ‘Ukraine.’”21 Independent Ukraine, according to him, can exist only as an artificial formation of foreign imperialisms. If Poland helps to “evoke its spirit,” it commits the most serious crime, for which it will undoubtedly pay.22 At the end of April, Petr Struve23 invited Savitskii to his ministry. He held the position of Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs and Head of the Economics Department in Vrangel's government.
Arnold Margolin,24 a Ukrainian diplomat, described the understanding of Ukraine, and most importantly of Russia itself, by the Russian elites. At a peace conference in Paris in 1919, he proposed to Aleksandr Kerenskii,25 Vasilii Maklakov, and Nikolai Avksent'ev26 a draft treaty between Great Russia, Ukraine, Don, Kuban, and other territories of the Russian Empire. It turned out that there was no Russian who would agree to represent only Great Russia.27
After Denikin's defeat, some Russian politicians recognized as a mistake the intransigence toward Poland and began to seek an understanding with it. Boris Savinkov28 and Nikolai Chaikovskii,29 members of the Russian Political Conference in Paris (RPC), saw this as the last chance to save the anti-Bolshevik cause. Savinkov and Chaikovskii considered the demand for recognition of Ukraine to be the most difficult in negotiations with Józef Piłsudski. They argued that even among liberal Russian parties, there was a belief that the maximum concession on the part of Russia would be to grant Ukrainian lands autonomy, but on the condition “sine qua non” that Ukraine would remain a part of Russia. After the first conversations among Russian emigrants, Savinkov was convinced that it would be difficult for him to find broad support for his initiatives. Although he managed to find several like-minded people, according to Savinkov himself, among Russian anti-Bolshevik figures there was a belief that he and Chaikovskii wanted to sell Russia to the Poles. Some believed that in this situation it was better to support the Bolsheviks.30
Savinkov's initiative, in particular, was highly criticized by the Russian ambassador to Washington, Boris Bakhmeteff,31 who considered external interference in Russia's civil war to be highly undesirable.32 He predicted that if Poland intervened, the Bolshevik struggle “would have the task of preserving Russia's unity, which would unite, at least initially, reactionary and military elements.”33 Instead, another member of the RPC and former Russian ambassador to Paris, Vasilii Maklakov, supported Chaikovskii and Savinkov. Otherwise, he believed, Whites would have to accept complete defeat.34
The conclusion of the Polish-Ukrainian treaty of April 21, 1920, the recognition of the UPR, and the joint march on Kyiv without the consent of the Russian Army in Crimea significantly changed the situation in the Polish-Ukrainian-Russian triangle and caused serious concern to the Russians. Maklakov wrote to Bakhmeteff that “[t]he march of the Poles on Volhynia and Podillya and their agreement with Petliura are the main facts of the [present] moment and bring the issue to another plane than the one on which we discussed it with you.”35
Russian public opinion reacted to the joint Polish-Ukrainian offensive on Kyiv as somewhat confused, but rather hostile. In May, Sofiyskaya Gazeta reported on the signing of a Polish-Ukrainian agreement and its basic terms.36 The newspaper argued that Poland's war against the Bolsheviks could only arouse the sympathy of the Russians when it was waged jointly with Russia and not against it. Another article expressed the desire for friendly Polish-Russian relations, but at the same time, it noted that only a united and strong Russia could be a faithful ally for Poland.37 Manuil Margulies,38 acquainted with the most influential members of the White movement, including Maklakov, wrote in his diary on May 11, 1920 about the Polish-Ukrainian offensive on Kyiv: “Judging by the ‘Poslednie Novosti,’ the attitude of Russian circles in Paris fluctuates—all want someone to finish off the Bolsheviks at any cost, but at the same time it is scary to recognize ‘Ukraine’: isn't it better to suffer a few years, but then the Bolsheviks could unite the whole of Russia.”39
From the very beginning of the Kyiv offensive, Russian public opinion was concerned with a fundamental question: Does Poland wage war against Bolsheviks or Russia as such? Therefore, a fundamentally important criterion was Polish attitude to the Ukrainian issue. The Polish-Ukrainian Alliance convinced many that the Poles were indeed at war with Russia.
Virtually all Russians reacted to Polish aid to Ukraine as external aggression and support for Ukrainian “separatism.” The leader of the Russian Kadets, Pavel Milyukov,40 was very disapproving of the Polish-Ukrainian agreements and the march on Kyiv. Poland's goal, in his opinion, was to fragment Russia. “This goal probably caused Poland not to support White armies in the fight against the Bolsheviks. Poland has started a rather dangerous game. Of course, no Russian with common sense can accept the Polish demands of restoration of the borders of 1772.”41 One of Russia's most influential émigré newspapers, Poslednie Novosti, noted that Russians could not have a common language with a government that supported separatist aspirations on Russia's outskirts. Citing an unnamed “leading politician,” the newspaper did not rule out the possibility of cooperating with Poland, provided the latter stopped the “independent comedy.”42
The newspaper that best represented the irreconcilable anti-Bolshevik position abroad was the Parisian Obschee Delo, headed by its editor, Vladimir Burtsev.43 Although the newspaper was not an official one of the Russian Army, it received subsidies and, in fact, reflected the position of the Sevastopol government.44 The newspaper strongly condemned the Ukrainian-Polish campaign of 1920. On May 16, when the Bolshevik troops had already left Kyiv, Burtsev wrote: “With pain in our hearts, we now read news from southern Russia. The Poles together with Petliura have occupied Kyiv.”45 Emphasizing the benevolent attitude of Russian democracy to Polish independence, Burtsev assumed that Poland was going to make a huge historical mistake and “in alliance with the so-called ‘Hetman’ Petlura, one of the most disgusting modern bandits, it dared to strike at shabby and ruined Russia.”46
According to Burtsev, the creation of an independent Ukraine, which was supported by Poland, was a “dismemberment” of Russia. He tried to convince the public opinion that an alliance with Vrangel’ was better for Poland than an alliance with Petliura. These two opportunities for him were entirely mutually exclusive. He declared that Russia favored an alliance with Poland, but only on the condition that Warsaw did not act together with Petliura. He advised Poland to “forget forever” Petliura and go “towards a free, democratic Russia.”47 The support of Ukrainian independence for Burtsev was not only harmful to the interests of the Russian people but also degraded the dignity of Russia.
