Abstract

During the Allied occupation of Austria from 1945 to 1955, hundreds of officials from the US Army, State Department, and various suborganizations worked in Vienna, Salzburg, and Washington, DC, on Austrian affairs. Their first-hand memories were recorded by the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (ADST), which continues to interview members of the US Diplomatic Corps. The oral histories are preserved on the ADST website as well as the American Memory Collection of the Library of Congress. Highlights from the interviews specifically from the critical decade after World War II speak to both familiar and more novel facets of the US occupation and the Austrian State Treaty: Rot-Weiss-Rot radio, Voice of America, the United States Information Service (USIA), the American High Commission, trade, Llewellyn Thompson, the effects in Europe of the outbreak of the Korean War, and rivalry with the Soviet Union in the early Cold War. Included in this selection are oral histories with Walter Roberts, Halvor C. Ekern, Denise Abbey, William Lloyd Stearman, Arthur A. Bardos, Mary Seymour Olmsted, Robert J. Martens, Lloyd Jonnes, Hendrik Van Oss, and Alfred Puhan.

Walter Roberts

USIA, Austrian Service, New York, 1943–1950

Austrian Desk Officer, Washington DC, 1950–1953

Interviewed by Cliff Groce in 1990

ROBERTS:

The most important date in terms of establishing an Austrian service was the Moscow Declaration of October 31, 1943, in which the foreign ministers of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union declared that Austria was an occupied country that deserved to be liberated after the end of the war—“provided,” et cetera and so forth. I remember at that time there were about three or four of us who were doing Austrian material, but always under the guidance of the chief of the German section, Hans Meyer. I had the highest respect for Hans intellectually—a very good editor and writer. But Hans was an emotional person, and so were a number of other people, particularly Martin Fuchs, who was later to become the first head of the Austrian desk. He and Meyer often disagreed regarding the thrust of the broadcasts to Austria. I remember after the Moscow Declaration Martin Fuchs proposed that a separate Austrian desk be created, and indeed sometime in 1944 the Austrian desk was established as a separate unit, but still within the German section. The people I remember who worked on the Austrian desk were Martin Fuchs, Robert Bauer, myself, and, on a purchase order basis, General Julius Deutsch….

To the best of my knowledge, the original broadcast to Austrian workers was transformed in March 1943 to a broadcast aimed at all Austrian listeners. A second Austrian show was added at the time of the Moscow Declaration. We had one broadcast at 9 a.m., which was 3 o'clock in the afternoon in Austria—not a very good time—and I don't know when the other one was on the air. But I don't think we had more than 30 minutes to Austria until May 1944. I do not remember when the Austrian desk was completely separated from the German section. When Martin Fuchs left VOA [Voice of America] and returned to Austria to join the Austrian foreign service at the behest of the then-chancellor of Austria, Leopold Figl, Robert Bauer became the head of the Austrian desk and I moved up to number two.

GROCE:

Given the fact that there was this separate broadcast, and the fact that the Austrians were to be considered occupied rather than enemy listeners, clearly there had to be distinctive differences between the approaches of the two programs, to Germany and to Austria. Tell me about those differences. Tell me what the Austrian program consisted largely of.

ROBERTS:

I remember this: At the beginning, in 1942 and 1943, the Austrian broadcasts were hardly different in tone and theme from the German programs. Indeed, the news summary was always taken from the preceding German broadcasts. What distinction there was … in terms of language; the Austrian announcers—Jens Friedrich, for instance—stressed the difference in terms of accent. But thematically, the thrust was similar to the German broadcasts—perhaps sometimes recalling the Austrian heritage, etc. What really changed the output was the Moscow Declaration. The Austrian declaration was a document conceived in the British foreign office sometime in the spring of 1943. The record shows that the British draft was forwarded to the State Department and to the Soviet foreign office sometime in the summer, and with very minor recommendations it was then accepted at the Tripartite Conference in Moscow in October 1943. I mention this only because this was not an American initiative, and whatever directives we had—I always add, to the best of my recollection—made very little distinction between Germany and Austria, because before the Moscow Declaration was published, there was no policy propounded in the State Department to have Austria treated separately. What we did, however—after the Moscow Declaration was issued—was to latch on to it, and we started writing more targeted scripts. We had a tripartite declaration which clearly indicated that after the end of the war Austria shall be an independent country. It also gave us a great deal of working room, because the Moscow Declaration said that Austrians must contribute to their liberation and that whatever Austria will do towards her own liberation will be taken into account when the final settlement is made. So it opened up a lot of possibilities, and all our intellectual acumen was brought to bear. My recollection is that we did not get very thought-provoking directives; what we did was basically on our own initiative.

