Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) was one of the most polymathically brilliant scientific thinkers in American history. He was also arguably the first American experimental psychologist, strongly influencing some of the nation’s earliest modern psychology pioneers. Yet partly because of the lasting effects of personal scandals and powerful enemies, he has been almost entirely forgotten by the broader field of psychology. This article aims to briefly reintroduce Peirce as a historically important figure in psychology to a general audience and highlight a few ways in which his trailblazing perspectives point to pervasive deficiencies and opportunities in psychological science. First, his pioneering writings on the economy of research call on us to consider how diminishing returns may plague our research programs, potentially leading to waste of time, money, and intellectual labor in our communities of inquiry. Second, his pragmatic maxim of clarity for intellectual constructs provides a compelling framework in which to understand how jingle and jangle fallacies often undercut the cumulativeness of our field. We contend that Peirce’s work, much of it still unpublished, is a rich resource for psychological scientists across many domains.