Like most Russians, Burtsev did not believe in the prospects of forming an independent Ukrainian state. In his opinion, it was beyond the power of Poland to “dismember” Russia. Instead, the support of Ukrainian separatists would deepen the gap between Poland and Russia because Polish actions were directed against Russia, and not against the Bolsheviks. Like Savitskii, Burtsev also emphasized that by supporting Ukraine's aspirations, Poland was making “a grave historical mistake—first and foremost against itself.”48
Convinced of the temporary nature of Russia's weakness, he angrily predicted that Polish victories near Kyiv would not give anything to the Poles but would cost them dearly in the future. V. Burtsev even peculiarly threatened Poland. He stressed that Ukraine would eventually remain with Russia and “there will be no Petlurists there.49 [. . .] So let no one try to dismember Russia! She will not forgive anyone when she is strong again.”50
Nevertheless, not everyone was convinced of Poland's hostile intentions. Savinkov believed that the support of the Ukrainian People's Republic was Poland's response to the Russians’ intransigence, which forced Piłsudski to take such a step.51 General Aleksandr Kutepov52 reported to Prince Georgy Lvov53 (a member of the RPC in Paris) that Piłsudski was trying to convince Savinkov that Poland's war against the Bolsheviks was not a war against Russia, and that the Polish-Ukrainian treaty was situational, and the Ukrainian question should be resolved at the Ukrainian constituent assembly.54 However, it seems that none of the leading Russian politicians except Savinkov believed in these explanations.
Bakhmeteff believed that the Polish attack on Kyiv with Petliura (whom Bakhmeteff called the new “False Dmitry-Petliura”) revealed the true essence of Polish politics. It had become clear, in his opinion, that the Polish negotiations with the Bolsheviks and the anti-Bolsheviks had a secret purpose: to implement long-term plans to create a system of Polish-dependent states under Polish protectorate. The last two weeks, he believed, had shown that Polish action was directed not just against the Bolsheviks, but against Russia.55 On June 8, Bakhmeteff issued a memorandum to the US Secretary of State entitled “Polish aggression against Russia.” In this memorandum, he argued that the Polish campaign went far beyond Polish ethnic borders. B. Bakhmeteff equated the formation of Ukraine “at Russian cost” to the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty. The offensive against Bolshevism, in his opinion, served only to cover up the real intentions. Bakhmeteff called Poland's eastern policy a threat to peace and democracy in Europe and appealed to the international community to restrain Poland and force it to abandon its political ambitions beyond the eastern ethnographic border.56
One of the most stubborn critics of Polish eastern policy was Aleksandr Kerenskii. In the book Izdaleka57 [From afar, 1922], which is a collection of his newspaper publications, he sharply criticized Poland, and Piłsudski personally, and called Polish policy towards Ukraine an intrigue.58 He stressed that Poland was pursuing not an anti-Bolshevik, but an anti-Russian policy aimed at dismembering it. He also categorically opposed Polish-Russian cooperation, criticizing Savinkov for his contacts with Piłsudski.59Kerenskii repeatedly emphasized that the Polish support for the “separatist Petliura” was an imperialistic policy. He also criticized Vrangel's government for trying to establish contacts with the UPR.60Kerenskii claimed that it was “dangerous to build one's relations with a great nation on ‘empty dreams’ and embark on dubious adventures.”61 In conclusion, he advised Poland not to “summon the spirit of a new partition.”62
The signing of the Polish-Ukrainian treaty on April 21,1920, did not come as a surprise to Vrangel’. Volunteer Army intelligence had been aware of this possibility since the fall of 1919 and regularly reported on negotiations during the winter.63 The attitude to these negotiations was not friendly. However, Vrangel’ was somewhat more flexible on the Ukrainian question than his predecessor, Denikin. He called for the uniting of all anti-Bolshevik forces and criticized Denikin's previous national policy for its intransigence on national movements. Although the Russians were hostile to Polish actions in Ukraine, the Polish-Ukrainian Kyiv offensive was tactically beneficial to the Russian Army, as it partly took away Bolshevik troops from Vrangel's front. According to Maklakov, the political situation forced them not to protest against the Polish-Ukrainian campaign and not to promote its defeat, but only to state the main provisions that this part of the land was Russian and that the “Ukrainian separatism” was a foreign invention.64 Also, Maklakov expected that Poland's seizure of Ukraine would provoke anti-Polish sentiments within the population, which could later be used to benefit the Russian Army. In his opinion, it was possible to tactically cooperate with Poland, “ignoring what it did with Petliura.”65 He noted that he would like the Poles’ victory over the Bolsheviks because when Russia got rid of the latter, “the question of what they [the Poles] captured from us would be put in line and then the injustices could be corrected.”66
However, the head of the foreign ministry Petr Struve had another view. He considered the Polish-Soviet War an interethnic Polish-Russian conflict, so “national Russia” in the person of Vrangel’ could not take a position other than neutrality.67 Officially, no alliance agreement was signed between Poland and the Russian Army.
With regard to relations between Poland and the Ukrainian People's Republic, the Russian press mainly emphasized the Polish-Ukrainian alliance's fictitiousness and the sham role of Ukrainian troops. For example, Obschee Delo noted that Poles did not have enough Ukrainians even to be appointed to positions in the administration of Kyiv.68Poslednie Novosti wrote that the Ukrainian army did not exist, and the civilian administration of the city was, in fact, under Polish control.69
The joint Polish-Ukrainian campaign on Kyiv gave the Bolsheviks a national aura. They actively used this in propaganda. The most striking symbol of this was the appeal of the former Chief of Staff of the Russian Empire, Alexei Brusilov,70 who called on all White officers to stand up for the homeland and support the Bolsheviks. Brusilov's address referred to traditional Russian patriotism and portrayed the Polish-Soviet War as a patriotic war, and the Bolsheviks as defenders of the homeland. He later recalled: “I thought that as long as the Bolsheviks guard our former borders, as long as the Red Army does not allow Poles into former Russia, I will be with them along the way. They will perish, and Russia will remain.”71 When Soviet troops were near Warsaw, some Russian politicians wanted the Bolsheviks to be victorious over Poland.72 Russian diplomat Georgiy Mikhailovskii73 mentioned that the sympathy of the members of the Russian mission in Warsaw was on the side of the Bolsheviks.74 Bakhmeteff, in a letter to Maklakov dated July 20, claimed that the Red Army owed its victory to the national upsurge caused by the Polish invasion in Russia.75
Press close to the Sevastopol government tried to oppose this view. Some newspapers published an open letter from Russian officers to Brusilov that condemned any aid to the Bolsheviks and argued that the issue of borders was of secondary importance compared to the issue of “restoring a free Russia.”76 However, there was no influential military among the signatories.
The Sevastopol government realized that in the event of Warsaw's defeat, the Russian Army would have no chance of continuing the struggle against the Bolsheviks. In mid-July, when the situation was very threatening for Poland, Burtsev published an article entitled “Spasite Polshu!” [Save Poland!]. He called on the Allies to help Poland defend its independence and suggested forgetting the recent Kyiv campaign and support for the UPR as an unfortunate confusion: “Poland, of course, made a mistake. However, this country is still so young, [. . .]. It was natural that instead of listening to Russian patriots’ voice, it was seduced by the bizarre promises of the adventurer Petliura, and allowed itself to come to Kyiv, not as an ally of Russia, but its enemy.”77 In an instructive tone, he noted that Russia, despite its recent Polish gamble, was still “with Poland” these days, and called the world to help it. However, he added that fair conditions should accompany assistance: “Poland must fight the Bolsheviks without a secret intention to dismember Russia. [. . .] and the Poles must ally with the real enemies of the Bolsheviks—Russian patriots.”78 According to Burtsev, only such an alliance could ensure the defeat of the Bolsheviks and the salvation of Poland and Russia. Another publication noted that even the implacable enemies of the Bolsheviks among Russians could not ally with Poland. A situation where there were no agreements between Poland and the Russian Army, but there was an agreement between Poland and the UPR, indicated Poland's intention to “dismember” Russia. “This puts us, the Russian anti-Bolshevik democrats, in a hopeless situation. Although we cannot wish the Bolsheviks victory over Poland, we cannot support Poland in its hostile claims towards Russia's interests and integrity. Only Poles can find a way out of this situation by changing their attitude,”79 wrote Obschee Delo in mid-July.