It wasn't always easy. Here I come back to our problem: We were still part of the German section, and we still had to clear our scripts with Hans Meyer and his staff, who were not all that happy, quite frankly, with a separate thrust toward an independent Austria. They didn't like the idea that we were suddenly sort of walking with higher heels in the corridors of 224 West 57th Street. I remember once a shouting match between Meyer and Bauer, when Meyer said to Bauer that the trouble was that Hitler was an Austrian. Whereupon Bauer answered that the trouble was that while in Austria Hitler was a paperhanger, as soon as he came to Germany the Germans made him Chancellor! I give you the flavor of the situation.

We started all sorts of new programs. We would, for instance, interview Bruno Walter, the famous conductor, who was a former Austrian. We would interview the film actress Hedy Lamarr—she went to school next to mine in Vienna; Hedy Kiesler was her name. I remember, for instance, the well-known writer Fritz Torberg wrote a poem about a famous Austrian soccer player, who committed suicide after the Nazis came to power in Austria in 1938; we broadcast that. We gave the broadcasts a more typical Austrian flavor, and I have no doubt—knowing my old friend, Jens Friedrich, who was a superb announcer; he had a wonderful voice that carried—that he probably stressed even more the Austrian accent after the Moscow Declaration. So there were distinctions made and the Austrian flavor was there. There was also Konrad Maril—I don't know exactly when he joined us—who wrote some beautiful scripts with a very heavy Austrian tinge. And so it became rarer that we used German material as time went on.

GROCE:

So how long were you in the Austrian service?

ROBERTS:

I was in the Austrian service until early 1950 … at which point I was transferred to the State Department proper…. In 1949 the Austrian treaty talks were located in the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York. These were the talks that the foreign ministers of the Big Four arranged for “deputies,” as they called them—though they were not really the deputies of the foreign ministers—to draft an Austrian state treaty. Again, you know that was the difference between Germany and Austria. In the case of Austria, it was the reestablishment of the state, and not a peace treaty. I was designated by Foy Kohler, who was then director of the Voice of America, to cover these talks for the Voice of America, not only for the Austrian desk but also for the news desk. So on the days the meetings took place, I went over to the Waldorf Astoria Hotel, where Sam Reber was the American “deputy,” Gyorgy Zarubin the Soviet “deputy,” William Mallet the British “deputy,” and Marcell Berthelot the French “deputy.” Anyway, throughout the fall of 1949, these talks took place—which of course resulted in nothing. This was the famous “Nyet” period of the Soviet Union. Very soon Sam Reber, with the concurrence of Foy Kohler, employed me also as a spokesman for the delegation. He wanted me to handle the press, who waited outside because the negotiations were closed. I was not only, as I said, a reporter but also became, for all intents and purposes, a member of the delegation.

One day Reber asked me whether I would be interested in another job, other than being a VOA reporter. I said yes, I would be. He wrote a letter to his colleague, Tommy Thompson, Llewellyn Thompson, who was then deputy assistant secretary of state for European affairs. A few days later, I got a telephone call from Tommy Thompson, asking me to come down to Washington to see him…. He added that if he were Dean Acheson—who was then Secretary of State—and were to show me a table of organization of the Department of State, what job would I like to have? I was stunned. After a second or so, I said that I would be very happy to serve on the Austrian desk of the State Department. He replied that he would see what he could do.

A few weeks later, Martin Herz—the Austrian desk consisted at that time of political, economic, and public affairs officers, and Martin had the public affairs job—was to be transferred to Paris. Tommy Thompson obviously must have said a nice word about me because I was asked whether I would like to have that job…. Beginning the first of July 1950, I was a permanent member of the Austrian desk of the State Department.

My first job was to go to Vienna and organize the transfer of all information and cultural functions of the military high commission to a normal USIS operation within a civilian high commission. USIS in Austria consisted then of more than fifty Americans and over a thousand Austrian employees—we published a daily newspaper, the Wiener Kurier, and were responsible for a three-station radio network, Red-White-Red, with stations and transmitters in Vienna, Linz and Salzburg…. After accomplishing this reorganization, I returned to Washington and remained on the Austrian desk till the creation of USIA in the summer of 1953.

Halvor C. Ekern

Assistant to the High Commissioner, Vienna, 1945–1955

Interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992

EKERN:

… I worked for the US element of the Allied Commission which was called the Quadripartite Directorate…. The State Department took this over in 1950. The Allied Commission was still there and they took me over, too. After a bit I was integrated into the Foreign Service.

KENNEDY:

This is a very interesting period. What was Austria like when you went in and what was your attitude towards Austria? Was it different than towards Germany?

EKERN:

Well, you may remember that Germany was a conquered country, but the four allies decided that Austria was a liberated country. In Germany they had the nonfraternization policy, a very stern attitude, but in Austria we were free to make friends. The city was devastated, having been bombed very badly. The Russians got in there first. The Allied Authority in London had decided where the demarcation lines between the four zones were as well as the four portions of the city, to be divided among the British, French, Russians, and US. We were supposed to move in, but the Russians weren't quite finished looting the place and they stalled. Mark Clark was our High Commissioner and Commanding General. The Russians wanted to come in, but he said not until they sign the agreements on access, something they didn't bother to do in Berlin. Al Gruenther, the Deputy High Commissioner, went in and talked to the Russians and said that his commissioner was not coming in until they sign the agreements for access by rail, air, and road. A smart decision. So we got there in August. The city was totally demoralized, looted and violated. They had really sacked that place. It was a terrible chapter that had been sort of passed over. We got the High Commissioner operating by September 1.

