This article is the second part of a two-part essay generally contending that pragmatism, as epitomized by Charles Peirce's 1905 essay “What Pragmatism Is” (henceforth WPI), is aptly characterized as transcendental philosophy, and that this reading is particularly illuminating with regard to Peirce's much-vexed 1908 essay “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God” (henceforth NA).1 Part 1 introduced Peirce's metaphysical categories (firstness, secondness, thirdness), characterizing them as capturing, among other things, phenomenological considerations also central for William James's radical empiricism.2 To the extent that Peirce's own approach is thus informed by phenomenological considerations also central for James, Peirce's approach vindicates the idea that the significance of pragmatism depends greatly on what theory of experience is presupposed. In this regard, James and Peirce alike would have us begin by recognizing that the conception of “experience” bequeathed to us by the British empiricists is inadequate.3
Part 1 also...