for william james, philosophy is inextricably linked to what he calls temperament. In the first of his Pragmatism lectures, he claims that “the history of philosophy is to a great extent that of a certain clash of human temperaments” (Pragmatism 11), while conceding that this will strike many philosophers as “undignified.” In a similar vein, he elsewhere writes that philosophy seeks “by hard reasoning for results emotionally valuable” (Some Problems of Philosophy 11). It's not hard to see a connection between these two claims: whether a philosophical conclusion is “emotionally valuable” will presumably depend, at least in part, on the reader's temperament. A philosophical work will leave some readers cold while resonating with others; some philosophy will engage one's interest and energy, while other philosophy will seem not so much mistaken as alien, remote from what one might ever find useful, interesting, or enlightening.
James's meta-philosophical...
