ABSTRACT
India’s spectrum management policies have transitioned from administrative allocation of spectrum to market-based assignment methods through auction, technological neutrality of licenses, and stronger ownership rights. Yet, the mobile service market in India has experienced financial distress, exit of operators, and growing concentration. 5G technologies will require wider access to spectrum resources, capital investment, and business innovation. This article examines how regulatory policies for availability and pricing of spectrum have impacted India’s mobile markets. Based on a comparative analysis of international spectrum policy trends, it concludes that India’s spectrum regime would require essential policy changes to meet the requirements of 5G.
India’s telecommunications reforms in the last decade of the 20th century and the growth of its mobile industry with some of the most competitive prices worldwide are an acknowledged success story. In this period, and continuing into the next 10–20 years, a major transition also took place in the spectrum management system with a movement from administrative allocation of spectrum for restricted use to market-based assignment methods through auction, technological neutrality of licenses, and stronger ownership rights including rights to secondary trading. Yet, the mobile service market in India has exhibited tendencies toward increasing financial distress, exit of operators, and growing concentration. The sector today stands on the threshold of another wave of technological change with the advent of 5G technologies, which will require wider access to spectrum resources, capital investment, and business innovation. The objective of this article is to examine how spectrum policies adopted in the past in India have resulted in the kind of mobile market we see today and the implications it carries for the adoption of 5G technologies and services in India. The analysis proceeds in two parts. First, we examine how regulatory policies that determine the availability and price of spectrum have impacted India’s mobile market structure. Several authors have discussed the effect of spectrum assignment approaches1 and spectrum pricing policies2 on the provision of mobile and broadband services. We base our examination on their findings. Second, we seek to assess through a comparative analysis of data derived from global 5G policy experience, how well spectrum management in India is equipped to deal with the requirements and challenges of the new technologies and services and what changes in the legacy approach may be needed to make it compatible with a swift rollout of 5G. We seek to address the following questions:
What were the factors that affected the structure of mobile markets in India during transition to market-based allocation of spectrum?
What have been the impacts of spectrum availability and pricing policies on financial conditions and competition in India’s mobile sector?
In the light of global experience, how is India’s mobile sector placed in terms of the introduction of 5G technologies and services, and what changes in approach, if any, are required in the spectrum management regime?
The article is organized as follows: Section I provides, as a background, the parametric effects of liberalization on telecom markets in India. Section II describes India’s spectrum policy structure and regime changes that have taken place since sector liberalization. Section III discusses the impact of spectrum availability and pricing policies on current market features of India’s mobile sector. Section IV brings out some of the special spectrum needs of 5G technologies, enlists the spectrum policy changes instituted by four selected countries out of those that are forerunners in 5G adoption and compares the policy position as it exists in India, highlighting the areas in which change in approach and structure may be required. Section V concludes.
Section I: Effects of Liberalization of Telecom Markets in India
A wave of structural change in telecommunications began in the early 1980s in the industrialized world, driven by changes in technology and market demand. By the early 1990s, it had reached several developing countries. Traditional state monopolies gave way to more complex sector structures through commercialization of operations, competition, and private sector participation.3 The Government of India also implemented reforms for transitioning Indian telecommunications from a public sector monopoly to open competition, with concurrent development of an independent regulatory mechanism. The pre-reform situation was characterized by a very low tele-density, poor telecom infrastructure, a restricted portfolio of services, and high prices.4 As licenses were issued and the private sector began to roll out services, there was a dramatic improvement in the state of telecommunications in India. Table 1 depicts the pattern of growth in Indian telecommunications since 1997:
Progress in key telecom market metrics 1997–2021
. | 1997 . | 2002 . | 2007 . | 2021 . |
---|---|---|---|---|
Wireline Subscribers (in millions) | 14.5 | 38.3 | 40.8 | 20.24 |
Wireless Mobile Subscribers (in millions) | 0.3 | 6.7 | 165.1 | 1180.96 |
Total Telephone Subscribers (in millions) | 14.8 | 45.0 | 205.9 | 1201.20 |
Tele-density (%) | 1.6 | 4.3 | 18.2 | 88.17 |
Internet Subscribers (Wireline + wireless) (in millions) | 0.1 | 3.4 | 40.6 | 825.30 |
Broadband Subscribers (in millions) | - | - | 2.3 | 778.09 |
Per Minute Call Charges (in INR) | ||||
Local | 16.8 ($0.40) | 3.1 ($0.07) | 1.0 ($0.02) | } } ~ 0.25 ($0.003) } |
National | 30.0 ($0.71) | 9.8 ($0.23) | 2.4 ($0.06) | |
International | 75.0 ($1.79) | 40.8 ($0.97) | 6.4 ($0.15) | |
Minutes of Wireless Use (per subscriber per month) | - | 215 | 471 | 818 |
Average Revenue per User (in INR per subscriber per month) | - | 811 | 298 | 103.58* |
Foreign Direct Investment in Telecom (in billion INR) | 223.3 | 956.2 | 1181.1 | 2220.73** |
. | 1997 . | 2002 . | 2007 . | 2021 . |
---|---|---|---|---|
Wireline Subscribers (in millions) | 14.5 | 38.3 | 40.8 | 20.24 |
Wireless Mobile Subscribers (in millions) | 0.3 | 6.7 | 165.1 | 1180.96 |
Total Telephone Subscribers (in millions) | 14.8 | 45.0 | 205.9 | 1201.20 |
Tele-density (%) | 1.6 | 4.3 | 18.2 | 88.17 |
Internet Subscribers (Wireline + wireless) (in millions) | 0.1 | 3.4 | 40.6 | 825.30 |
Broadband Subscribers (in millions) | - | - | 2.3 | 778.09 |
Per Minute Call Charges (in INR) | ||||
Local | 16.8 ($0.40) | 3.1 ($0.07) | 1.0 ($0.02) | } } ~ 0.25 ($0.003) } |
National | 30.0 ($0.71) | 9.8 ($0.23) | 2.4 ($0.06) | |
International | 75.0 ($1.79) | 40.8 ($0.97) | 6.4 ($0.15) | |
Minutes of Wireless Use (per subscriber per month) | - | 215 | 471 | 818 |
Average Revenue per User (in INR per subscriber per month) | - | 811 | 298 | 103.58* |
Foreign Direct Investment in Telecom (in billion INR) | 223.3 | 956.2 | 1181.1 | 2220.73** |
Source: Telecom Regulatory Authority of India figures, collated and tabulated5; 2021 figures derived from Telecom Performance Indicators Report, TRAI, for the quarter Jan-Mar 2021.
Wireless service
DPIIT website; figures for Apr 2000-Mar 2021 https://dpiit.gov.in/publications/fdi-statistics
By early 2008, there were 10–14 private sector mobile operators in each License Service Area,6 gross revenues from telecom services had crossed INR 800 billion7 and India had what was possibly the cheapest mobile service in the world.8
Section II: India’s Spectrum Policy Management Regime
Spectrum is an essential resource for mobile communications. By nature, the spectrum is nonexhaustible. But its unrestrained use is limited by interference, which necessitates the management of spectrum put to various kinds of use. Interference takes place when two or more devices located near each other use the same radio frequency (or contiguous frequencies) at the same time.9 In the present day, there are multiple devices, technologies, and uses for spectrum.
The management of spectrum, worldwide, takes place at three levels: international, regional, and national.
At the international and regional levels, countries collectively decide how radio spectrum bands will be designated and allocated for specific uses and services, so as to ensure that full advantage is taken of the existing and latest technologies without disrupting current radiocommunications services provided worldwide, including aeronautical and maritime services, satellite services, and scientific and space research. This coordination exercise has greatly increased in complexity in recent times with the rapid technological advances made in the information and communications sectors and their need for spectrum in a wide range of bands for service provision.10
The actual assignment of spectrum to service providers for running their operations takes place at the national level and this work is performed by the national regulatory authorities or equivalent organizations.
Administrative Structures for Spectrum Management in India
In India, the legal basis of all spectrum management is the Indian Telegraph Act 1885 and the Indian Wireless Telegraphy Act 1933, and the rules and procedures made under these Acts. The Wireless Planning and Coordination (WPC) Wing of the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) is the principal radio regulatory agency responsible for radio frequency spectrum coordination and management, including licensing, and looks after the needs of all wireless users in the country, Government or private, security, or nonsecurity.11 The head of the WPC is the Wireless Adviser to the Government of India, who works under the supervision of the Member (Technology), Digital Communications Commission, which is the apex policy making body of the Department. The WPC issues a National Frequency Allocation Plan (NFAP), which is largely derived from the Table of Frequency Allocations in the international Radio Regulations, and is supposed to be reviewed every 2 years (after the WRC has been held). The NFAP provides the basis for the assignment of frequencies.
Apart from several commercial and private users, there are important public sector users of radio spectrum notably the Defense forces, broadcasting agencies, civil aviation authorities for air traffic control, air navigation and control and landing systems, police, civil defense, railways, and the Space programme. The major wireless user Ministries and administrative Departments of the Government of India have membership in the Standing Advisory Committee on Radio Frequency Allocations (SACFA), a high-level committee that makes recommendations on major frequency allocation issues and the formulation of the NFAP.12 SACFA, with WPC acting as secretariat, sits separately to take decisions on government and nongovernment allocations. When it meets for nongovernment services, delegates from organizations whose applications are being discussed can be present in the meeting but not participate in it, unless specifically asked to do so by SACFA members.13 This arrangement gives considerable weight to government stakeholders. Where there are competing claims for use of the same spectrum band by government and nongovernment users, clearance of the Government Ministry or Department is essential; if there is irreconcilable dispute, the matter may have to be decided at a higher level and may ultimately have to be placed before the Union Cabinet.14 The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) undertakes consultative reviews of spectrum policy but its role is restricted to making recommendations to the DoT; nor is the DoT bound to abide by the recommendations made by TRAI in this regard.
