Four principal themes emerge in this intensive reexamination of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. The first is that it was avoidable, of which several of the contributors remind us, including Jerome Slater in his conclusion. Second is that the intransigence and misevaluation that marked both US and Israeli policies were in great measure the reasons for its outbreak, with a few key policymakers in those two governments bearing the greatest responsibility. The impact of the 1973 war upon the interstate system of the Middle East is a third theme cast here in bold relief. A fourth theme, persuasively argued, places the onus for the early demise of US-Soviet détente upon Henry Kissinger’s conduct during the final few days of the war. His behavior convinced Soviet leaders that he had acted in bad faith. In fact as William Quandt notes, Kissinger’s ascendance in US foreign policy meant that détente no longer had...

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