ABSTRACT
Over the past several decades there have been robust attempts at crafting descriptions of mind that overcome the legacy of Cartesianism. W. Teed Rockwell puts the body as a nexus of interlocking systems at the center of his account of cognition, effectively dissolving the tie of mind/brain and the problems that follow such an equation. Though Rockwell's project is promising, his phenomenological/Deweyan approach leads him to reject realism and, consequently, to reject an evolutionary role in cognition. On offer is a naturalistic account of mind that begins with the animal embedded in ecosystemic constitutional relations—a zoological account of mind.
naturalistic philosophy of mind, embodied cognition, embedded cognition, W. T. Rockwell, mind and natural selection
Copyright © 2014 by The Pennsylvania State University. All rights reserved.
2014
The Pennsylvania State University
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