Transition in Approaches to Spectrum Management in India
Before the liberalization of the telecom sector, users of spectrum were by and large confined to the government sector and private users were confined to noncommercial deployments only. The WPC had developed an application-based administrative mechanism for the assignment of frequencies based on a command-and-control approach with fixed charges and license fees. After the progressive introduction of private sector competition, the legacy administrative framework for spectrum management persisted from 1994 to 2010 and has become progressively more market-orientated since 2010.15
Within the legacy administrative period, some distinct stages in the process of evolution of the spectrum assignment and management regimes can be distinguished16:
- 1.
1995–2003: Licenses to operate were auctioned by the licensing authority and administered spectrum (2x4.4 MHz in case of GSM17) for each of the selected operators, bundled with the license was assigned by the WPC. Beyond this start-up spectrum further allocations depended upon availability, justification, and payment of higher rates of spectrum usages charges (SUC).18
- 2.
2003–2006: In this phase, there was an implicit delinking of the license and spectrum. The CDMA19 fixed line operators had come into Unified Access Service (UAS) by payment of a fixed fee rather than through auction; this theoretically delinked the license and the spectrum. Apart from the CDMA-based operators, a number of new operators also paid up the fixed fee to get the UAS license. Start-up spectrum to such licensees, however, was given only as and when available.20
- 3.
2006–2008: A very large number of licenses (more than 200 in all) came to be given on first-come-first served basis without any cap on the number of operators.21 There was a serious shortage of spectrum and a growing queue of licensees waiting for spectrum. The philosophy was maximal utilization of spectrum.22 In keeping with this philosophy, there was a squeeze on the assignment of spectrum to incumbents and the norms for assignment of additional spectrum were substantially tightened.
Carrying the chronology forward, we can distinguish the following phases:
- 4.
Development of the primary market (2010 onwards): In 2010, the DoT made the first foray into a market-oriented spectrum regime by auctioning 2100 MHz band for 3G services and the 2300 MHz band for Broadband Wireless Access (BWA-4G). After the Supreme Court decision and cancelation of licenses in 2012,23 auctions were held by the DoT in 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2021 for access spectrum.24
- 5.
Development of the secondary market (2015 onwards): All access spectrum till the year 2015 had to be purchased in the primary market through auction.25 In 2015, DoT introduced the policy for liberalizing of spectrum and making it technology neutral. All auctioned spectrum was considered liberalized and technology neutral, while administratively assigned spectrum could be liberalized and made technology neutral through payment of a liberalization fee. The liberalized spectrum could also be traded in the secondary market within the framework of trading guidelines issued by DoT.26
Bauer27 extending the common resources framework defined by Schlager and Ostrom28 to property rights in spectrum, defines four different kinds of users based on the rights assignment to them: authorized users, claimants, proprietors, and owners. Authorized users have limited rights of access to and use of the resource. Claimants have the rights to manage the resource, in addition to usage rights. Proprietors also additionally have the right to take part in decisions for excluding others from using the resource. Owners have all these rights and the right to sell or lease the use of the resource. From a property rights perspective, the users of spectrum in India have, over time, transitioned from being authorized users to owners. The effects of the transition are analyzed in the following section.
Section III: Impact of Spectrum Availability and Pricing Policies on India’s Mobile Markets
Several academic works deal with the thesis that policies determining the availability of spectrum for mobile services and its pricing have an impact on the structure of the mobile market and provision of services to consumers.
According to Gruber,29 mobile market structure is determined by three categories of factors:
Technology, i.e., the level of technological development; more technological progress leading to greater spectral efficiency and a more fragmented market structure
Regulation, which includes i) amount of spectrum assigned to the industry; the greater this amount, the more fragmented the industry, ii) the decision to select the technology, which may affect the efficiency of spectral use, and iii) the decision to levy fees for the use of spectrum
Endogenous sunk costs, including “excessive license fees”; where there is competition among firms to acquire a spectrum license, the size of the fee offered by the firm becomes a determinant for assigning the spectrum, as happens in an auction. Competition may cause the fees to increase and this could endogenously affect the market structure. A higher license fee may tend to reduce the number of firms in the industry as some firms will have to exit to reestablish nonnegative profits. The objective of having as many firms in the industry as possible is therefore at odds with the objective of extracting the maximum value out of a spectrum assignment. If license fees higher than profits are paid in a market with few players (such as a duopoly), another option for the firms would be to collude to earn enough profits to pay the license fees, so that high fees may be an inducement for collusive behavior, leading to higher consumer prices. High license fees such as those that emerge out of auctions, which have been traditionally justified as a way of putting an economic value on spectrum and allocating it to the most efficient use, could end up creating endogenous sunk costs that could force firms out of the market and incentivize collusive behavior.
Verde30 looks at license allocation to operate an oligopolistic market where demand is uncertain at the time of investment (rollout). Operators need credit both to invest and to acquire the license. Auctions extract a higher license price, and then lower investment. The model is based on experiences of spectrum licensing for new telecommunication technologies.
Hazlett and Munoz31 find that spectrum policies create rents that impose social costs. Comparing the efficiency of output in 28 mobile markets, they conclude that countries allocating greater bandwidth to licensed operators and achieving more competitive market structures achieve better welfare outcomes than those associated with mere license sales.
Datta32 finds that revenue maximization for government through high fees can affect bank interest charges for which infrastructure investment in telecom may suffer, and that at least part of the revenue earnings should be utilized to subsidize telco investment. Oughton et al.33 similarly find that attempts to raise government revenues through spectrum pricing generates an off-setting subsidy requirement, so that there is no net impact on government finances.
Prasad and Sridhar34 examine possible causes of allocative inefficiency in mobile markets in India including insufficient spectrum allocation per operator, underpricing of spectrum, and inefficient use of the radio access network infrastructure.
Elliot et al.35 develop a model of competition and infrastructure investment in which they find that consolidation typically has adverse impacts on consumer surplus. Consumer surplus is maximized at a moderate number of firms, and that the optimal number of firms is higher for lower income consumers. The marginal social value of allocating more spectrum to mobile telecommunications is roughly five times an individual firm’s willingness to pay for a marginal unit of spectrum.
Bae et al.36 explore the consequences of lifting restrictions on allocations and ownership of spectrum, and allowing more extensive markets for spectrum across locations, times, and diverse applications so as to promote better utilization of spectrum bands.
Application to the Indian Context
The events that took place in this transition commencing in the decade of the 1990s in India described in the previous section, entailed several regulatory decisions which impacted the availability of spectrum for mobile operations and its price. We use the relationships described in the academic works referred to above, to link these regulatory approaches and decisions with the structure of the mobile markets that subsequently evolved in India. The listing of mobile market determinants comprising regulatory policy- particularly spectrum availability for operators, technology choices and license fees, and endogenous sunk costs arising from auction defined by Gruber in his model, form a convenient framework for carrying out the analysis.
Regulatory Policies Affecting Availability and Use of Spectrum by Mobile Operators
Release of spectrum for mobile operations: There has been, right from the earliest stages of liberalization, scarcity in availability of commercial access spectrum in India. Before the advent of mobile services, commercial usage of spectrum on a large scale was nonexistent; the public sector was the main user, apart from some limited private use. A large swathe of spectrum was in the control of the Defense forces. It was from the holdings of the defense forces in the 800 MHz and 1800 MHz bands that the first limited amount of spectrum for commercial mobile services was released in 1995.37 This has been the general trend since that time; spectrum has been freed up in small parts for commercial use after protracted and difficult negotiations with incumbent users.38
The per operator spectrum assignment in India is well below international standards39; the same goes for spectrum availability per user. In a comparative analysis of the assignment of spectrum per operator and its availability per user, the Brookings institution40 came up with the following figures in Tables 2 and 3:
Summary of Total Licensed Spectrum in Various Countries
Country . | Current (MHz) . | Pipeline (MHz) . | Hz/subs . |
---|---|---|---|
USA | 608 | 55 | 2.1 |
Australia | 478 | 230 | 22.8 |
Brazil | 554 | 0 | 2 |
China | 227 | 360 | 0.5 |
France | 555 | 50 | 9.3 |
Germany | 615 | 0 | 6.2 |
Italy | 540 | 20 | 5.9 |
Japan | 500 | 10 | 3.3 |
Spain | 540 | 60 | 11.8 |
UK | 353 | 265 | 7.9 |
India | 221 | 10(est.) | 0.2 |
Country . | Current (MHz) . | Pipeline (MHz) . | Hz/subs . |
---|---|---|---|
USA | 608 | 55 | 2.1 |
Australia | 478 | 230 | 22.8 |
Brazil | 554 | 0 | 2 |
China | 227 | 360 | 0.5 |
France | 555 | 50 | 9.3 |
Germany | 615 | 0 | 6.2 |
Italy | 540 | 20 | 5.9 |
Japan | 500 | 10 | 3.3 |
Spain | 540 | 60 | 11.8 |
UK | 353 | 265 | 7.9 |
India | 221 | 10(est.) | 0.2 |
Source: International data–FCC (2013), Indian data from Cellular Operators Association of India (2015), subscriber data from World Bank.