KENNEDY:

We are looking at this in the field of foreign affairs. In the first place, what was your particular rank and position?

EKERN:

I was a major. The Allied Commission head was General Sasman and General Floree. I served Clark in the Allied Commission meetings as an assistant. The Allied Commission operated as a member of the Four Powers, which had an Executive Committee of their deputies and then twelve Four-Power Directorates for internal affairs, economics, finance, political, military, etc. They met weekly and the Council met twice a month. The work went on and our objective was, of course, to get a treaty and get out having established a democratic government. But the Russians had no intentions of leaving.

The first negotiations on a state treaty began in 1947 and we thought by '48 we would be out of there for sure. Well, we left in '55 because of the Russian intransigence. They were not prepared to leave and they stalled on the treaty. So I worked on that treaty from 1947 until 1955….

KENNEDY:

… You say you worked on the treaty, but here you are there for ten years. A treaty is not that big a thing. How does one work on a treaty when you know the other side is not going to do anything with it?

EKERN:

Well, by diplomatic persistence and patience. Meeting whenever we could get them to come. Article 35 was the question of disposition of German assets. Since Germany literally owned everything, they took over the country lock, stock and barrel, the Russians were free to choose what they wanted to seize in their zone as German assets … including the unbuilt autobahn, for example, which they seized as a German asset. So we could not leave them there with an unchallenged territorial position or we wouldn't have had an independent country. So we whittled away at these other articles trying to get them squared away, all the time chewing away on Article 35. We even had a special Austrian treaty commission come in, mostly to deal with the disposition of the oil fields. An American lawyer came in and worked for a year and gave up. I would have to look in the book to find out how many meetings we had of the Council of Foreign Ministers, and the Deputy Foreign Ministers, plus special negotiations.

Finally, what I think led to the treaty, was that the Russians at that time, 1953, '54, were trying to get a neutralized Germany if I remember. They made an attempt to get Germany out of NATO but we didn't think a neutralized Germany would work. So Molotov decided to set an example and have a neutralized Austria, to show them how it could be done. So it was in early 1955 that they called Chancellor Rabb and suddenly said they wanted this treaty. It shocked us all. I remember Llewellyn Thompson got the telegram and called us in and said that we must be prepared for thirty days of hard work. He was right. By that time the German scene had changed. Germany was more integrated into NATO.

Denise Abbey

Programmer, Radio Free Austria, USIS, Salzburg, 1945–1947

Educator, Austro-American Institute of Education, USIS, Vienna, 1947–1952

Interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt in 1988

ABBEY:

On the fourteenth of June, another fourteenth of June, six of us went in another station-wagon bus up over the Brenner Pass and on the way we had a rare experience. We met the German Army in retreat under a couple of MPs. There would be a long train of German vehicles with German officers of every rank in them. And at the front was an MP and at the end was an MP. They were surrendering. They were prisoners of war. That's all the guards there were. We'd have to somehow share the road and get past them. Then we began to overtake the American army going up in trucks, up into Austria and Germany. The trucks would be full of these dusty soldiers sitting there, you know. And the one on the tailgate would look and see the station wagon and yell “Girls!” Then everybody in that truck, everybody in the next truck would pick it up and stare and cheer. We went by to a constant stream of greeting and wolf whistles.

Well, we got to the Brenner Pass proper, the line of demarcation, the Americans were in charge. Two weeks later we would turn it over to the French because we shared our territory with them when they demanded to be recognized. But at that time we were in charge. And the man in charge there was absolutely floored. He hadn't had any women through before…. We had some lunch and went on through the Brenner Pass and went down into Innsbruck and then turned and went on to Salzburg. We came into Salzburg at sunset, of course, one of the most beautiful sights in the whole world. Salzburg had been bombed a little but not very badly. It had been saved, of course, by the man who later became the head of military government. Because he said, like he said of Rothenburg, there's no point. It's not a military place. So only an accidental bomb or two had hit it. One hit the cathedral. We came in there and for once we had a decent hotel. I don't know how it happened. But it did. It was the Bristol Hotel right by the Trinity Church, and we stayed there.