As a part of this campaign Russian press close to Vrangel’ argued that Petliura had no support in Ukraine and could not represent the Ukrainian people. Instead, the Russophile Ukrainian federalist Serhii Morkotun,80 whom Obschee Delo portrayed as a spokesman of the majority of Ukrainians’ opinion, was advancing. He assured readers in the pages of the Russian newspaper that most Ukrainians wanted a federation with Russia.81 This campaign was aimed at persuading Poland to abandon support for the UPR and agree to resolve the Ukrainian issue in the Russian version. In his public statements, Struve signaled the possibility of an agreement with Poland. In late July, he claimed that Poland was at war with the Bolsheviks, not with Russia as such, so in fact, Poland and Vrangel’ were allies.82Obschee Delo stressed the need for an agreement between the Russian Army in Crimea and Poland.83
Arnold Margolin mentioned that Struve had declared the readiness of the federation of the peoples of Russia as equals at the beginning of the summer when Polish and Ukrainian troops were in Kyiv. Nevertheless, in Spa, when the situation changed to the detriment of Poles and Ukrainians, he was not so compliant.84 The highest readiness for dialogue among Russian figures in Spa was demonstrated by the Minister of War of the Provisional Government Aleksandr Guchkov.85 He stated to Margolin that he did not mind the independence of Ukraine. However, his liberal views on the Ukrainian issue were superficial. According to him, the Ukrainian people would then undoubtedly voluntarily join the federation with the Great Russian.86
The defeat of the Red Army near Warsaw caused a surge of optimism among the Whites. In early September, Obschee Delo wrote that “the defeat of the Bolsheviks in Poland could soon turn into a general catastrophe for them.”87 Burtsev, contrary to his previous assertions, insisted that this war was not Polish-Russian, but only Polish-Bolshevik, because the Bolsheviks did not represent Russia.
Pavel Milyukov, the Russian Kadets’ leader, described the moral dilemma of the White Russians very clearly: “Polish tactics of the last offensive put patriotic anti-Bolshevik Russia in a very challenging position. On the one hand, fighting the Red Army, Poles were natural allies of all Russian anti-Bolshevik forces. On the other hand, no Russian, Bolshevik, or anti-Bolshevik could recognize Poland's claims to Russia. No matter what ‘democratic’ arguments these claims are covered up.”88 Milyukov, predicting the further success of the Polish army (then still waiting for the war to continue and not knowing that the Polish-Bolshevik armistice would be signed in just a month), expressed concern that the Russians would again “feel a terrible emotional split.” Convinced of the fallacy of the previous course of action in support of the UPR, Milyukov worried whether the Poles had learned the “tragic lesson.”89
In early September 1920, a special meeting took place in Sevastopol, where a resolution was adopted on the evaluation of Polish policy. It stated that Piłsudski's strategy on the Russian question was guided by aggressive considerations and had the goal of dismembering Russia. For that purpose, “Petliura was put on the stage.”90
In October 1920, P. Struve publicly stated that he expected Poland to continue the war against the Bolsheviks at the front, which would correspond to the Polish ethnographic border. He threatened serious complications if Polish troops advanced far into Russian territory and stressed that the Russian Army in Crimea was ready to make serious concessions but only if they did not contradict the “inviolable basis of Russian unity.”91
The Ukrainian Question—A Russian Solution
Concluding that it was impossible to ignore the Ukrainian question anymore, the Whites also decided to play the Ukrainian question. Back in March, Maklakov had expressed the idea of using “Russophile Ukrainians.”92 Margulies noted in his diary that, according to Maklakov, in Sevastopol they understood that without the abandonment of imperialistic claims, there would be no possibility of saving Russia. Vrangel’ was ready to go to any federation, as well as his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Struve. The latter asked Maklakov to “grope” Ukrainians in this purpose.93Maklakov, however, was unsure which Ukrainians to negotiate with: either with Mykhailo Tyshkevych,94 as a representative of Petliura, or with Serhii Morkotun's opposition group. It was decided that the unpopularity of Poles in Ukraine would make Petliura, as the author of the agreement with Poland, unpopular among Ukrainians. Markotun's group was to take advantage of this and take power.95 Federal views, according to Margulies, were rising among the Russian Kadets. On 26 May 1920, Margulies met Morkotun. He made a vague impression on him.96
Nevertheless, the Whites still tried to play the card of Morkotun. During the Spa conference on July 5–16, 1920, ObscheeDelo described him as a representative of the Ukrainian National Committee at the conference. It was stressed that his party did not want the separation of Ukraine from Russia, but rather autonomy within Russia.97
Journalist and military correspondent Georgiy Rakovskii, who was then in the Crimea, noted that the need to rely on organized Ukrainian forces was obvious to the Whites, so, in late summer 1920, the Ukrainian question was central to Sevastopol. Vrangel’, Struve, and Krivoshein,98 Rakovskii noted, “federated” with Morkotun.99
In September 1920, Maklakov wrote to Bakhmeteff about Vrangel's plans for the Ukrainian question: “Now Vrangel’ subscribes to Morkotun and Mohylyansky100 as representatives of Ukrainians, and they [the Sevastopol government] are not far from reconciling with the remnants of the Petliurists, on the condition of excluding Petliura [. . .] and renouncing separatism.”101 In early September, a delegation of the Ukrainian National Committee arrived at Sevastopol. It was met with great pomp, and the visit was widely covered in the press affiliated with the Crimean authorities.102
Morkotun argued in the Russian press that “[t]he failures of the Polish adventure in Kyiv had a fatal effect on the Petliurist movement.”103 He tried to discredit Petliura personally and the Polish-Ukrainian Alliance. Speaking on behalf of all Ukrainians, he supported the official Russian line and called on Poland to renounce support for the UPR.104
But Russian attempts to gain influence in Ukraine with the help of the federalists, led by Morkotun, did not yield noticeable results. These plans looked like a tactical move. As Sergei Stern105 noted (a Kadet, during 1920–1921, and an employee of Obschee Delo), Struve, known for his Ukrainophobic views, despite his talks about the federation with Ukraine, only planned to use Ukrainians as a military force. These conversations lacked sincerity, so they did not inspire confidence in Ukrainian circles.106Milyukov was of the same opinion. He believed that all the liberal slogans of Vrangel’ were only a means, not an aim. Therefore, from his “reassessment of values” emerged the previous right psychology.107Milyukov believed that just the name of the centralist and Great Russian nationalist Struve destroyed faith in the sincerity of federalist plans. The far-right tone of the Russian press did not contribute to Russian-Ukrainian friendship either.108 At the end of October, Maklakov admitted his mistake in betting on pro-Russian Ukrainians. According to him, the Ukrainians were the only nationality it made sense to negotiate with, but it was most difficult to reach an agreement with them. Vrangel's attempts to reach an agreement with those Ukrainians who “did not renounce Russia,” Morkotun and Mohylyansky, showed that they had no support and could not provide any assistance. However, the very fact of their reception in the Crimea made a bad impression on the supporters of Petliura, who, according to Maklakov, was the only one to have had real support in Ukraine. The Russians’ prediction of growing anti-Polish sentiment in Ukraine and, as a result, Petliura's declining influence did not materialize. Also, Maklakov stressed that “Piłsudski did not break with him,” “and Piłsudski means money, weapons, and rear.”109