Spectrum Availability in Commonly Deployed Bands (in MHz)
Band . | Europe . | USA . | India . |
---|---|---|---|
900 MHz | 70 | 64 | 12.4 |
1800 MHz | 150 | 130 | 97.6 |
2/2.3 GHz | 120 | 90 | 60 |
2.6 GHz | 190 | 194 | 20 |
800 MHz | 60 | 70 | 27.5 |
Total | 590 | 548 | 217.5 |
Band . | Europe . | USA . | India . |
---|---|---|---|
900 MHz | 70 | 64 | 12.4 |
1800 MHz | 150 | 130 | 97.6 |
2/2.3 GHz | 120 | 90 | 60 |
2.6 GHz | 190 | 194 | 20 |
800 MHz | 60 | 70 | 27.5 |
Total | 590 | 548 | 217.5 |
Source: FCC, DoT India.
As per figures from TRAI41 quoted by Kathuria et al.,42 the overall availability of spectrum per operator in India is 31 MHz as against a global average of 50 MHz.
Selection of Technology: In the administrative assignment regime for spectrum, the use of spectrum was not technologically neutral, i.e., the spectrum administrator made the choice of technology and the licensed user did not have the freedom to adopt any other technology or put the spectrum to alternative use. GSM was the technology chosen initially for mobile services. The first breach occurred when CDMA-based mobile services were introduced after legal battles in the period 2001–2003,43 which led to a redefinition of the mobile licenses as Universal Access Service (UAS) Licences permitting both GSM and CDMA technologies. However, the spectrum administrators continued to exercise control over spectrum assignments for different technologies by allocating a smaller amount of spectrum for CDMA operators on the ground that it was a more efficient technology.44 It was only after spectrum auctions were introduced in 2010 that attention was paid to true liberalization for spectrum purchased in an auction or for which market value had been paid. Permission for trading of spectrum granted in 2015 marked an important policy milestone in this direction.
Regulatory Policies Affecting the Price of Spectrum
Fees for Spectrum: In the administrative spectrum assignment regime, it was the mobile license itself that was auctioned for upfront fixed license fees, which was later extended into a fixed fee plus revenue sharing arrangement under the policy directive of New Telecom Policy (1999).45 For the use of spectrum, the operators paid a revenue share-based Spectrum Usage Charge, which was graded depending upon the quantum of spectrum holding of the operator. The revenue sharing arrangement as well as revenue-based spectrum usage charges continued to be levied even after spectrum auctions were introduced in 2010.
Endogenous sunk costs: The phenomenon of endogenous sunk costs came into play in the Indian context in the auctions of 2010. In a sense, 2010 marked a watershed in spectrum management policies in India, as, for the first time, spectrum in the 2100 MHz and 2300 MHz bands was assigned through an online auction. The government’s objectives were to discover a market price for the 3G and BWA spectrum, enable efficient use of spectrum, avoid hoarding, stimulate competition, and promote fast rollout of 3G and broadband services, as also to earn revenues for the exchequer. The auction was successful and all the spectrum was sold much above the reserve prices that had been laid down.46 The government earned revenues of Rs 509683.7 million ($11.3 billion) from the 3G auction and Rs 256955.4 million ($5.7 billion) from the BWA auction.47 The 2010 auction was held in an environment of extreme stringency in spectrum assignment with tightened norms (as described in an earlier section) and uncertainty with regard to future availability of spectrum. As per TRAI, 3G prices were scarcity driven and operators were fearful of being left out of data service growth. Describing the key highlights of these auctions, telecom expert Parag Kar48 mentions, some of the following features:
Low supply: This was significant as the auctions were being held just after the issue of new first-come-first-served licenses issued by DoT based on 2001 prices to new players waiting for spectrum in the backdrop of willingness of banks to lend liberally to the telecom sector.
Mismatch between demand for spectrum and its supply especially in the metro areas of Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, and Chennai (Tamil Nadu) and Category A circles. In the case of 3G spectrum, eight operators were chasing three slots Pan-India and the prices for Delhi and Mumbai increased to 10 times the RP, contributing more than 40% of the auction value; for BWA three operators (Idea, RCOM, and Tata) contributed significantly to the bidding process but did not win any spectrum, only contributing in raising the round prices; prices for Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, and Tamil Nadu increased to 14, 14.3, 8.7, and 12.9 times the reserve price. The prices for metros and some Category A circles were much higher than justified by their revenue earning potential.
Lack of a roadmap for the future availability of spectrum. Such a roadmap may have allayed the fears of the operators about spectrum availability in the future and bidding may not have been as desperate as it was.
Lack of rules for trading of spectrum. This meant that auction was the only way of obtaining additional spectrum.
The high prices paid for spectrum in the 2010 auction created substantial sunk costs. However, the flaws in the signaling of availability of spectrum in the 2010 auction and consequent high prices are especially significant as the price discovered in this auction became the reference for valuing spectrum in all other bands in future.
Auctions After 2010, Reserve Prices, and Market Structure
From 2012, after the cancellation of access licenses granted in 2008 by the Supreme Court of India, the administrative method was abandoned and auction became the sole basis of assignment of fresh frequencies by DoT. Several auctions for spectrum were held between 2012 and 2016; after a break of 5 years, an auction was held again in 2021. These auctions were characterized by high reserve prices benchmarked on the basis of the prices obtained in the 2010 auction. High reserve prices were among important reasons for large amounts of spectrum, which were put on the block in each auction remaining unsold.49 Table 4 indicates spectrum put on the block, and spectrum sold in each of these auctions:
Access spectrum auctions conducted in India since 2012
Sl. No. . | Year . | Spectrum bands . | Spectrum put to auction in different LSAs . | Spectrum sold . | % sold . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
1. | November 2012 | 1800 MHz (paired) | 295 MHz | 127.5 MHz | 43% |
800 MHz (paired) | 95 MHz | No bidder | 0 | ||
2. | March 2013 | 900 MHz (paired) | 46 MHz | No bidder | 0 |
1800 MHz (paired) | 57.5 MHz | No bidder | 0 | ||
800 MHz (paired) | 95 MHz | 30 MHz | 31.5% | ||
3. | February 2014 | 900 MHz (paired) | 46 MHz | 46 MHz | 100% |
1800 MHz (paired) | 385 MHz | 307.2 MHz | 79.8% | ||
4. | March 2015 | 800 MHz (paired) | 108.75 MHz | 86.25 MHz | 79.3% |
900 MHz (paired) | 177.8 MHz | 168 MHz | 94.5% | ||
1800 MHz (paired) | 99.2 MHz | 93.8 MHz | 94.6% | ||
2100 MHz (paired) | 85 MHz | 70 MHz | 82.4% | ||
5. | October 2016 | 700 MHz (paired) | 770 MHz | No bidder | 0 |
800 MHz (paired) | 73.75 MHz | 15 MHz | 20.33% | ||
900 MHz (paired) | 9.4 MHz | No bidder | 0 | ||
1800 MHz (paired) | 221.6 MHz | 174.8 MHz | 78.9% | ||
2100 MHz (paired) | 360 MHz | 85 MHz | 23.6% | ||
2300 MHz (unpaired) | 320 MHz | 320 MHz | 100% | ||
2500 MHz (unpaired) | 600 MHz | 370 MHz | 61.7% | ||
6. | March 2021 | 700 MHz(paired) | 660 MHz | No bidder | 0 |
800 MHz(paired) | 230 MHz | 150 MHz | 65.2% | ||
900 MHz(paired) | 81.4 MHz | 38.4 MHz | 47.1% | ||
1800 MHz(paired) | 313.6 MHz | 152.2 MHz | 48.5% | ||
2100 MHz(paired) | 175 MHz | 15 MHz | 8.6% | ||
2300 MHz(unpaired) | 560 MHz | 500 MHz | 89.2% | ||
2500 MHz(unpaired) | 230 MHz | No bidder | 0 |
Sl. No. . | Year . | Spectrum bands . | Spectrum put to auction in different LSAs . | Spectrum sold . | % sold . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
1. | November 2012 | 1800 MHz (paired) | 295 MHz | 127.5 MHz | 43% |
800 MHz (paired) | 95 MHz | No bidder | 0 | ||
2. | March 2013 | 900 MHz (paired) | 46 MHz | No bidder | 0 |
1800 MHz (paired) | 57.5 MHz | No bidder | 0 | ||
800 MHz (paired) | 95 MHz | 30 MHz | 31.5% | ||
3. | February 2014 | 900 MHz (paired) | 46 MHz | 46 MHz | 100% |
1800 MHz (paired) | 385 MHz | 307.2 MHz | 79.8% | ||
4. | March 2015 | 800 MHz (paired) | 108.75 MHz | 86.25 MHz | 79.3% |
900 MHz (paired) | 177.8 MHz | 168 MHz | 94.5% | ||
1800 MHz (paired) | 99.2 MHz | 93.8 MHz | 94.6% | ||
2100 MHz (paired) | 85 MHz | 70 MHz | 82.4% | ||
5. | October 2016 | 700 MHz (paired) | 770 MHz | No bidder | 0 |
800 MHz (paired) | 73.75 MHz | 15 MHz | 20.33% | ||
900 MHz (paired) | 9.4 MHz | No bidder | 0 | ||
1800 MHz (paired) | 221.6 MHz | 174.8 MHz | 78.9% | ||
2100 MHz (paired) | 360 MHz | 85 MHz | 23.6% | ||
2300 MHz (unpaired) | 320 MHz | 320 MHz | 100% | ||
2500 MHz (unpaired) | 600 MHz | 370 MHz | 61.7% | ||
6. | March 2021 | 700 MHz(paired) | 660 MHz | No bidder | 0 |
800 MHz(paired) | 230 MHz | 150 MHz | 65.2% | ||
900 MHz(paired) | 81.4 MHz | 38.4 MHz | 47.1% | ||
1800 MHz(paired) | 313.6 MHz | 152.2 MHz | 48.5% | ||
2100 MHz(paired) | 175 MHz | 15 MHz | 8.6% | ||
2300 MHz(unpaired) | 560 MHz | 500 MHz | 89.2% | ||
2500 MHz(unpaired) | 230 MHz | No bidder | 0 |
Source: TRAI Recommendations: August 2018,50 DoT.