I was assigned, as I say, to the radio section under Hans Cohrssen. Well, I knew nothing about radio. Hans Cohrssen didn't know anything about radio either. And he told [Canadian journalist James MacDonald “Don”] Minifie that when Minifie said, will you come to Austria as head of my radio? He said, but I know nothing about radio. And Minifie said, no, but I can trust you. And I soon learned what he meant. Because there was more chicanery, more ex-Nazis doing this and that and the other thing. Because Salzburg was of course the greatest centerpiece of Nazism there was. But it was true. Hans Cohrssen was and is the finest American citizen I have ever known. He had come from Germany as a young man, brought his family over, married, had two children. Later in Austria he fell in love with an Austrian girl. Instead of just shacking up he went back home, told his wife. They arranged a divorce and to this day he supports members of that family. He married the girl and they have lived very happily ever since…. He is still working to build up a better radio TV connection between Europe and America, and he has arranged different programs, especially with the culturally inclined US stations.

SCHMIDT:

Has he stayed on then in Austria or Germany ever since that time? He never came back to the States?

ABBEY:

Yes, Hans Cohrssen stayed on. That of course presented certain difficulties in the early days because he was a naturalized citizen. I had occasion to write a letter on two occasions asking that his citizenship not be removed because he was doing a job that was badly needed. And he was such a fine citizen. Then, of course, the law was changed and he was not endangered…. He set up the radio in Austria on the sixth of June in 1944. And of course they had nothing to program. But they just had to put something on the air somehow. Now, it was radio in the German language because that's the language of Austria radio under the American control in the American section. Each nation had one. And when we divided our territory and gave France Voralberg and Tyrol they set up radio down there, Radio Dornbirn. The Russians, of course, had the main ones in Vienna…. We had Salzburg and Upper Austria. And the Russians had Lower Austria and Burgenland and the British had Steiremark and Tarnten. Each section had a radio in German language supervised by that particular country. Salzburg was until that fall the headquarters for Red-White-Red [radio station], which then moved to Vienna and has been there ever since, and the branch stations continue in Salzburg and Linz.

There was very little programming material available. The Americans came in with records and things. But we found in those stations something which we had never had in America, and that was tape recorders. I became introduced to them the first day I went to work in radio in Austria. They were a source of wonder to us because we had wire recorders like that. We used great sixteen-inch records. But the tapes, of course, became the thing and have grown naturally ever since.

The thing that Mr. Cohrssen did which was unique, and which had a tremendous effect for all America, was that he dreamed up the idea that there was not anywhere in Europe helping all of those thousands, even millions, of lost people who had been separated from their homes, their families, everything, by the German treatment of the Jews and others like that. How were they going to find their people? So he set up what was called Such meldungen. That is searching calls. And three-quarters or more of the programs on Red-White-Red in the early days consisted of people coming in and saying, “I am Hans Friendman. I come from so and so. I'm looking for so and so.” And they would broadcast that information. And from somewhere the answer would come back. And literally millions of people found their homes, found their people, found some connection through that Such meldungen. It was first in Austria. It was taken up by other nations because it was too impossibly important…. It was our brainchild you might say. The “our” is Austrian, not mine.

SCHMIDT:

Did you ever have any tangible expressions of appreciation for this kind of service that was given to you by the Austrians and/or other people that were utilizing your facilities to make these contacts?

ABBEY:

We had an endless verbal danke schön (thanks) or danke viel mals (thanks very much). I didn't understand—it was “dunk a field mouse” to me and I couldn't see what was happening to the poor mouse for months until I found out it was “thank you very much.” I'm sure there were written records. But it was a verbal thing. It was an enormous thing. It was an intangible that became tangible more by expression. But there was one young German, Helmut Dantine, who had come over to America as a movie actor. He found his parents through us, and he was so grateful because he had no way—he couldn't get to the country and find them. Of course, that was one of the major difficulties. There was so little physical contact. That was the main thing….

Shortly after I got there, [I was] assigned a job of providing one hour a month, an American program which we would create there. And I created them for a couple of years. The first time I did a program called This Is America…. This was something I had never done. But I wrote the program. I had it translated. I had to double over them to be sure they got the translation correct because my German was nonexistent. And then I watched the direction of it to be sure that they got it done. And I did This Is America. It was thirteen shows, thirteen divisions of America including music, history, folklore and other things. And that was one year. The second year I did a series of programs, plays, radio plays, on the—well, the history of the United States beginning with the first Thanksgiving and working right down through the Matanuska Valley in Alaska and doing a program for each one. As I've said often since then, when I think how many people it takes to make a radio program or a TV program today, and there I sat and did the whole works for a whole country for two years! At any rate, they were appreciated. Some of them were copied and used elsewhere.

The work largely, of course, I had to do it through an interpreter. And that led to something. I wanted then to learn German. And so I was trying very hard. At that time we were having very rapid changes in our commanding officers. General MacCrystal had never come up to Austria. We kept getting this man or that man. And we had a certain Colonel Grogan. And he hauled me on the carpet. I didn't know what I had done. He said, you're learning German. I said, yes. He said, what do you mean by learning German? You've got interpreters. I said, but I have 120 employees, almost none of whom speak English. Well, they should work with interpreters. Well, I happen to know how many of the interpreters were ex-Nazis—if there was an “ex.” He didn't flatly refuse to let me learn German. He didn't order me not to. He certainly thoroughly disapproved of it. But I continued to learn German and I went on with it because I didn't see how I could deal with 120 people who didn't speak English if I didn't speak any of their language.