After the signing of the armistice between Poland and the Bolsheviks on 12 October, the search for an ally became especially relevant for the Russian Army. The Polish authorities put pressure on the Russian delegate in Warsaw, Petr Makhrov,110 to conclude an agreement with the Ukrainian People's Republic. Polish aid depended on this. The Sevastopol government refused to recognize Ukraine's right to independence almost until the end of its existence. Even in late October, Struve told the press: “We are ready to give Ukrainians, as well as other Russian inhabitants of non-Russian origin, a lot, an awful lot, but within the Russian state.”111 Only on November 2, Makhrov received a telegram from Struve. He got permission for an agreement with the Ukrainian People's Republic and consent that the Ukrainian constituent assembly would decide the future of Ukraine. However, this agreement was never concluded. Almost immediately after this telegram, Makhrov received a telegram from Istanbul about the Russian Army's collapse and evacuation from the Crimea.112 Thus, representatives of the mainstream of the Russian White movement had consistently avoided recognizing Ukraine's independence. The events of the Polish-Soviet War, the Polish-Ukrainian alliance, and the desperate situation of the Russian Army forced some concessions, but no further than a federation within Russia.
Third Russia of Boris Savinkov
The Polish authorities, seeing the pertinacity of the Whites, considered Savinkov the most appropriate counterpart for the negotiations. In turn, Savinkov, realizing the impossibility of continuing the struggle without Polish support, became increasingly independent of the rest of the Russian emigration. In the spring of 1920, the Russian Political Committee in Poland was established. Headed by Savinkov, it was practically the independent center of the anti-Soviet struggle. In its program brochure, the concept of a “Third” Russia was interpreted as follows: “Tsarist Russia has perished irretrievably, it cannot be resurrected. Bolshevik Russia will perish, it must not exist. There will be a new, ‘Third’ Russia, a democratic, peasant, free Russia, not oppressing and living in harmony with its neighbors.”113 Savinkov stressed that Russia could not be revived by the Great Russian forces alone.114 From July 1920, he was in Warsaw, actively involved in the creation of a military formation in Poland, which was called the Third Russian Army.115
The position of the Russian Political Committee in Poland was represented by the Warsaw newspaper Svoboda (after 1921, Za Svobodu!) with Dmitry Filosofov116 as editor-in-chief. Unlike the rest of the press, Svoboda from the very beginning of the Polish-Soviet War argued that Poland was not fighting Russia, but the Bolsheviks, and criticized the thesis about the Bolsheviks as “gatherers of Russia.”117
It was proposed that the fate of Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine should be decided through the constituent assembly of these countries.118 That newspaper emphasized the kinship of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples, and expressed skepticism about the pro-independence sentiments of the Ukrainian population.119Savinkov understood the impossibility of ignoring the national question and believed that Denikin's concept of the restoration of Russia had become obsolete and insisted on another, free unification of the peoples of the former Russian Empire.120 He believed that only the excessive centralization of tsarist Russia pushed the non-Russian peoples away from the center. If these peoples did not experience any coercion, they would willingly ally with Russia. “I do not believe,” wrote B. Savinkov, “that there will be at least one person among the ‘independents’ [samostiyniki] who, choosing between a free agreement with a democratic and robust ‘Third’ Russia and the ‘independence’ of his geographically limited and geographically dependent homeland, will choose hostility to Moscow and uncompromising ‘independence.’”121 Savinkov believed that the “independent misunderstanding” would disappear if Russia was restored as a union of free peoples.122 Declaring its commitment to the principle of self-determination of peoples, Svoboda also insisted that “an independent Ukraine will necessarily come to an agreement with Russia in its own interests.”123
However, the Polish newspaper Naród acrimoniously criticized this view. The editorial expressed disappointment with the representatives of the “Third” Russia. “And what is left of the ideological coup we sought among the representatives of the broad Russian democracy? [. . .]. It is only a tactical move.”124 In response to criticism, Savinkov explained that he acknowledged the right of peoples to self-determination unconditionally. However, he believed that if the Russians stopped encroaching on other people's rights, Russia would recover “by itself” through an equal agreement between Moscow and individual states. “It cannot but be restored, because both economic and cultural mutual attraction is so irresistibly great that all former insults and differences will dissolve.”125
Under the pressure of circumstances in November 1920, the Russian Political Committee in Poland, headed by Savinkov, recognized the independence of the UPR.126 According to the signed agreement, the Third Russian Army under the command of Boris Permykin127 was operatively subordinated to the Ukrainian command. After joint actions with the Ukrainian troops against the Bolsheviks in November, the Third Russian Army moved to Poland, where it was interned, as was the Ukrainian. After Savinkov's arrest in 1924, Dmitry Filosofov with his Za Svobodu! remained a spokesman of relatively democratic Russian thought. After Petliura's assassination in 1926, Za Svobodu! published an obituary. In friendly intonations, it emphasized Petliura's uncompromising struggle against the Bolsheviks and faithfulness to alliance with Poland.128Filosofov called for a reconsideration of the Russian principle of “indivisibility.” He drew attention to the fact that Russians “need to see more clearly not only other people's chauvinism but also their own.”129 Nevertheless, this political group remained on the sidelines of Russian public opinion.
The “Change of Signposts” or the Smenovekhovtsy
If one part of the Russian anti-Bolsheviks, seeing the hopelessness of the situation, was ready to compromise with the non-Russian peoples of the empire, the other part began to perceive the Bolsheviks as national representatives of Russia. Such sentiments were even in an environment close to Vrangel’. For example, Petr Savitskii, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, emphasized in a letter to Struve that the Bolsheviks had already gathered nine tenths of the territory of the former empire and that the failure of the war with Poland was temporary and could soon change.130 While the newspaper Svoboda wrote that Bolshevik Russia was not real Russia, on the other side of the continent, in Harbin, a new direction of political thought had emerged—the “Change of Signposts” movement or the Smenovekhovtsy, which later grew into the National Bolsheviks. Its founder was a Russian philosopher, Nikolai Ustryalov,131 former head of the press bureau in the government of Kolchak. In his view, the Bolsheviks, despite international slogans, represented the Russian national power and were the only force capable of reviving Russia's greatness.