In a constrained spectrum supply environment, this resulted in a dichotomous situation in which operators were unable to obtain even such spectrum as had been released for mobile services and put up for sale, due to uneconomic prices.
On the other hand, there were some operators who were compelled to pick up spectrum in these auctions only to stay on in business. In this category were operators whose licenses had been canceled by the Supreme Court in 2012 and who had committed investments as well as operators whose licenses were expiring and needed renewal. These operators had no option but to purchase the spectrum at whatever price it was available, creating huge endogenous sunk costs in the process.
The Government collected substantial revenues from the sale of spectrum from 2010 onwards. Albeit installments were allowed to the winning operators, the total bid amounts in Table 5 calculated on the basis of the final prices achieved give some idea of the size of the debt owed by operators to the government, which was to be collected interest indexed (apart from a partial upfront payment), over the subsequent years after the auction:
Auction collections in India
Auction . | Bid Amount (INR bill) . | Amount in USD bill . |
---|---|---|
May 2010 | 1062.62 | 23.10 |
November 2012 | 94.07 | 1.77 |
March 2013 | 36.40 | 0.66 |
February 2014 | 611.63 | 9.87 |
February 2015 | 1098.75 | 17.72 |
October 2016 | 657.89 | 9.82 |
March 2021 | 778.15 | 10.66 |
Total | 4339.51 | 50.50 |
Auction . | Bid Amount (INR bill) . | Amount in USD bill . |
---|---|---|
May 2010 | 1062.62 | 23.10 |
November 2012 | 94.07 | 1.77 |
March 2013 | 36.40 | 0.66 |
February 2014 | 611.63 | 9.87 |
February 2015 | 1098.75 | 17.72 |
October 2016 | 657.89 | 9.82 |
March 2021 | 778.15 | 10.66 |
Total | 4339.51 | 50.50 |
Source: DoT data, compiled by Kathuria et al.51 up to 2016, extended by author to 2021; conversions of USD at concurrently prevalent exchange rates.
The burden on the operators led to mounting debt, increasing leverage, and falling interest coverage ratios for all operators, indicating in general an inability to service debts.52 The years from 2012 witnessed the exit of several firms that had taken licenses for operating mobile services in India. S Tel and Etisalat exited when their licenses were canceled by the Supreme Court of India, but those that remained went into a spate of mergers notable among which were the mergers of Vodafone India with Idea Cellular (2018), acquisition of Telenor India (2018) and Tata Docomo (2019) by Bharti Airtel, acquisition of MTS India by Reliance Communications (2017), and exit through sale of spectrum by Videocon to Bharti Airtel (2016). Two companies Aircel (in 2018) and Reliance Communications (in 2019) became bankrupt.53 As a result, only three private sector MNOs of any significance remain in the Indian telecom sector today, apart from the public sector operator. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of the Indian mobile industry54 went up from 1608 in 2009 to 2810 in 2019, indicating the growing degree of market concentration.
Current Trends in Spectrum Availability, Reserve Prices, and Market Concentration
Although there has been some increase in the quantum of spectrum available per operator, the amount available is below global standards. In 2017, the per operator availability of spectrum was about 31 MHz, as against global levels of 50 MHz.55 Reserve prices continue to be very high. In the 2021 auctions, the reserve price for 700 MHz was set at about $1.89 per MHz per capita and was not taken by any operator.56 Again, the reserve price for the 3.3–3.6 GHz band as recommended by TRAI in 2018 (although the spectrum was not ultimately put up for auction in 2021) was about $0.01 per MHz per capita on a pan-India basis, but USD 0.09 per MHz per capita in the metro and “A” category circles,57 where the best business proposition for 5G may be expected to lie. This is as against a global average price for such spectrum of around $0.02 per MHz per capita.58 Fresh recommendations from TRAI are awaited. The market, in the meanwhile, remains concentrated. This is the prevailing regulatory and market environment as India attempts to enter the next stage of mobile evolution into 5G technologies and services.
Section IV: International Experience in 5G and Spectrum Policy
Spectrum Requirements in 5G
5G is a recent generation in mobile network technologies for wireless communications. 5G mobile systems are expected to bring diverse levels of performance and capability, provide new user experiences and connect new enterprises.59 5G services have not as yet been launched in India. However, the Government of India has declared its intention to encourage the adoption of 5G technologies to expand the potential of its networked society and reap economic benefits.60 Preparatory activities, tests, and trials are in process; 5G services are expected to be rolled out in the current year 2022 after spectrum auctions have been held.61
For any service to take off it is important to make available for it the right amount of spectrum at the right time. For 5G services, a range of spectrum in at least three frequency bands—low frequency, mid band, and high frequency—must be made available.62 If necessary, administrators will have to take steps for harmonizing and re-farming of spectrum, accommodating the needs of existing users of these bands through innovative technical and economic solutions. Innovators should have access to spectrum for tests and trials. 5G will bring in new functional capabilities in the network, new services, and new market paradigms. At least two features of the new technology, network slicing that will allow end-to-end connectivity at a lower cost and small cell deployment that will make possible the provision of small localized networks in specific locations on higher frequency bands, will open up the sector to a host of smaller service providers.63 Such service providers will also need access to spectrum, if the full benefits of 5G services are to be realized. 5G in the mobile network would also entail substantial costs for investment in new equipment, higher technical quality of service, greater backhaul capacity, cell densification, deployment of active antenna systems, and building a network capable of supporting a large number of devices.64 For 5G therefore, spectrum policy will need to be active on at least three important dimensions:
Adequate spectrum across the range must be made available
It must be at affordable prices
The approaches to sharing of spectrum must be innovative and flexible.
It would be instructive to take a look at international experience with regard to spectrum policy and administration for 5G. While doing so, it is important to bear in mind that the assignment of spectrum for 5G had to take into account the following factors65:
In most countries, spectrum in 3.5 MHz and mmWave bands had not been allocated earlier for mobile services
The mmWave spectrum bands are very different from lower bands in terms of coverage capabilities and other characteristics
Much wider spectrum bandwidths had to be assigned than was ever done in the past
There was some uncertainty about business models
The 5G spectrum policy had to be proactive and forward-looking to create new and innovative applications and services, rather than reactive to growth in mobile traffic, as had mostly been the case in earlier technologies.
We undertake a comparative analysis of the spectrum policy steps taken by other countries across the world which have managed a successful transition to 5G technology in terms of a rapid and extensive rollout of network coverage. Four countries are selected from among those which were ahead of the global average in launching their services and had also achieved substantial coverage by 2021. The early movers and implementors who had launched services in 2018–2019 and had covered more than 35 cities by 202166 were the Republic of Korea, the United States, United Kingdom, Spain, Germany, the Gulf countries, China, Japan, and Australia. Of these countries, the Republic of Korea, the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia are selected for study as having a similar overall philosophy of regulatory governance as obtains in India67 and also to include a wide geographical representation of countries.
South Korea
Korea has been one of the early adopters of 5G. Commercial 5G services were launched in December 2018 and by 2021, 85 cities have 5G coverage.68 The government’s early, proactive, and transparent spectrum planning policies played a very important role in enabling an early adoption of 5G. Policy announcements with regard to 5G spectrum signaled clearly the bands in which frequencies would be made available for mobile broadband and estimated time frames. The plans cover licensed, unlicensed, and local spectrum. The central role in strategizing, planning, and directing the growth of ICT is with the Ministry of Science, ICT, and Future Planning (MSIP). The Korean Communications Commission (KCC) oversees the enforcement of regulations among market players in telecommunication and broadcasting.69
United States of America
Commercial 5G services were launched in the United States in April 2019; by March 2021, 5G coverage was available to about 270 million people in 279 cities.70 The United States is today one of the leaders therefore in 5G deployment.
Like Korea, the United States also followed a strategy of making large amounts of spectrum available for 5G and broadband services. One of the problems faced by the United States has been the need to “repurpose” or re-farm substantial amounts of mid band spectrum71 presently deployed for other uses. Repurposing spectrum is bound to be contentious, as there would be opposition and resistance from existing users who will have to be co-opted or bought out in a manner that is to the satisfaction of all parties. Since large amounts of spectrum are with the defense forces, defense priorities also need to be factored in.
Clearance of frequencies for commercial use was attained through band-by-band resolution under the aegis of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) after consultation with all stakeholders. The agency that looks after matters involving the use of spectrum by all three branches of the federal government is the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA). The NTIA and the FCC have been making concerted efforts to expand the availability of spectrum for flexible use wireless applications for several years. FCC’s dispensations had to factor in the rights and protections of not only existing licensees but also Federal users. Adjustments and trade-offs were viewed in the overall perspective of the need to maintain the technological and economic leadership of the United States in the emerging 5G era.
United Kingdom
United Kingdom launched commercial 5G services in May 2019; by March 2021, 54 cities had 5G coverage.72
The UK 5G policy73 also centered around making available sufficient radio spectrum at the right frequencies, sharing of spectrum wherever possible, and increasing flexibility within the spectrum licensing regime. Ofcom, the telecoms regulator, had a key role to play in supporting the delivery and rollout of 5G across the United Kingdom. Ofcom has a legal duty to ensure the efficient use of radio spectrum. Ofcom assigns frequency bands to all users, including the MNOs. Ofcom would plan to make spectrum bands available for 5G and arrange auctions and assignments, so as to ensure that spectrum did not become an inhibitor to mobile growth and early 5G rollout.