And so I did learn to speak German. I made many Austrian friends and learned German with them. In the end when I came back here [Washington] and had to take the test on foreign languages, I left the instructors so dazed they didn't know what had happened. They had never heard more German in less time, more vocabulary and less grammar in any of their experiences. I'll tell you that I did later have a chance for five years of instruction in the language, and I cleared up a great deal. But I never will speak German perfectly because I learned it by ear. They said why don't you speak more slowly? I said, I can't. I don't know what I'm saying unless I say it fast.

At any rate, I made many Austrian friends and I still have many Austrian friends. I go back almost every year. I was transferred to Vienna finally. And I became associated with the Austro-America Institute of Education which had been founded in 1926 by a Dr. Dengler and still serves as one of the great sources for exchange between the two countries. I set up a lecture series there, gave courses towards easier English.

I had with me an English woman because all of the Austrians had learned English from English people and the American accent was kind of strange to them. So by having the two of us we could explore the differences in the language. And that is also one of the difficulties when they had learned from this one teacher then they could understand the teacher perfectly but they didn't know what anybody else was saying. So that helped to solve that problem.

I worked with the Austro-American Institute of Education all the years I was in Austria. I have continued ever since then. A group of former American officers in Austria formed the Friends of the Austro-American Institute of Education and Cultural Affairs, Dr. E. Wilder Spa[u]lding, D. Emil Spitzer of the International Bank, and Robert Bauer, and others of the group who formed the Friends…. And we have tried to promote the better understanding through the Austro-American Institute of Education.

I served in Salzburg that summer temporarily, then I was hastily called up to Vienna again on the fourteenth of September—there's something about the fourteenth! And I had a funny experience on the way up. They said you have to come. You have to come. We're crazy. Come. Get any transport. So I found a major who was going up to Vienna on Monday and I rode up with him in his jeep. We went through the Russian lines, of course, and two or three times between inns and Vienna a Russian soldier came out on the road and held up his hand, touched his wrist, and held up five. He would give me $500 for a wristwatch, any watch. I didn't have one to spare. But that was going on and it happened. And it was $500, not $5. The watches were absolutely incredibly in demand. Even Mickey Mouse would have paid a fortune.

I got to Vienna. I went into our office, which was in what is now the Wiener Kurier Building. (We founded the Wiener Kurier [newspaper] there) and said here I am! … And Don Minifie who was there in charge looked at me. And he said, oh, yes, yes, yes. Take a letter. And I got a pencil and my book and he said, address it to Colonel Charles Beauchamp, the British Information Officer. And he said, “Dear Charles, thank you for two bottles of mustard.” And that was all the work I did for ten weeks. I nearly went mad. So after two or three days finding that there was nothing happening I asked Mr. Minifie if he'd have any objections if I went to Berlitz and took German lessons. He said, no. In fact, I'll go with you. So we went to Berlitz for some weeks.

… I stayed in Salzburg until February of '47 at which point I transferred up to the radio office in Vienna. Now, when we first came in, in June of '45, the great event in Austria, musical event, had always been the Salzburg Festival. And so we undertook to get it underway somehow and arranged to broadcast it all over Europe. We offered it free. Well, of course, there weren't that many programs. Nobody was going to refuse it. So they managed to put on a Salzburg Festival. We got an American girl to be a pianist. We brought her up from Italy. And she played. So we had an American artist at the thing. And then the next year, Hans Cohrssen was gone. And I was in charge of the recording and placing of the Salzburg Festival.

[Later Abbey was reassigned from the radio to the USIS library.] … We at that time were having between 30 and 60,000 people a month come into that place to get books and magazines or to read the papers. It was the busiest place that I'd imagine…. This was the American library. The information center. It was the outgrowth of the old prop[aganda] shops…. And the newspapers and the books that we had. And at that time we were just beginning our translation program. They were just beginning to put things out. And we would get the publisher and then he would bring out a book. Then of course we'd keep a certain number of copies in the library and the rest would go on sale.

SCHMIDT:

… the books then that you had were entirely in English up to that point[?]

ABBEY:

Yes, except certain books usually by American authors—Jack London, Hawthorne, Mark Twain, etc., from German libraries which we put in because, of course, the people didn't speak that much English. But all during the years we kept getting more and more books translated into German. The translation program was really enormous.

SCHMIDT:

Pardon me, but … if they didn't understand English, what did they get out of it? How did they manage it?

ABBEY:

Two things. The newspapers which we had and the German-language newspapers which we were publishing. Of course, we brought them in from different places where they could get American background papers. Then books in English because a lot of people, the older ones especially, did read English. And as the time went on more and more of the young people knew English. And so they came and read them. And then some of them came frankly to keep warm in the winter. We might as well be honest. But they came. And we had a tremendous requirement for the books. It's rather interesting. The very first book which the Americans put out in German was put out in the newspapers as soon as they started in Austria. It was Gone with the Wind. And it was also the first book we then published. And to this day it remains the most popular book. We never had enough copies on the shelves.