“The anti-Bolshevik movement,” Ustryalov noted, “due to the circumstances became too attached to foreign elements, and this involuntarily surrounded Bolshevism with a kind of national halo [. . .].”132 Ustryalov admired how the Bolsheviks subjugated the non-Russian peoples, which he considered a continuation of imperial policy. The most significant impetus and catalyst for such a change in attitude toward the Bolsheviks was the Polish-Soviet War and Polish support for Ukrainian independence. Ustryalov dedicated his collection of articles, “In the Struggle for Russia,” to Brusilov for his appeal to unite around the Bolsheviks to repel the Poles; Ustryalov called this appeal a “patriotic position.” He even criticized Vrangel’ for continuing the struggle against the Bolsheviks during the war with Poland. Ustryalov compared Vrangel’ to Brutus and criticized Struve for entering into negotiations “even with Petliura.”133
Ustryalov considered the Bolsheviks the only force capable of protecting Russia from disintegration. According to him, if the Bolsheviks lost, “Greater Russia would finally become a mess of ‘liberated nationalities,’ ‘independent Ukraine,’ and ‘free Caucasus’ in the south, ‘Greater Poland’ and a dozen ‘smaller’ nationalities in the west.”134 In May 1920, Ustryalov claimed that if the Poles had wanted to overthrow the Bolsheviks, they would have helped A. Denikin during his offensive in 1919, but deliberately had not done so. Instead, Poland was playing a “comedy of Ukrainian independence. ”135 In his opinion, this argument left no doubt that this war was a matter not only for the Soviet government but for the whole of Russia. Ustryalov warned Poland against damaging relations with its neighbors—Russia and Germany—which could lead to future problems.136
Aleksandr Bobrishchev-Pushkin137 shared Ustryalov's arguments. In his opinion, the support for Ukrainian independence was the most convincing proof that Poland was seeking to weaken and dismember Russia.138Bobrishchev-Pushkin believed that Vrangel's Russian Army should cease hostilities against the Bolsheviks until they dealt with the external enemy.139 If not the Bolsheviks, “Poles would have remained in Kyiv, and an ‘independent Ukraine’ would have been given to Petliura,” Bobrishchev-Pushkin emphasized.140 He stressed that the Soviet government had “reunited” the rejected parts of Russia, “starting with Ukraine and ending with Georgia.”141 Thus, the argument about the national character of the Bolsheviks Bobrishchev-Pushkin built on the example of the Polish-Soviet War.
Sergei Chakhotin142 also called for an end to the struggle against the Bolsheviks. If the Bolsheviks were gathering and strengthening Russia, he believed, they should receive support from the patriotic intelligentsia.143
Although the Smenovekhovtsy did not have a very decisive influence on the White Russian emigration, the views they expressed were widespread. Eventually, even Maklakov, in a letter to Bakhmeteff in December 1920, stated that the Bolsheviks were pursuing a Russian national policy.144 Thus, among a particular part of the Russian emigration, Russia's indivisibility was an essential postulate. Thanks to the policy of unification of the former provinces of the Russian Empire, the Bolsheviks acquired the image of Russian national power. The Polish-Ukrainian alliance and the joint attack on Kyiv, which provided for the restoration of independent Ukraine, which for many Russians seemed an absolute catastrophe, became the most significant impetus for the crystallization of these views.
After the Peace of Riga
The Polish-Soviet War ended with the Peace of Riga, signed on 18 March 1921. Poland recognized the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic and pledged not to support anti-Soviet formations. The treaty of Riga practically annulled the Polish-Ukrainian treaty of April 21,1920. After an unsuccessful attempt at an independent campaign against the Bolsheviks, Ukrainian and Russian troops, who returned to Poland, were interned. Under the terms of the agreement, the Polish-Soviet border passed almost in the same place as the Polish-Ukrainian border by the agreement of April 21,1920. It was close to the line of the second partition of Poland in 1793. Russian emigration had a very negative perception of this line of the border and the Peace of Riga in general. It is worth noting that despite the existence of a separate USSR, Russian emigration perceived the Bolsheviks as a form of Russia.
In the second half of the 1930s, after the publication of Tadeusz Kutrzeba's145 work,146 in which J. Piłsudski's plans for Russia were revealed as transparently as possible, Denikin published his answer entitled “Who saved the Soviet government from destruction?”147 Commenting on Piłsudski's plans to support the UPR, Denikin stated: “Never, of course, will any [emphasized by Denikin—VB] Russia—reactionary, democratic, republican, or authoritarian—allow the separation of the Ukraine. Senseless, unfounded, and incited from the outside the dispute between Moscow Rus’ and Kyivan Rus’ is our internal dispute. This dispute does not concern anyone, and we will resolve it ourselves.”148 A. Denikin believed that the “awakening of national Russia” was taking place in the USSR. Noting that Poland was between a “hammer and an anvil,” Denikin foretold Poland's imminent military catastrophe, which, in his opinion, would be a well-deserved punishment for the defiant policy in 1919‒1920.
Conclusions
The Russian anti-Bolsheviks of the entire political spectrum—from left to right—did not agree to recognize Ukraine even for the sake of cooperation against the Bolsheviks.Unlike many other provinces of the former Russian Empire, the secession of which they could accept, Ukraine was perceived as an absolutely integral part of Russia. Warsaw's support for Ukraine made it impossible for the Russians to cooperate with Poland against the Bolsheviks. Russian emigration saw Polish support for Ukraine as external aggression and an attempt to separate an integral part of Russia. The Bolsheviks proved to be more flexible in this matter, which led to their victory. After all, many White Russians took this fact for granted, satisfying the fact that the Bolsheviks had collected most of the legacy of the former Romanov empire. Thanks to the Polish project to support an independent Ukraine, the Bolsheviks acquired the image of Russia's defenders.
Acknowledgment
The research on which this article is based has been carried out within the framework of the Visegrad Scholarship Program, project number # 51910541.
Notes
Anton Denikin (1872–1947), a Russian Lieutenant General in the Imperial Russian Army, a participant of the Russo-Japanese War and World War I. One of the main leaders of the White movement during the Civil War and its leader in the South of Russia (1918–1920). Since April 1920, an emigrant, one of the main political figures of the Russian emigration. From December 1945 onward, he lived in the United States.
Petr Vrangel (1878–1928) was an officer of Baltic German origin in the Imperial Russian Army, participant of the Russo-Japanese War and World War I. Since November 1920, in exile. Died in Brussels. According to his family, he was poisoned by a Bolshevik agent.
A. I. Miller, “Ukrainskii vopros” v politike vlastei i russkom obshchestvennom mnenii (vtoraia polovina XIX v.) (Sankt-Petersburg: Aleteia, 2000), 39.
Miller, “Ukrainskii vopros,” 40.
