Abstract

Xenophobia is conceptually distinct from racism. Xenophobia is also distinct from nativism. Furthermore, theories of racism are largely ensconced in nationalized narratives of racism, which are often influenced by the black-white binary, which obscures xenophobia and shelters it from normative critiques; so, philosophical accounts of racism, rather than merely subsuming racism, end up neglecting this historically important category of exclusion and oppression. This paper addresses these claims, arguing for the first and last, and outlining the second. Just as philosophers have recently analyzed the concept of racism, clarifying it and pinpointing why it's immoral and the extent of its moral harm, so we will analyze xenophobia and offer a pluralist account of xenophobia, with important implications for racism. This analysis is guided by the discussion of racism in recent moral philosophy, social ontology, and research in the psychology of racism and implicit attitudes.

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