SCHMIDT:

At this point, I gather that all the newspapers that were being published either in Germany or in Austria were those that had been originated after the war by American sponsorship.

ABBEY:

Yes, they were, or by other allies. I don't know if there were any older papers but if there were they were under new management obviously. But mostly they were entirely new names which of course by today are old names. And in Austria we had the Wiener Kurier. It was then the Wiener Kurier. Today it's just the Kurier. And then we had, of course, papers the British, the French and the others put out so we'd have more variety.

And one day, I had not been there very long when Jack Nelson came to my desk and he dropped three big envelopes of photographs on my desk. One thing we were always getting from America were photographs. Also we had a big photographic section which produced quantities of photographs of Austrian activities that had an American association or American background.

What he put on my desk were three big envelopes of 8×10s about the aluminum industry. Now, Austria has some of the biggest aluminum deposits in the world. And they had been opened up and were working. And these three envelopes, one was the mines themselves, two was the development and use of it, and the third was the transport and export of aluminum. He said, “I want you to make three windows out of that.” Well, I'd never made a [display] “window” in my life…. I sorted the pictures and I worked them out. And I finally sketched out and put on his desk what I planned. And he said, fine. That's your job. Do the windows now.

Well, we had about ten windows in that big corner shop which is right behind the opera in Vienna. And we had that always as the information center until Austria became a nation and we then gave up that big development. But that corner of Karntnerstrasse and the opera was one of the busiest corners in Vienna. And it had these great windows.

He gave me the job and I had a studio. And I had very good artists. I had to design and do the windows. My main project was showing either American influence in Austria or America itself.

SCHMIDT:

You had this position after you had left the radio station? … As a result of your having been—I won't say fired—from the radio program, you got into this cultural and information work in Vienna[?]

ABBEY:

Yes. Well, now this is where things really began to develop. Because in those days since nobody knew exactly what we were supposed to do, if you had a good idea you could try it. And we did. From those pictures I developed my first windows. And I almost always used pictures in there and something using the pictures. But I soon had a tremendous stock of pictures. And I had a very conscious and conscientious assistant. A German woman by birth, an Austrian citizen then. And she said the teachers are desperate for learning material. Suppose we should set up a loan of these pictures. Because all we do is just collect them by the thousands. And that was all right except of course all the captions were in English. So I soon had a translation section. And we translated all the captions into German and typed them and put them on the racks. Then we notified the teachers and they would come in and they would go through our stacks of pictures and borrow them in quantities and take them out for a week or a month, whatever they needed and bring them back. If I needed more copies then I went to our photographic section. And we ended up with over 60,000 photographs, and an enormous loan section.

Then we had films. They were the American films and almost always, of course, in English, but they were available. So I had a whole film section set up … all documentaries. We didn't have any what you would call commercial films, or entertainment films, at all. They were coming into the Austrian market very slowly because, of course, of the language problem. But later they did get them translated, and they did commercially bring them out. But ours were in English and they were documentaries, but of many, many kinds.

SCHMIDT:

How did you manage to make them comprehensible to the Austrians? Was there over-voicing?

ABBEY:

No, they were just played. Usually the person who took them explained about them. The people were so fascinated. And the pictures—documentaries are so often self-explanatory. In some cases I think we did put a photo with it or a sheet with it to cover material. But it was generally speaking they just were hungry for films. They were hungry for books.

Then another program was started and I had a double hand in that. Warren Robbins, who later was the founder of the African Museum here, was one of our cultural officers there. And he started a magazine for teachers of English. It was a small publication but it was very, very popular, and we had really a tremendous list. He came to me one day and he said,

“Denise, would you do a section in English for the younger people?” Of course all my life I'd wanted to write and that thrilled me. So I did. And I named our section “Young People.” Not a children's or things like that. Because young people of any age can read that, and we often saw it in the hands of old men and old women, young people. I put that out for two years. Then in the book translation section they decided that they would do a special section on children's books.

William Lloyd Stearman

Political Officer, Vienna, 1950–1955

Interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992

KENNEDY:

You were in Austria from 1950 to 1953. What were you doing there?

STEARMAN:

Actually I spent a lot of time in Austria from 1948 on. I was transferred to Berlin in 1955. I had a fascinating job in Vienna. I was in the political section and represented the US in a subcommittee of the Political Directorate dealing and negotiating with the Soviets. I did that for four and a half years. I also started something which became quite an operation, to help both our people and correspondents to report on Eastern Europe. I set up my own sort of peripheral reporting operation. There was a classified and an unclassified part. The unclassified part I made available to the press. I would say at one time that little office, with a very small staff, was, at any given time, the source of about a third of everything that appeared in the noncommunist press in the world on Eastern Europe…. Every single day of the year, Reuters' worldwide service carried at least one piece from us on events in Eastern Europe. It was a shoestring operation, cost the USG practically nothing, and was remarkably successful.