Symon Petliura (1879–1926), a statesman and publicist; supreme commander of the Army of the Ukrainian National Republic and president of the Directory of the Ukrainian National Republic. In early 1924, Petliura settled in Paris. He was assassinated by Sholom Schwartzbard.
Józef Klemens Piłsudski (1867–1935) was a Polish statesman who served as the Chief of State (1918–1922) and First Marshal of Poland (from 1920).
V. Zh. Tsvetkov, Beloe delo v Rossii. Formirovanie i evoliutsiia politicheskikh struktur Belogo dvizheniia v Rossii. 1919–1922 gg, Vol. 2. (Moscow: Dostoinstvo, 2016).
Anna Procyk, Russian Nationalism and Ukraine: The Nationality Policy of the Volunteer Army during the Civil War (Edmonton, Alberta: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1995).
Adolf Juzwenko, Polska a “Biała” Rosja: Od listopada 1918 do kwietnia 1920 r. (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1973).
Andrzej Nowak, Polska i trzy Rosje. Studium polityki wschodniej Józefa Piłsudskiego (do kwietnia 1920 r.), 4th ed. (Kraków: Arcana, 2017).
Zbigniew Karpus, Wschodni sojusznicy Polski w wojnie 1920 r.Oddziały wojskowe ukraińskie, rosyjskie, kozackie i białoruskie w Polsce w latach 1919‒1920 (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, 1999).
Marian Kamil Dziewanowski, Josef Pilsudski. A European Federalist (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1969), 259.
The Jassy Conference was a gathering of anti-Bolshevik political figures that met in Jassy (Romania). The conference was organized by French diplomat Emile Henno and was aimed to coordinate the anti-Bolshevik movements in order to facilitate dealings with the Allied powers.
Juzwenko, Polska a “Biała” Rosja, 82.
Nowak, Polska i trzy Rosje, 124.
Vasily Shulgin (1878–1976) born in Kyiv, was a Russian conservative monarchist, politician, and member of the White movement.
Vasily Maklakov (1869 –1957) was a Russian trial lawyer and liberal parliamentary orator, one of the leaders of the Constitutional Democratic Party and Russian Freemasonry.
O. V. Budnitskii, ed., Spor o Rossii: V. A. Maklakov ‒ V. V. Shul'gin. Perepiska, 1919‒1939 (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2012), 43‒50.
Petr Savitskii (1895–1968)—Russian geopolitician, philosopher, public figure, one of the main figures of Eurasianism. Was born in Chernihiv, Ukraine. While still a student, he joined the right wing of the Cadet Party headed by P. B. Struve. In 1919 he joined the volunteer movement of the south of Russia (“Denikinites”). From the very inception of the Eurasian movement, he has been one of its main theoreticians and political leaders.
Cited by Andrzej Nowak, Metamorfozy Imperium Rosyjskiego 1721‒1921. Geopolityka, ody i narody (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2018), 366.
Nowak, Metamorfozy, 366.
Nowak, 367.
Petr Struve (1870–1944) was a Russian political economist, philosopher, and editor. After the Bolshevik revolution, he joined the White movement. Struve represented Gen. Anton Denikin's anti-Bolshevik government in Paris and London in 1919. In early 1920, Struve became Wrangel's foreign minister. From 1920, he lived in exile in Paris, where he was a prominent critic of Russian Communism.
Arnold Margolin (1877–1956) was a lawyer, active participant in Ukrainian and Jewish community, and political affairs. He was an Undersecretary of State of Ukraine and a member of the Ukrainian delegation to the Versailles Peace Conference between 1918 and 1919.
Aleksandr Kerenskii (1881–1970) was a second Minister-Chairman of the Russian Provisional Government. On 7 November, his government was overthrown by the Lenin-led Bolsheviks in the October Revolution. Kerenskii spent the remainder of his life in exile.
Nikolai Avksent'ev (1878–1943) was a leading member of the Russian Socialist-Revolutionary Party (PSR). In September 1918, he was elected chairman of the State Meeting in Ufa and headed the new Provisional All-Russian Government, which united the fragmented anti-Bolshevik governments of eastern Russia. He was overthrown and arrested by the Minister of War, Alexander Kolchak, who proclaimed himself the Supreme ruler of Russia. Avksent'ev settled in Paris and was active in émigré circles and in Freemasonry.
A. D. Margolin, Ukraina i politika Antanty (Zapiski evreia i grazhdanina) (Berlin: S. Efron Publ, 1921), 143.
Boris Savinkov (1879–1925) was a Russian writer and revolutionary, Assistant War Minister (in office from July to August 1917) in the Provisional Government. After the October Revolution he organized armed resistance against the Bolsheviks. Savinkov held various posts in the Russian émigré societies and was Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak's main representative in Paris.
Nikolai Chaikovskii or Tchaikovskii (1851–1926) was a Russian revolutionary. In 1918–1919 he headed the government of the Northern Region in Arkhangelsk. He was also elected member of the Ufa directorate. On January 23, 1919, he left for Paris where he represented the interests of the North Region at the Versailles Conference. He was a member of the “Russian Political Conference” in Paris until its dissolution in February 1921.
Nowak, Polska i trzy Rosje, 457.
Boris Bakhmeteff (1880–1951)—the only ambassador of the Russian Provisional Government to the United States.
O. V. Budnitskii, ed., “Sovershenno lichno i doveritel'no!”: B. A. Bakhmeteff – V. A. Maklakov. Perepiska. 1919‒1951. Vol.1, Avgust 1919 – Oktiabr’ 1921 (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2001), 172.
Budnitskii, “Sovershenno lichno i doveritel'no!,” 166.
Budnitskii, 183‒194.
Budnitskii, 210.
“Petliura i Pol'sha,” Russkaia sofiiskaia gazeta: Nezavisimyi bespart. organ rus. emigrantov v Bolgarii, May 23, 1920, 1.
“S bol'shevikami ili s Rossiei voiuet Pol'sha,” Russkaia sofiiskaia gazeta: Nezavisimyi bespart. organ rus. emigrantov v Bolgarii, May 23, 1920, 1.
Manuil Margulies (1869–1939) was a Russian public and political figure. During the Civil War, he lived in Kyiv, then in Odesa. Participant in the Jassy Conference. He served as Minister of Trade, Industry, Supply, and Health in the North-West government of General N. Yudenich. After the military defeat of the Whites in the North-West of Russia, he emigrated to London, then Berlin, and settled in Paris.
M. S. Margulies, God interventsii. Kniga tret'ia. (Sentiabr’ 1919 – dekabr’ 1920) (Berlin: Izdatel'stvo Z.I. Grzhebina, 1923), 171.
Pavel Milyukov (1859–1943) was a Russian historian and liberal politician. Milyukov was the founder and leader of the Constitutional Democratic party (known as the Kadets). In the Russian Provisional Government, he served as Foreign Minister. In exile, he sought help for the White Movement.
“Miliukov o pol'skom nastuplenii,” Varshavskoe slovo, June10, 1920, 3.