Australia
After a start in late 2019, mobile operators in Australia made rapid 5G deployments in 2020. As of May 2021, the main cities were already covered with 5G availability.74
Because of Australia’s geography and population distribution, wireless telecommunication has always been important.75 Spectrum management in Australia is characterized by a strong, independent, and skilled spectrum management body, market-based approaches to spectrum assignment such as auctions and incentive pricing, a licensing scheme based on technology neutrality and trading rights, delegation of licensing powers within the industry, a self-declaration arrangement for radio equipment, and a consultation-based process for implementation, revision, and improvement of the regulatory framework.76 The Australian Communication and Media Authority (ACMA) is the telecommunication regulator responsible for communications infrastructure (including spectrum), services, and content.
Making available adequate spectrum was a cornerstone of the Australian Government’s 5G policy of October 2017.77 It recognized that some potential 5G bands had unused spectrum, but others would need to be re-farmed or transitioned over time to 5G, based on the principle of highest value use. Some re-farming could be “soft-re-farming” where 4G and 5G technologies would be supported simultaneously, minimizing the impact on legacy users. The re-farming process takes place under the aegis of ACMA, with stakeholder consultation.
A comparative analysis of institutional structure, and key policy and regulatory steps taken in these four countries vis-a-vis the position in India is presented in the following table:
Recommended Spectrum Policy Changes in India
The analysis indicates that telecom administrations have adopted similar policies for making available spectrum for 5G technologies and services at an affordable cost. Learning from these 5G strategies adopted in other countries, the following spectrum policy steps would appear to be urgently required in India:
Comparative Analysis of Institutional Structure, Key Policies, and Regulatory Steps for 5G Spectrum Across Countries
Institutions, policy directions, and regulatory actions . | South Korea . | USA . | UK . | Australia . | India . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Availability of Spectrum: | |||||
Institutional arrangements for making spectrum available | Central role in planning and arranging auctions played by Ministry of Science, ICT, and Future Planning (MSIP), Government of Korea | Coordinating authority for clearing frequencies for commercial use and holding auctions is the FCC | Release of new spectrum, re-farming of spectrum, auctions, and assignments by Ofcom | Re-farming of frequencies and auctions by ACMA | Decisions on major frequency allocation issues made through SACFA; wireless user ministries and departments of government members Auctions held by DoT TRAI has only recommendatory powers |
Announcement of road map for spectrum availability | 2012, 2013: Mobile Gwanggaeto Plan 1.0 (for 600 MHz) and 2.0 (for 1190 MHz) 2017: K-ICT Spectrum Plan (for 4400 MHz) 2019: 5G+ 5-year spectrum plan for licensed, unlicensed, local 5G spectrum78 | Strategy of making large amounts of spectrum available Band-by-band resolution and availability announcements by FCC | 2017: UK Government policy79 with road map: mix of low, medium, and high frequencies—new and re-farmed; planning left to Ofcom 2017: Ofcom Spectrum update80 2021 Ofcom Spectrum Vision81 | Annual Spectrum Review Plan of ACMA- Process for identifying potential future spectrum laid down- monitoring, initial investigation, replanning, and re-farming/reallocation ACMA Spectrum Outlook 2021 to 202682 | No road map available |
Policy framework for rationalization of public sector spectrum | No specific policy 5G Strategy Committee, public–private partnership vehicle, cross-ministerial and multi-stakeholder partnership entity with members from relevant ministries, industry, academia, civil society, to plan and execute 5G strategy (World Bank Group, 2021) | Efforts made at Presidential level to rationalize use of government spectrum 2010 Presidential Memorandum83-double quantity of spectrum for broadband; free up 500 MHz of spectrum 2018 Presidential Memorandum84 for review of government spectrum | 2016 Budget: Commitment to make available 750MHz of public spectrum in bands <10GHz by 2022, 500 MHz by 202085 Public Sector Spectrum Release (PSSR) Prog. 2017 policy document: commitment to prioritize public sector spectrum for 5G, after assessment of economic value | 2018 Commonwealth Held Spectrum Review86: strong governance, regular report of spectrum holdings, and government agencies given permission to lease or sell spectrum | No policy commitments in this regard System for deciding government and nongovernment allocations archaic and inflexible Weighted in favor of government stakeholders |
Plans/processes for re-farming/ defragmentation | Included in spectrum road map; command and control approach87 | Incl. in band-by-band FCC announcements Mix of command and control (+stakeholder consultations) and market-based approaches88 | Included in Ofcom determinations for different bands Command and control approach, with stakeholder consultation89 | Three broad stages in replanning and re-farming defined90; band status incl. in ACMA spectrum plan, command and control approach with stakeholder consultation | Approach and procedure for identifying and re-farming spectrum bands not transparently or systematically articulated |
Approaches to spectrum sharing | No specific policy | Innovative sharing using Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA): 3.5 GHz Citizens Broadband Radio Service (CBRS) three-tiered scheme -Hierarchy of rights of protection from interference bet. Federal, Priority Access, General Authorized Access users | Spectrum sharing using tech. tools, auctions, secondary markets, flexible licensing92 | Spectrum sharing by geography, time, priority, technical means96 -Class licensing for less-closely-managed sharing, incl. spectrum commons -Arrangements re quantum of spectrum and regulatory settings97 under review in 5 GHz, 6 GHz band98 | Only very limited sharing by holders of spectrum within the same band is permitted100 Sharing arrangements managed by the regulator not in existence or contemplated |
-Hybrid licensing schemes to facilitate shared access -Intensive spectrum sharing across Fed/commercial users, exclusive/ nonexclusive assignments, private /carrier networks91 | -Approaches incl. tiered authorization with hierarchy of rights for different users in a band,93 inter-operator coordination with or without assistance from Ofcom, and open access network94 Authorization approach tailored for sharing scheme; national, local with interference control, unlicensed regimes | -Spectrum management framework review99 Radiocomm. Act 1992 amended (Dec 2020) for easing market‐based activity, trading and sharing, simplifying regulatory/ licensing structures, streamlining processes, and clarifying government’s role | No discussion in the public domain on changes contemplated in spectrum licensing framework to accommodate new needs of 5G technologies | ||
Ofcom permitted to administratively license out unused licensed spectrum95 | |||||
Spectrum needs for local and private networks | Specific 5G frequency supply plan for nonmobile and private 5G networks in sub 6 GHz and 28 GHz band, catering to the smaller scale needs of industrial vertical markets- prescribed frequency usage fees101 | Band-by-band approach to geographic area determination; no general policy | Local licensing of 3.8-4.2, 1.8, 2.3 GHz band; Low and Medium Power Licenses for rural areas; 26 GHz indoor use only102 License exempt/light license access103 | Area-wide apparatus licensing −2 types of local networks: limited market subscriber networks over small, localized areas - 3.4, 3.7–4.2, 26, and 28 GHz identified for these uses; wireless broadband networks for business enterprise services by private entities in own premises or private networks - local area licensing in above bands +1880-1920 MHz and 1.5 GHz as additional options | No special spectrum availability policy for local and private networks to meet 5G requirements is enunciated107 |
Spectrum at 5.8 GHz on site-by-site basis for broadband thro’ local Fixed Wireless Access for remote areas104 Spectrum for local, regional, or national private mobile networks on a coordinated basis for defined areas105 | -Dedicated Low Power Wide Area (LPWA) IoT access to 928–935 MHz band106 | ||||
Spectrum for tests/ trials | Temporary permission given for use of spectrum for 5G tests and trials108 Government-industry 5G collaboration in R&D and commercialization | Experimental Licensing System (ELS) authorizes temporary experimental wireless lab-testing, space launch/ recovery, short-duration wireless communication109 | National programme for 5G test beds/trials to prove business cases and accelerate investments - spectrum on request - separate licensing process110 | Policy for making spectrum available to facilitate 5G trials111 | In May 2021, 5G spectrum in 700 MHz, 3.5 GHz, 26 GHz given to MNOs for 6 months for tests and trials; period extended beyond Nov 2021112 |
Recent assignments in low-, mid-, and high-frequency bands through auction, administrative authorization and delicensing | 2018: Auction 3.5 GHz (280 MHz) and 28 GHz hot spots 5.2-5.8 GHz unlicensed 5.9-7.1 GHz and 57-64 GHz under examination for unlicensed use113 | 2016: 600 MHz band: Incentive auction 2020:3.5 GHz band: 3-tiered sharing114 2020/21: Auction 3.7-4.2 GHz (280 MHz); 3.45-3.55 GHz (100 MHz) 2019: Auction 24 GHz (700 MHz) | 2017: Auction 2.3GHz; 3.4 to 3.6 GHz (40+150 MHz) 2020: Auction 700 MHz; 3.6 to 3.8 GHz (80+120 MHz) | 2018: Auction 3.6 GHz (125 MHz) 2021: Auction 26 GHz (2-2.5 MHz) 2021: Auction 850/900 MHz (10+25 MHz) | Mid band and mmWave auctions have not been held DoT decisions on E band (71-86 GHz) and V band (57-64 GHz) spectrum not announced |
2018/2019: Auction 28 GHz (27.5-28.35 GHz), 37 GHz (37-38.6 GHz), 39 GHz band (11 GHz) Unlicensed: 64-71 GHz | 2019: 3.8 GHz to 4.2 GHz,1800 MHz, 2300 MHz (local licensing for low power use); 24.25 to 26.5 GHz indoor use115 66-71 GHz unlicensed use (planned)116 | Licensed use through Low Interference Potential Devices Class License rules, allow short-range devices over specified frequencies w/o interference to communications services117 | |||
