In this article I confront and criticize the widespread tendency to ignore, marginalize, or dismiss without serious consideration Nietzsche's psychological hypothesis that a “will to power” is the major motivator of human behavior. I begin by separating Nietzsche's psychological hypothesis from both his occasional cosmological extension of it into an account of all processes in the world and from his power-based theory of value. And I argue that, since the psychological thesis does not depend on the cosmological extension, is more fundamental to Nietzsche's overall project, and is much better supported by Nietzsche's argument, it deserves to be seriously considered on its own merits. Then, I critically consider Robert Solomon's attempts to deny any value at all to the will to power as a general motivational hypothesis and to reinterpret Nietzsche's theory of the will to power in a way that ignores what Nietzsche actually says about it and, moreover, radically undermines its significance.

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