KENNEDY:

Did you think what you were doing was appreciated by the powers-to-be in Austria and back in Washington? Did they understand how useful this was?

STEARMAN:

Not fully, because it was so unorthodox. The main reason I did this was because correspondents were trying to cover Eastern Europe from Vienna, and I realized that if they could be helped, it could substantially increase the coverage and knowledge of Eastern Europe. But bureaucrats have little appreciation for unorthodox procedures and operations—I am sure you have found that out a long time ago—this operation was well known in Vienna, and it was widely called the “Stearman Service” by unhappy authorities in Eastern Europe. It was giving them problems….

KENNEDY:

Speaking of the Soviets, you worked for four and a half years dealing with them in trying to settle issues. What kind of issues were you working on and how did you find one dealt with this group of officials?

STEARMAN:

That is a very good question. You learn a lot in that length of time about how to deal with the Soviets. I came up with what I call an original Stearmanism: You had to be precise, patient, perseverant and powerful to deal with the Soviets. This required an enormous amount of patience…. We did have a few minor problems with the Soviets trying to interfere with access, but we could always nail them because we had such a tight access agreement. At one point early on, they were stopping and boarding our train … the Mozart Express which ran between Vienna and Salzburg in the American Zone.

In early 1946 the American High Commissioner told the Soviet High Commissioner that they must cease and desist from doing this. Once, in January 1946, when the train had to stop in the Soviet Zone to take on water, a party of Soviet troops boarded headed by a senior lieutenant and two enlisted men. That car was guarded by Tech Sergeant Shirley B. Dixon of Toledo, Ohio, who ordered them to get off the train and stay off. One of the officers made the mistake of reaching for his revolver and Dixon beat him to the draw and shot and killed him, badly wounded another soldier, and the other Soviets ran away. That was the last time they tried to board a US train in Austria.

We had also some early interference with air access to Vienna because that was not spelled out in as great detail as it was with Berlin. Our High Commissioner said that if there was any further interference with US flights, we were going to escort all our planes with fighter aircraft ordered to shoot down interfering aircraft. Soviet air interference immediately ceased….

KENNEDY:

What was the atmosphere at the embassy? What did people think of Soviet intentions?

STEARMAN:

We didn't think that their intentions were very benign as far as we and the rest of the West was concerned. There was considerable worry. When the Marshall Plan was announced and agreed to, the Soviets waged war against it by forming the Comiform in 1947 and by fomenting strikes, riots, and disturbances in France and Italy through the local communist parties. That was a very, very disturbing time….

KENNEDY:

Most of the time you were there the Cold War was in full sway. There was no doubt what our goal was, it was to stop the Soviets. Is that correct?

STEARMAN:

Always. And the closer you were to it, the larger loomed the threat. In Vienna we were 100 miles behind the Iron Curtain and surrounded by Soviet forces who were active in all sorts of nefarious ways throughout Vienna, even in the American Sector…. One event that really had enormous impact in Europe, I think more than most people now appreciate, was outbreak of the Korean War…. Many people thought that the attack on South Korea was a gambit in a worldwide Soviet offensive and that they were going to do something in Europe. Europe would come next. We had people in the Legation in Vienna who sent their wives and children to France, Spain, etc., to get them into Western Europe and out of Vienna. I sent most of my possessions back to my parents in the US. There was a great feeling of uncertainty. We didn't realize that Korea was an aberration….

KENNEDY:

What about when the United States went in, how was that received by our Legation?

STEARMAN:

From a psychological point of view it would have been infinitely worse if we had not, and South Korea had been taken rapidly. As it was, we almost lost anyway, even though we went in very soon after the attack, as you recall…. So we acted fairly rapidly. That was enormously important for the Western Europeans, to a degree which I think is still very little appreciated in the US. Had we not intervened then, the Europeans could well have concluded that they couldn't rely on the Americans, and that the Russians can go in anywhere and the Americans won't lift a finger. So it was very important, from the Europeans' point of view, what we did.

KENNEDY:

Did the mission that you were part of change while you were there? …

STEARMAN:

As a result of Korea, NATO became a military organization; prior to that it was a political organization and didn't have any military structure. As a result of the Korean War, our defense budget went from $12.7 billion in a year to $50 billion. Then we deployed several divisions of combat troops to Europe. We set up a NATO High Command, with Eisenhower the first Supreme Allied Commander, and it became a military organization for the first time. And then, of course, there were efforts to bring the Germans in somehow, and all of that story. Work kind of changed, and we were making somewhat more progress with the Soviets because they became somewhat more reasonable in this detente period. Things happened that never happened before. Agreement was reached with them on various issues that had been difficult or impossible to resolve before. Ultimately, and this was a keystone of that whole detente operation, they agreed to sign a state treaty for Austria on terms much better for Austria than they were willing to accept a year before….