Pricing spectrum: | |||||
Reserve prices for C-band spectrum | Reserve Price ~USD 0.20/MHz/pop118 | Reserve Price USD 0.03/MHz/pop | Reserve price < USD 0.01/MHz/pop119 | Reserve price: three categories Perth license area ~USD 0.38/MHz/pop Metros ~ USD0.06/MHz/pop Regions ~ USD 0.02 MHz/pop | Reserve prices ~USD 0.01/MHz/pop on pan-India basis, but ~USD 0.09/MHz/pop in metro and “A” category circles120 |
Reserve Prices for mmWave auctions | Lower reserve prices based on uncertainty remarket potential in mmWave and potential adverse consumer effects from high spectrum prices Reserve Price ~USD 0.005/MHz/pop | Lower reserve prices; in three categories depending on the nature of Partial Economic Area (PEA) licensed: Reserve Price USD 0.001/MHz/pop; 0.0002/MHz/pop; 0.0001/MHz/pop; | No auction held | A tenth of C-band reserve prices in regions and a twentieth in metros/cities Reserve Price Cat 1&2 ~USD 0.003/MHz/pop; Cat 3~USD 0.002/ MHz/pop | Reserve prices for mmWave not yet decided121 |
Institutions, policy directions, and regulatory actions . | South Korea . | USA . | UK . | Australia . | India . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Availability of Spectrum: | |||||
Institutional arrangements for making spectrum available | Central role in planning and arranging auctions played by Ministry of Science, ICT, and Future Planning (MSIP), Government of Korea | Coordinating authority for clearing frequencies for commercial use and holding auctions is the FCC | Release of new spectrum, re-farming of spectrum, auctions, and assignments by Ofcom | Re-farming of frequencies and auctions by ACMA | Decisions on major frequency allocation issues made through SACFA; wireless user ministries and departments of government members Auctions held by DoT TRAI has only recommendatory powers |
Announcement of road map for spectrum availability | 2012, 2013: Mobile Gwanggaeto Plan 1.0 (for 600 MHz) and 2.0 (for 1190 MHz) 2017: K-ICT Spectrum Plan (for 4400 MHz) 2019: 5G+ 5-year spectrum plan for licensed, unlicensed, local 5G spectrum78 | Strategy of making large amounts of spectrum available Band-by-band resolution and availability announcements by FCC | 2017: UK Government policy79 with road map: mix of low, medium, and high frequencies—new and re-farmed; planning left to Ofcom 2017: Ofcom Spectrum update80 2021 Ofcom Spectrum Vision81 | Annual Spectrum Review Plan of ACMA- Process for identifying potential future spectrum laid down- monitoring, initial investigation, replanning, and re-farming/reallocation ACMA Spectrum Outlook 2021 to 202682 | No road map available |
Policy framework for rationalization of public sector spectrum | No specific policy 5G Strategy Committee, public–private partnership vehicle, cross-ministerial and multi-stakeholder partnership entity with members from relevant ministries, industry, academia, civil society, to plan and execute 5G strategy (World Bank Group, 2021) | Efforts made at Presidential level to rationalize use of government spectrum 2010 Presidential Memorandum83-double quantity of spectrum for broadband; free up 500 MHz of spectrum 2018 Presidential Memorandum84 for review of government spectrum | 2016 Budget: Commitment to make available 750MHz of public spectrum in bands <10GHz by 2022, 500 MHz by 202085 Public Sector Spectrum Release (PSSR) Prog. 2017 policy document: commitment to prioritize public sector spectrum for 5G, after assessment of economic value | 2018 Commonwealth Held Spectrum Review86: strong governance, regular report of spectrum holdings, and government agencies given permission to lease or sell spectrum | No policy commitments in this regard System for deciding government and nongovernment allocations archaic and inflexible Weighted in favor of government stakeholders |
Plans/processes for re-farming/ defragmentation | Included in spectrum road map; command and control approach87 | Incl. in band-by-band FCC announcements Mix of command and control (+stakeholder consultations) and market-based approaches88 | Included in Ofcom determinations for different bands Command and control approach, with stakeholder consultation89 | Three broad stages in replanning and re-farming defined90; band status incl. in ACMA spectrum plan, command and control approach with stakeholder consultation | Approach and procedure for identifying and re-farming spectrum bands not transparently or systematically articulated |
Approaches to spectrum sharing | No specific policy | Innovative sharing using Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA): 3.5 GHz Citizens Broadband Radio Service (CBRS) three-tiered scheme -Hierarchy of rights of protection from interference bet. Federal, Priority Access, General Authorized Access users | Spectrum sharing using tech. tools, auctions, secondary markets, flexible licensing92 | Spectrum sharing by geography, time, priority, technical means96 -Class licensing for less-closely-managed sharing, incl. spectrum commons -Arrangements re quantum of spectrum and regulatory settings97 under review in 5 GHz, 6 GHz band98 | Only very limited sharing by holders of spectrum within the same band is permitted100 Sharing arrangements managed by the regulator not in existence or contemplated |
-Hybrid licensing schemes to facilitate shared access -Intensive spectrum sharing across Fed/commercial users, exclusive/ nonexclusive assignments, private /carrier networks91 | -Approaches incl. tiered authorization with hierarchy of rights for different users in a band,93 inter-operator coordination with or without assistance from Ofcom, and open access network94 Authorization approach tailored for sharing scheme; national, local with interference control, unlicensed regimes | -Spectrum management framework review99 Radiocomm. Act 1992 amended (Dec 2020) for easing market‐based activity, trading and sharing, simplifying regulatory/ licensing structures, streamlining processes, and clarifying government’s role | No discussion in the public domain on changes contemplated in spectrum licensing framework to accommodate new needs of 5G technologies | ||
Ofcom permitted to administratively license out unused licensed spectrum95 | |||||
Spectrum needs for local and private networks | Specific 5G frequency supply plan for nonmobile and private 5G networks in sub 6 GHz and 28 GHz band, catering to the smaller scale needs of industrial vertical markets- prescribed frequency usage fees101 | Band-by-band approach to geographic area determination; no general policy | Local licensing of 3.8-4.2, 1.8, 2.3 GHz band; Low and Medium Power Licenses for rural areas; 26 GHz indoor use only102 License exempt/light license access103 | Area-wide apparatus licensing −2 types of local networks: limited market subscriber networks over small, localized areas - 3.4, 3.7–4.2, 26, and 28 GHz identified for these uses; wireless broadband networks for business enterprise services by private entities in own premises or private networks - local area licensing in above bands +1880-1920 MHz and 1.5 GHz as additional options | No special spectrum availability policy for local and private networks to meet 5G requirements is enunciated107 |
Spectrum at 5.8 GHz on site-by-site basis for broadband thro’ local Fixed Wireless Access for remote areas104 Spectrum for local, regional, or national private mobile networks on a coordinated basis for defined areas105 | -Dedicated Low Power Wide Area (LPWA) IoT access to 928–935 MHz band106 | ||||
Spectrum for tests/ trials | Temporary permission given for use of spectrum for 5G tests and trials108 Government-industry 5G collaboration in R&D and commercialization | Experimental Licensing System (ELS) authorizes temporary experimental wireless lab-testing, space launch/ recovery, short-duration wireless communication109 | National programme for 5G test beds/trials to prove business cases and accelerate investments - spectrum on request - separate licensing process110 | Policy for making spectrum available to facilitate 5G trials111 | In May 2021, 5G spectrum in 700 MHz, 3.5 GHz, 26 GHz given to MNOs for 6 months for tests and trials; period extended beyond Nov 2021112 |
Recent assignments in low-, mid-, and high-frequency bands through auction, administrative authorization and delicensing | 2018: Auction 3.5 GHz (280 MHz) and 28 GHz hot spots 5.2-5.8 GHz unlicensed 5.9-7.1 GHz and 57-64 GHz under examination for unlicensed use113 | 2016: 600 MHz band: Incentive auction 2020:3.5 GHz band: 3-tiered sharing114 2020/21: Auction 3.7-4.2 GHz (280 MHz); 3.45-3.55 GHz (100 MHz) 2019: Auction 24 GHz (700 MHz) | 2017: Auction 2.3GHz; 3.4 to 3.6 GHz (40+150 MHz) 2020: Auction 700 MHz; 3.6 to 3.8 GHz (80+120 MHz) | 2018: Auction 3.6 GHz (125 MHz) 2021: Auction 26 GHz (2-2.5 MHz) 2021: Auction 850/900 MHz (10+25 MHz) | Mid band and mmWave auctions have not been held DoT decisions on E band (71-86 GHz) and V band (57-64 GHz) spectrum not announced |
2018/2019: Auction 28 GHz (27.5-28.35 GHz), 37 GHz (37-38.6 GHz), 39 GHz band (11 GHz) Unlicensed: 64-71 GHz | 2019: 3.8 GHz to 4.2 GHz,1800 MHz, 2300 MHz (local licensing for low power use); 24.25 to 26.5 GHz indoor use115 66-71 GHz unlicensed use (planned)116 | Licensed use through Low Interference Potential Devices Class License rules, allow short-range devices over specified frequencies w/o interference to communications services117 | |||
Pricing spectrum: | |||||
Reserve prices for C-band spectrum | Reserve Price ~USD 0.20/MHz/pop118 | Reserve Price USD 0.03/MHz/pop | Reserve price < USD 0.01/MHz/pop119 | Reserve price: three categories Perth license area ~USD 0.38/MHz/pop Metros ~ USD0.06/MHz/pop Regions ~ USD 0.02 MHz/pop | Reserve prices ~USD 0.01/MHz/pop on pan-India basis, but ~USD 0.09/MHz/pop in metro and “A” category circles120 |
Reserve Prices for mmWave auctions | Lower reserve prices based on uncertainty remarket potential in mmWave and potential adverse consumer effects from high spectrum prices Reserve Price ~USD 0.005/MHz/pop | Lower reserve prices; in three categories depending on the nature of Partial Economic Area (PEA) licensed: Reserve Price USD 0.001/MHz/pop; 0.0002/MHz/pop; 0.0001/MHz/pop; | No auction held | A tenth of C-band reserve prices in regions and a twentieth in metros/cities Reserve Price Cat 1&2 ~USD 0.003/MHz/pop; Cat 3~USD 0.002/ MHz/pop | Reserve prices for mmWave not yet decided121 |
Source: Compiled by author.