T. E. “Pol'skii krizis i petliurovshchina (iz besedy),” Poslednie novosti, June 13, 1920, 2‒3.
Vladimir Burtsev (1862–1942) was a revolutionary activist, publisher, and editor of several Russian language periodicals. He supported the White Movement of Admiral Kolchak, Anton Denikin, and Petr Vrangel’.
The headquarters of the Government of South Russia was in Sevastopol on the South of Crimea.
V. L. Burtsev, “Ne raschleniaite Rossіi,” Obschee Delo, May 16, 1920, 1.
Burtsev, “Ne raschleniaite Rossіi,” 1.
V. L. Burtsev, “Soiuz s Pol'shei – no na kakikh usloviiakh,” Obschee Delo, June 25, 1920, 1.
Burtsev, “Ne raschleniaite Rossіi,” 1.
Burtsev, 1.
Burtsev, 1.
Budnitskii, “Sovershenno lichno i doveritel'no!” 206.
Aleksander Kutepov (1882–1930), a Russian military leader, active participant in the White movement, monarchist. Participant of the Russo-Japanese War and the First World War.
Prince Georgy Lvov (1861–1925) was a Russian aristocrat, statesman, and the first post-imperial prime minister of Russia, from March 15 to July 20, 1917.
“Depesza gen. Kutiepowa do księcia Lwowa w Paryżu o rozmowie B. Sawinkowa z J. Piłsudskim,” in Sąsiedzi wobec wojny 1920 roku, ed. Janusz Cisek (London: Polska Fundacja Kulturalna, 1990), 105‒106.
Budnitskii, “Sovershenno lichno i doveritel'no!,” 211.
Janusz Cisek, Granice Rzeczypospolitej i konflikt polsko-bolszewicki w świetle amerykańskich raportów dyplomatycznych i wojskowych 1919‒1921 (Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2012), 178.
A. F. Kerenskii, Izdaleka : Sbornik Statei. : (1920–1921 gg.), (Paris : Rus. knigoizd-vo Ia. Povolotskogo i K°, 1922).
Kerenskii, Izdaleka, 104‒106.
Kerenskii, 105.
Kerenskii, 103‒104.
Kerenskii, 104.
Kerenskii, 104. This is an allusion to the partitions of Poland that took place in the late eighteenth century and ended the existence of the Polish state.
Procyk, Russian Nationalism and Ukraine, 152.
Budnitskii, “Sovershenno lichno i doveritel'no!” 209.
Budnitskii, 215‒218.
Budnitskii, 218.
G. N. Mikhailovskii, Zapiski iz istorii rossiiskogo vneshnepoliticheskogo vedomstva. 1914‒1920. Vol. 2. Okt. 1917 g. – Noiab. 1920 g. (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1993), 218‒220.
“Poliaki i Petliura,” Obschee Delo, July 2, 1920, 2.
“Kiev v dni poliakov (iz besedy),” Poslednie Novosti, June 25, 1920, 3.
Alexei Brusilov (1853–1926) was a Russian general most noted for the development of new offensive tactics used in the 1916 Brusilov Offensive.
A. A. Brusilov, Moi vospominaniia (Moscow: Olma-Press, 2004), 271.
A. S. Puchenkov, “Pol'sha i Vrangel’: iz istorii kampanii 1920 goda,” Russian Colonial Studies, no. 2 (2019): 136.
Georgiy Mikhailovskii (Garin-Mikhailovskii) (1890–1946), a Russian lawyer and diplomat. In 1918–1919, he worked in the foreign affairs departments of the White movement: first under A. Denikin, then—under P. Vrangel. In February 1920, he evacuated to Constantinople where he served as a legal adviser to the Russian mission.
Mikhailovskii, Zapiski, 511.
Budnitskii, “Sovershenno lichno i doveritel'no!” 220.
“Otkrytoe pis'mo russkikh ofitserov generalu Brusilovu,” Obschee Delo, July 2, 1920, 2; “Otkrytoe pis'mo russkikh ofitserov gen. A.A. Brusilovu,” Varshavskoe Slovo, June 19, 1920, 1.
V. L. Burtsev, “Spasite Pol'shu!” Obschee Delo, July 16, 1920, 2.
Burtsev, “Spasite Pol'shu!” 2.
“Rossіia i Pol'sha,” Obschee Delo, July 16, 1920, 1.
Serhii Morkotun (1893–1971) in 1918 was the personal secretary of Hetman Pavel Skoropadsky. He opposed the independence of Ukraine, defended the need for its federation with “White” Russia.
“Rossіia i Pol'sha,” 1.
“Beseda s P.V. Struve,” Svoboda, July 27, 1920, 3‒4.
S, “Vnutrenniaia i vneshniaia politika gen. Vrangelia,” Obschee Delo, July 2, 1920, 2.
Margolin, Ukraina i politika Antanty, 241.
Aleksander Guchkov (1862–1936) was a Russian politician, Chairman of the Third Duma and Minister of War in the Russian Provisional Government.
Margolin, Ukraina i politika Antanty, 241.
V.L. Burtsev, “Nachalo kontsa bol'shevikov,” Obschee Delo, September 3, 1920, 1.
P. N. Miliukov, “Pol'sha i Rossiia,” Obschee Delo, September 3, 1920, 1.
Miliukov, “Pol'sha i Rossiia,” 1.
“Soveshchanie po pol's'komu voprosu,” Obschee Delo, September 3, 1920, 1.
“Zaiavlenie P. Struve,” Novoe Varshavskoe Slovo, October 12, 1920, 1.
Budnitskii, “Sovershenno lichno i doveritel'no!” 209.
M. S. Margulies, God interventsii. Kniga tret'ia. (Sentiabr’ 1919 – dekabr’ 1920) (Berlin: Izdatel'stvo Z.I. Grzhebina, 1923), 171.
Mykhailo Tyshkevych (1857–1930) was a count, Ukrainian diplomat, publicist, artist, and philanthropist. A representative of the UPR in the Vatican. On August 22, 1919, he became the head of the Ukrainian mission at the Peace Conference in Paris (after Hryhoriy Sydorenko).
Margulies, God interventsii, 171.
Margulies, 171.
“Markotun v Spa,” Obschee Delo, July 16, 1920, 2.
Aleksander Krivoshein (1857–1921) was a Russian monarchist politician and Minister of Agriculture under Petr Stolypin. In May 1920, he was appointed acting chairman of the Government of the South of Russia formed in Crimea, and since June 1920, chairman of this government and assistant to the commander-in-chief, General P. Vrangel’.
G. N. Rakovskіi, Konets belykh. Ot Dnepra do Bosfora (Vyrozhdenіe, agonіia i likvidatsіia) (Prague: Volia Rossіi, 1921), 132.
Mykola Mohylyansky (1871–1933)—Ukrainian public and statesman, Ukrainian diplomat. During the times of the Ukrainian State from May 20, 1918, he served as an assistant of the Secretary of State.
Budnitskii, “Sovershenno lichno i doveritel'no!” 232.
