Abstract

This article defends Marjorie Suchocki’s position against two main objections raised by David E. Conner. Conner objects that God as a single actual entity (affirmed by Suchocki) must be temporal because there is succession in God’s experience of the world. The reply is that time involves at least two successive occasions separated by perishing, but in God nothing ever perishes. Conner also objects that Suchocki’s personalistic process the-ism is not experiential but is instead theoretical (based on what Whitehead says in Part V of PR) and not definitive. The reply is that his dismissal of Part V of PR is arbitrary, the interpretation of all experience is theoretical, and no metaphysical interpretations are absolutely definitive, including PR as a whole. Also, Conner ignores religious experience.

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