A thorough stocktaking of spectrum held by the public sector followed by a clear plan for the release of such spectrum for commercial usage with a road map indicating amounts and time frames should be enunciated.
Transparent policies and procedures for defragmentation of spectrum bands and re-farming of spectrum for alternate uses should be announced—needs of existing users in public and private sectors must be accommodated through use of technological or economic solutions
Auctions for mid band and mmWave spectrum should be held at the earliest
Reserve prices for mid band spectrum should be aligned to internationally prevalent levels
While fixing reserve prices for mmWave spectrum, the special coverage and propagation characteristics and the nascent business case for services in these bands should be borne in mind
A policy for making available spectrum for local and private networks should be instituted122
The approach to voluntary spectrum sharing between operators should be liberalized; mandated sharing arrangements under regulatory direction using technological tools, flexible licensing and secondary markets should be explored.
Section V: Conclusion
Our analysis shows that transition of spectrum administration in India to a liberalized auction regime had the long-term effect of reducing competition in India’s mobile market, since it was not matched by an easing of spectrum availability by the government while reserve prices were maintained at high levels. The constrained availability of spectrum, high prices, and tendencies to market concentration have persisted, and on the eve of the advent of 5G, we find the position almost unchanged in so far as these vital parameters are concerned. 5G will require much larger swathes of spectrum than have ever been required by wireless telecommunications in the past, and at affordable prices for a wide variety of telecom players and businesses. From the comparative study of spectrum regimes in other countries, we find that other telecom administrations adopted similar policies for making available spectrum for 5G technologies and services at an affordable cost. From this perspective, it is evident that the spectrum regime in India would be ill-equipped to meet the requirements of new 5G technologies and services unless essential policy changes are put in place.
Gruber, 59–70; Hazlett and Munoz, “A Welfare Analysis of Spectrum Allocation Policies,” 424–51; Bae et al., “Spectrum Markets for Wireless Services”; Elliot et al., “Market Structure, Investment and Technical Efficiencies in Mobile Telecommunications.”
Gruber, “Spectrum Limits and Competition in Mobile Markets”; Verde, “License Allocation and Performance in Telecommunications Markets.”; Datta, “Spectrum Auction and Investment in Telecom Industry: A Suggested Policy,” 19–30; Prasad and Sridhar, “Allocative Efficiency of the Mobile Industry,” 521–33; Oughton, et al., “Policy Choices Can Help Keep 4 G and 5 G Universal Broadband Affordable.”
WorldBank, “Implementing Reforms in the Telecommunications Sector- Lessons from Experience,” (World Bank 1994), Preface.
Prasad, “The Impact of Policy and Regulatory Decisions on Telecom Growth in India.”
Ibid.
Sridhar, The Telecom Revolution in India - Technology, Regulation and Policy, 110.
Indian Brand Equity Foundation (IBEF) Telecom Industry Overview, Dec 2008 https://www.ibef.org/download/Telecommunications_060109.pdf
Sridhar, The Telecom Revolution in India - Technology, Regulation and Policy, 86.
Cave, Doyle and Webb, Essentials of Modern Spectrum Management.
Sources: European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT), Electronic Communications Committee (ECC) Newsletter August 2020; https://apps.cept.org/eccnews/aug-2020/cept_2023_world_radiocommunication_conference.html
Radiocommunication Sector, ITU, “World Radiocommunication Conference 2023 (WRC-23) Agenda and Relevant Resolutions” (ITU, 2022)
World Bank, “Radio Spectrum Management Development in India: A Framework for Strengthening Radio Spectrum Management and Policies” (World Bank, 2006).
Ibid.
Ibid.
Prasad, Sridhar, and Bunel, “An Institutional Analysis of Spectrum Management in India,” 252–293.
Jain and Dara, “Framework for Evolving Spectrum Management Regimes: Lessons from India.” 473–485.
Sridhar, The Telecom Revolution in India - Technology, Regulation and Policy, 111–114.
Global System for Mobile
Sridhar, The Telecom Revolution in India - Technology, Regulation and Policy, 112; Jain and Dara, “Framework for Evolving Spectrum Management Regimes: Lessons from India.”
Code Division Multiple Access
Sridhar, The Telecom Revolution in India - Technology, Regulation and Policy, 114.
Jain and Dara, “Framework for Evolving Spectrum Management Regimes: Lessons from India.”
Sridhar, The Telecom Revolution in India - Technology, Regulation and Policy, 114.
Around this time, the first-come-first served telecom licenses, especially those granted in 2008, were called to question, first for procedural irregularities and later, for loss of revenue to the Government when the proceeds were compared to the amounts earned by the Government from the 2010 auction. The matter reached the Supreme Court which in 2012 mandated that the licenses of 2008 should be canceled and thereafter, all spectrum should be sold only through auction as it was a scarce public resource which had to be handled transparently for maximizing public good.
Backhaul, backbone, and noncommercial captive spectrum continued to be assigned by the DoT administratively
Jain and Dara, “Framework for Evolving Spectrum Management Regimes: Lessons from India.”
Jain and Dara, “Framework for Evolving Spectrum Management Regimes: Lessons from India.”
Bauer, 118–22.
Schlager and Ostrom, 249–62.
Gruber, “Spectrum Limits and Competition in Mobile Markets.”
Verde, “License Allocation and Performance in Telecommunications Markets.”
Hazlett and Munoz, “A Welfare Analysis of Spectrum Allocation Policies.”
Datta, “Spectrum Auction and Investment in Telecom Industry: A Suggested Policy.”
Oughton et al., “Policy Choices Can Help Keep 4 G and 5 G Universal Broadband Affordable,” 29.
Prasad and Sridhar, “Allocative Efficiency of the Mobile Industry in India and Its Implications for Spectrum Policy.”
Elliott et al., “Market Structure, Investment and Technical Efficiencies in Mobile Telecommunications.”
Bae et al., “Spectrum Markets for Wireless Services.”
Sridhar, The Telecom Revolution in India–Technology, Regulation and Policy, 113.
For more details of the process of spectrum release from Defence and the public sector for commercial use in India see Prasad, Sridhar and Bunel, “An Institutional Analysis of Spectrum Management in India,” 269–273.
Sridhar, The Telecom Revolution in India - Technology, Regulation and Policy, 113; International Telecommunications Union (ITU), “Telecommunications Regulation Handbook-10th Anniversary Edition,” (World Bank; Infodev; IFC; ITU: 2011).
Ravi and West, “Spectrum Policy in India.”
Source: Broadband India Forum (BIF) response to TRAI consultation on Auction of Spectrum in 700 MHz, 800 MHz, 900 MHz, 1800 MHz, 2100 MHz, 2300 MHz, 2500 MHz, 3300–3400 MHz, and 3400–3600 MHz bands August 2017; https://www.trai.gov.in/sites/default/files/BIF_07112017.pdf
Kathuria et al., “Evaluating Spectrum Auctions in India.”
Sridhar, The Telecom Revolution in India - Technology, Regulation and Policy, 126.
Ibid.
Ibid., 118–119.
Kathuria et al., “Evaluating Spectrum Auctions in India.”
Figure available on dot.gov.in; $-Re exchange rate taken as Rs 45/=; excludes the amount of Rs 295983.3 million collected later based on final auction prices from public sector units for their assignments.
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/indian-spectrum-auction-key-issues-learnings-parag-kar/ accessed 25th November 2021
Kathuria et al., “Evaluating Spectrum Auctions in India.”
TRAI, “Recommendations on Auction of Spectrum in 700 Mhz, 800 Mhz, 900 Mhz, 1800 Mhz, 2100 Mhz, 2300 Mhz, 2500 Mhz, 3300–3400 Mhz, and 3400–3600 Mhz Bands,” 2018.
Kathuria et al., “Evaluating Spectrum Auctions in India.”
Kathuria, Kedia, and Sekhani, “A Study of the Financial Health of the Telecom Sector.”
Famous Mergers in Telecommunication Sector of India-Reliance JIO’s Revolution, Navleen Kaur, August 2020 preprint available on https://www.researchgate.net/publication/343501881_FAMOUS_MERGERS_IN_TELECOMMUNICATION_SECTOR_OF_INDIA_-RELIANCE_JIO’S_REVOLUTION accessed on 2.12.2021
Calculated on the basis of subscriber market share data in TRAI’s Performance Indicators Report for the relevant years www.trai.gov.in
Kathuria et al., “Evaluating Spectrum Auctions in India.”
Sridhar and Prasad, “Analysis of Spectrum Pricing for Commercial Mobile Services: A Cross Country Study.”
TRAI, “Recommendations on Auction of Spectrum in 700 Mhz, 800 Mhz, 900 Mhz, 1800 Mhz, 2100 Mhz, 2300 Mhz, 2500 Mhz, 3300–3400 Mhz, and 3400–3600 Mhz Bands “, 2018; calculated from figures in TRAI recommendations using 1$=INR 75 and wireless subscriber base figures in TRAI’s Wireless Subscription Report for 30.06.2021.
