Reply to Tibor R. Machan, "Rand and Choice" (Spring 2006), Eric Mack, "More Problematic Arguments in Randian Ethics" (Spring 2006), and Douglas B. Rasmussen, "Regarding Choice and the Foundation of Morality: Reflections on Rand's Ethics" (Spring 2006): Objectivity and the Proof of Egoism

Tibor R. Machan, Eric Mack, and Douglas B. Rasmussen present three differing analyses of Rand's view that the "choice to live" serves as the foundation of her ethical system. Hartford criticizes Machan's view that the choice is a "fundamental commitment." Hartford concludes that Rasmussen's assertion—that individual self-perfection is the natural end of human choice—cannot validate the choice to live. Hartford claims that Mack's analysis of the "function of valuing" as a bridge of the factual-normative gap can be strengthened. Hartford argues that carefully defining the meaning of "the choice to live" allows proof of its validity.