“Ukrainskie federalіsty i pravitel'stvo gen. Vrangelia,” Obschee Delo, September 3, 1920, 3.
S. K. Markotun, “Pol'sha i Petliurovshchina,” Obschee Delo, September 3, 1920, 3.
Markotun, “Pol'sha i Petliurovshchina,” 3.
Sergei Shtern (1886–1947)—lawyer, journalist, and writer, Russian public figure, was born in Odesa.
S. F. Shtern, V ogne grazhdanskoi voiny: vospominaniia, vpchatleniia, mysli (Paris: Russkoe knigoizdatel'stvo Ia. Povolotskii i Ko., 1922), 177.
P. N. Miliukov, Rossiia na perelome: Bol'shevistskii period russkoi revoliutsii, Vol. 2. Antibol'shevistskoe dvizhenie (Paris: b.i., 1927), 222.
Miliukov, Rossiia na perelome, 223.
Budnitskii, “Sovershenno lichno i doveritel'no!” 263.
Petr Makhrov (1876–1964)—was a Russian lieutenant-general, took part in the Russian-Japanese, First World, and the Civil Wars. On June 16, he was appointed a military representative of the Russian Army to Poland, where he was instructed to form the third Russian Army from the remnants of the White troops located there.
“Obzor pol'skoi pechati. Beseda s P. Struve,” Svoboda, November 10, 1920, 2.
Procyk, Russian Nationalism and Ukraine, 163.
B. V. Savinkov, Na puti k ‘Tret'ei’ Rossii: ‘Za Rodinu i Svobodu’. Sb. statei B. Savinkova s predisloviem i biografiei avtora (Warsaw: Izdanie Russkogo Politicheskogo Komiteta v Pol'she, 1920), 4.
Savinkov, “Na puti k ‘Tret'ei’ Rossii,” 9.
Procyk, Russian Nationalism and Ukraine, 159.
Dmitry Filosofov (1872–1940)—Russian publicist, art and literary critic, religious, public, and political figure. In the 1920s he was one of the leaders of the anti-communist emigration and political columnist.
B.S. [Savinkov B.], “Brusilovskie patrioty,” Svoboda, June 25, 1920, 1.
“Rossiia i Pol'sha,” Svoboda, June 17, 1920, 1.
“Peresmotr vostochnoi programmy,” Svoboda, June 21, 1920, 2.
B. V. Savinkov, “O ‘samostіinosti’ i ‘samostіinikakh’,” Svoboda, August 15, 1920, 1; Savinkov, Na puti k ‘Tret'ei’ Rossii, 31‒35.
Savinkov, “O ‘samostіinosti’ i ‘samostіinikakh,’” 1.
Savinkov, 1.
“Nota Pravitel'stva Ukrainskoi Narodnoi Respubliki. Ot redaktsii,” Svoboda, August 13, 1920, 4.
“Trzecia Rosja,” Naród, August 19, 1920, 2.
B. V. Savinkov, “O ‘samoopredelenii’ narodov,” Svoboda, September 28, 1920, 1.
Margolin, Ukraina i politika Antanty, 376; Procyk, Russian Nationalism and Ukraine, 162.
Boris Permykin (1890–1971)—from August 1920, commander of the third Russian Army with the rank of lieutenant general. At the end of 1920, after the actual cessation of the intensive hostilities of the Soviet-Polish war, Permykin's corps was interned by the Polish authorities in the Szczypiorno camp. After Poland concluded peace with Soviet Russia, Permykin remained in Poland.
“S.V. Petliura,” Za Svobodu! May 28, 1926, 3.
D. V. Filosofov, “Pri osobom mnenii. Uroki Parizhskogo protsessa,” Za Svobodu! November 13, 1927, 2.
Nowak, Metamorfozy Imperium Rosyjskiego 1721‒1921, 390.
Nikolai Ustryalov (1890–1937) was a Russian lawyer, philosopher, and politician. He returned to the USSR. Despite the support of the Soviet regime, in 1937 he was accused of “espionage, counter-revolutionary activities and anti-Soviet agitation” and was shot on the same day.
N. V. Ustryalov, “Patriotica,” in Smena vekh, ed. Iu. V. Kliuchnikov, N. V. Ustryalov, S. S. Luk'ianov, A. V. Bobrishchev-Pushkin, S. S. Chakhotin, and Iu. N. Potekhin (Prague: Tipografiya Otto El'snera v Berline, 1922), 52‒70.
N. V. Ustryalov, V bor'be za Rossiiu. (Sbornik statei), (Kharbin: Okno, 1920); N. V. Ustryalov, “V bor'be za Rossiiu. (Sbornik statei),” Literatura i zhizn,http://dugward.ru/library/ustralov/ustralov_v_borbe_za_rossiu.html. First published in May 1920 in the Harbin newspaper Novosti Zhizni.
Ustryalov, V bor'be za Rossiiu.
Ustryalov, V bor'be za Rossiiu.
Ustryalov, V bor'be za Rossiiu.
Aleksandr Bobrishchev-Pushkin (1875‒1937) was a Russian lawyer and one of the active participants in the “Change of Signposts” movement. In August 1923, he returned to Soviet Russia. Shot on October 27, 1937, in Sandarmokh.
A.V. Bobrishchev-Pushkin, “Novaia vera,” in Smena vekh, ed. Iu. V. Kliuchnikov, N. V. Ustryalov, S. S. Luk'ianov, A. V. Bobrishchev-Pushkin, S. S. Chakhotin, and Iu. N. Potekhin (Prague: Tipografiya Otto El'snera v Berline, 1922), 91‒149.
A.V. Bobrishchev-Pushkin, “Novaia vera,” 139.
A.V. Bobrishchev-Pushkin,140.
A.V. Bobrishchev-Pushkin,141.
Sergei Chakhotin (September 13,1883-December 24, 1973) was a Russian biologist, sociologist, and social activist, socialist. He worked in the propaganda departments of the Volunteer Army under Anton Denikin and the Don Army under Pyotr Krasnov. He left the service of Krasnov when the latter entered into negotiations with the Germans in Ukraine.
S.S. Chakhotin, “V Kanossu!” in Smena vekh, ed. Iu. V. Kliuchnikov, N. V. Ustryalov, S. S. Luk'ianov, A. V. Bobrishchev-Pushkin, S. S. Chakhotin, and Iu. N. Potekhin (Prague: Tipografiya Otto El'snera v Berline, 1922), 150‒166.
Budnitskii, “Sovershenno lichno i doveritel'no!” 299.
Tadeusz Kutrzeba (1886‒1947)—Major General of the Polish Army. In April 1920, as chief of staff of the third Army, he participated in the Kyiv offensive.
Tadeusz Kutrzeba, Wyprawa kijowska 1920 r. (Warsaw: Gebethner i Wolff, 1937).
A. I. Denikin, Kto spas sovetskuiu vlast’ ot gibeli (Paris: Izd. Soiuza Dolbrovol'tsev, 1937).
Denikin, Kto spas sovetskuiu vlast’ ot gibeli, 10.