Sridhar and Prasad, “Analysis of Spectrum Pricing for Commercial Mobile Services: A Cross Country Study.”
Dangi et al., “Study and Investigation on 5G Technology: A Systematic Review.”
Based on ITU defined use cases listed in Forge and Vu, “Forming a 5G Strategy for Developing Countries”; GSMA, “5G Spectrum GSMA Public Policy Position.”
Matinmikko et al., “On Regulations for 5G: Micro Licensing for Locally Operated Networks,” 622–35.
Merz, “European Markets in 5G Spectrum Management”; Forge and Vu, “Forming a 5G Strategy for Developing Countries.”
Hong, Ryu, and Lee, “Entering the 5G Era : Lessons from Korea.”
Data from Statistica, Lifewire, 5G European Observatory and Verizon.com- accessed on 2nd October 2021.
Although there are differences in governance arrangements and distribution of powers between government agencies; China is not included in the study due to differences in their model of spectrum administration and regulation; see https://cms.law/en/int/expert-guides/cms-expert-guide-to-5g-regulation-and-law accessed on 2nd Oct 2021.
Data from Lifewire https://www.lifewire.com/5g-availability-world-4156244 and Statista https://www.statista.com/statistics/1215456/5g-cities-by-country/
Kim, “The Shape and Implications of Korea’s Telecommunication Industry,” 214–33.
Data from Lifewire https://www.lifewire.com/5g-availability-world-4156244; Statista https://www.statista.com/statistics/1215456/5g-cities-by-country/; and Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “Accelerating 5G in the United States,” 2021.
CSIS, “Accelerating 5G in the United States.”
Data from Lifewire https://www.lifewire.com/5g-availability-world-4156244 and Statista https://www.statista.com/statistics/1215456/5g-cities-by-country/
Government of UK, Department for Culture, Media and Sports, “Next Generation Mobile Technologies: A 5G Strategy for the UK,” March 2017.
Data from Lifewire https://www.lifewire.com/5g-availability-world-4156244 and Statista https://www.statista.com/statistics/1215456/5g-cities-by-country/
ITU, “Spectrum Management for a Converging World.”
Ibid.
Government of Australia, Department of Communications and the Arts, “Enabling the Future Economy.”
Een Kee Hong et al., “Entering the 5G era: Lessons from Korea.”
Government of UK, “Next Generation Mobile Technologies: A 5G Strategy for the UK,” March 2017; https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/next-generation-mobile-technologies-a-5g-strategy-for-the-uk
Ofcom, “Update on Spectrum for 5G” Feb 2017; https://www.ofcom.org.uk/data/assets/pdf_file/0021/97023/5G-update-08022017.pdf
Ofcom, “Statement: Supporting the UK’s Wireless Future – Our Spectrum Management Strategy for the 2020s,” July 2021 https://www.ofcom.org.uk/data/assets/pdf_file/0017/222173/spectrum-strategy-statement.pdf; spectrum for innovation, sharing and local access
ACMA, “Five Year Spectrum Outlook 2021-26 Work Program” September 2021, https://www.acma.gov.au/five-year-spectrum-outlook; indicates mid and mm Wave bands of interest
Ofcom, “A Framework for Spectrum Sharing,” April 2016, Executive Summary page 4 https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0028/68239/statement.pdf
Government of Australia, “Commonwealth Held Spectrum- Review,” Feb 2018 https://www.infrastructure.gov.au/sites/default/files/commonwealth-held-spectrum-review.pdf
Supervision of clearance of occupied spectrum bands by directing existing users to cease operations in a particular band, and either move to another band or stop operating altogether; typology provided by Rosston and Skrzypacz, “Reclaiming Spectrum from Incumbents in Inefficiently Allocated Bands.”
Following the typology of Rosston & Skrzypacz, Reclaiming Spectrum from Incumbents in Inefficiently Allocated Bands: Transaction Costs, Competition, and Flexibility
in the 3.6-3.8 GHz band, part of the defragmentation was left to post-auction trading; Statement: Award of the 700 MHz and 3.6–3.8 GHz spectrum bands (ofcom.org.uk)
Stage 1 Business as usual monitoring, Stage 2 Initial investigation, Stage 3 Sub-stage 1 Long Term Transition Arrangements, Stage 3 Sub-stage 2 Final Technical Framework.
FCC, “Report and Order and Second NPRM 15-47.”
Ofcom, “A Framework for Spectrum Sharing.”
Upper C band (3.8-4.2 GHz), V band and TV white spaces (470-790 MHz) identified for intensive sharing
Providers of mobile services to end-users, also wholesalers and intermediaries, bid for capacity covering different time periods and locations
Ofcom, “Update on Spectrum for 5G.”
e.g., code modulation, polarization, directionality, or differential power; Government of Australia, Department of Communications and the Arts, “Enabling the Future Economy,” October 2017 https://www.infrastructure.gov.au/sites/default/files/5g-enabling-the-future-economy.pdf
power levels and operating conditions (e.g., indoor use limitations in some frequency ranges) to support RLANS and Wi-Fi
ACMA, Five Year Spectrum Outlook 2021-26.
Government of Australia, “Spectrum Review,” March 2015 https://www.infrastructure.gov.au/spectrum-review; for speed, flexibility, administrative convenience
See www.dot.gov.in, Spectrum Sharing Guidelines
Netmanias.com blogsite; accessed on 4.10.2021; https://www.netmanias.com/en/?m=view&id=blog&no = 15139
shared local use to encourage innovative and new uses in manufacturing, enterprise, logistics, agriculture, mining and health;Ofcom,”Enabling wireless innovation through local licensing: Shared access to spectrum supporting mobile technology,” July 2019) https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0033/157884/enabling-wireless-innovation-through-local-licensing.pdf
for innovation in IoT and smart apps at 870 – 873 MHz, Wi-Fi and Bluetooth at 2.4 GHz, Wi-Fi at 5 GHz and 60 GHz
Ofcom, “Review of the Authorisation Regime for Spectrum,” Dec 2017; https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/108604/Review-of-the-authorisation-regime-for-spectrum-access.pdf
ranging from 50 km2 up to national level; Ofcom, Review of the Authorisation Regime for Spectrum
ACMA updates to the Radiocommunications (Low Interference Potential Devices) Class Licence 2015
TRAI, Consultation Paper on “Auction of Spectrum in frequency bands identified for IMT/5G,” November 2021, has raised this issue for the first time; https://www.trai.gov.in/consultation-paper-auction-spectrum-frequency-bands-identified-imt5g
Information obtained on email from expert in Korea Information Society Development Institute (KISDI)
https://fcc.report/ELS/; https://www.cio.gov/assets/files/Framework-to-Conduct-5G-Testing-508.pdf
for testing, development, R&D of 5G radio eqpt; Ofcom, Update on Spectrum for 5G
Internet of Things Alliance (IOTA) Australia, “Spectrum Available for IOT,” May 2016 https://www.iot.org.au/wp/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/IoTSpectrumFactSheet.pdf
Qualcomm presentation on Global update on spectrum for 4G & 5G, December 2020 https://www.qualcomm.com/media/documents/files/spectrum-for-4g-and-5g.pdf
70 MHz priority, 80 MHz general users
Ofcom, “Enabling Wireless Innovation through Local Licensing: Shared Access to Spectrum Supporting Mobile Technology,” July 2019; https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0033/157884/enabling-wireless-innovation-through-local-licensing.pdf
Ofcom, “5G Spectrum Access at 26 Ghz and Update on Bands above 30 Ghz,” July 2017; https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/104702/5G-spectrum-access-at-26-GHz.pdf
Based on previous spectrum auctions, mobile market competition dynamics, technical features of bands, size of auctionable bandwidth, 5G market prospects; balance in short-term revenue maximization & long-term socioeconomic benefits of 5G; World Bank, Entering the 5G Era: Lessons from Korea.
Based on previous auction results in the United Kingdom and Europe, current market information; Ofcom, “ Statement on “Award of the 2.3 and 3.4 GHz Spectrum Bands: Competition Issues and Auction Regulations,” July 2017 https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0022/103819/Statement-Award-of-the-2.3-and-3.4-GHz-spectrum-bands-Competition-issues-and-auction-regulations.pdf; Reserve price < benchmarks for market value (where available) leaving space for price discovery, keeping in mind concerns re collusion/ strategic behavior; https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0021/205554/statement-final-regulations-700mhz-3.6-3.8ghz-spectrum-award.pdf
TRAI, Recommendations on Auction of Spectrum in 700 MHz, 800 MHz, 900 MHz, 1800 MHz, 2100 MHz, 2300 MHz, 2500 MHz, 3300–3400 MHz, and 3400–3600 MHz Bands; calculated from figures in TRAI recommendations using 1$=INR 75 and wireless subscriber base figures in TRAI’s Wireless Subscription Report for 30.06.2021
TRAI consultation has commenced: refer TRAI, “Consultation Paper on “Auction of Spectrum in Frequency Bands Identified for IMT/5G”,” November 2021 https://www.trai.gov.in/consultation-paper-auction-spectrum-frequency-bands-identified-imt5g
As a follow up to the recent decision of the Indian Cabinet to allot spectrum directly for 5G captive use; https://telecom.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/cabinet-clears-direct-5g-spectrum-allotments-to-non-telcos-for-captive-5g-networks/92221826?utm_source=Mailer&utm_medium=ET_batch&utm_campaign=ettelecom_news_2022-06-19&dt = 2022-06-19&em=YW51Lm1pdHJhMTk2MEBnbWFpbC5jb20=