KENNEDY:

While you were there we were still going through the Denazification period in Austria. Did we follow through on that or let up after the war?

STEARMAN:

We carried out Denazification there just about to the extent that we did in Germany. It was remarkable considering we always regarded Austria the “first victim of Nazi aggression.” But the percentage of Austrians in the Nazi party was about as great as in Germany…. I know the situation fairly well because I married into an Austrian family. They were anti-Nazi as were most of the aristocrats. To them the Nazi's strength was in the worse part of the population, called the “black coated proletariat.” … It was a very mixed picture in Austria, and some of the worst Nazis were Austrians….

Arthur A. Bardos

Radio Austria, Vienna, 1951–1955

Interviewed by Hans Tuch in 1990

BARDOS:

I was hired to be radio program officer in Vienna [in 1951]. So we had there this radio network, Vienna, Salzburg, and Linz, and this was by far the most listened-to radio in Austria … called Rot-Weiss-Rot, “Red-White-Red,” which always bothered us because we were flying the Austrian national colors as an American-operated station. It was a little bit embarrassing at times. But that's what the Army had done, and there was no way we could change it at that point.

We had the country's largest newspaper, called Wiener Kurier, which still exists under Austrian management, named Kurier, simply. It is a fairly direct successor. We had every kind of operation imaginable. I don't think that most people are aware of the degree to which we were really running the information machinery in Austria. Whether one considers this a good or bad thing, it was, I think, enormously effective. For instance, in all the industrial enterprises in Austria, which is a heavily trade unionized country, there was a trade union picture newspaper, poster newspaper, photographs with captions. Even in all the factories that were under Soviet management, they had to have these newspapers on their walls. I don't know whether the Soviets knew, but they may very well have known that these newspapers under the Austrian Trade Union Federation label were put out by USIS, with the unions' agreement, of course. Once I looked into it after the fact, because I was trying to do something similar in another country: we had footlockers with book collections circulating around the country, and I asked for a report on how this worked because I hadn't had anything directly to do with it in Austria. I found out that there were at one point—I am pretty sure I am right on the number—6,000 of these circulating…. Each had about 100 books, would spend two weeks in a given location—village school, restaurant, union hall, whatever. People could read the books they were interested in out of the collection…. There were no libraries, except USIS libraries….

We had a pervasive influence on what happened. When I arrived in Vienna, it was explained to me, more or less, that this was a very popular radio station, but it had a very bad reputation for cultural integrity. My predecessor, who was, incidentally, a very good man in his own way, was formed by American commercial radio and did something for which I was very grateful, but which was not calculated to endear him to Austrians: namely, he introduced the exact timing of programs. This was not new for Europe, but certainly for Austria, where programs usually ran as long as they ran, and then there was, in the old Austrian radio, the sound of an alarm clock ticking, until the next program, which might have started five minutes or fifteen or half an hour later….

I was instructed to improve the reputation of the station, but not to lose its popularity, of course, and I was instructed to stay out of Austrian politics. I immediately asked, “Is that possible, if we broadcast news 14 times a day, every hour on the hour? Can we stay out of Austrian politics?” “You have to. Those are your instructions.” … I violated, I am afraid, the second of these instructions on a regular basis, because you obviously were considered as playing politics, whatever you did. There was a coalition government in Austria. There were altogether four parties…. So, much of the thankless task of Americans working in Rot-Weiss-Rot was to somehow keep our heads down in some of these cross-fires in which we were constantly caught….

TUCH:

The Austrian Radio was controlled by the Soviets?

BARDOS:

The old Austrian Radio. This was one of our constant problems there, but it made the job more interesting, actually. The old Austrian Radio, which was one of the very venerable radio organizations formed in the 1930s, which gave the United States (CBS) its best radio engineer—inventor of long-playing records and various other things—remained. It had become part of the “Reichsrundfunk” under the Germans and then it became the Austrian Radio, run by two public administrators. But the Soviets were in the building because the building was in the Soviet sector of Vienna. They didn't run the station. We ran Rot-Weiss-Rot. They didn't run the RAVAG, as it was popularly called…. Anyway, the Soviets insisted on certain hours of airtime for programming which they prepared. Their programs were called “Russische Stunde,” Russian Hour. That was helpful to us, because it contributed to the popularity of our station, because the “Russische Stunde” turned everybody off. The Soviets also insisted on certain standards in the Austrian Radio news, and in emergencies, they could take over the whole station…. The Soviets also insisted, for instance, that news from the Soviet zone be broadcast in the “official” version, and this drove Austrians up the wall. A typical news story might have been “A person in the uniform of an officer of one of the occupying forces last night in such and such village shot an Austrian gendarme. Investigation proceeds.” And Austrians found it outright refreshing to hear, over our station, “A Soviet officer, drunk, shot an Austrian gendarme in such and such village,” which was the truth and everybody knew to be the truth.

TUCH:

There was very little competition in that sense.

BARDOS:

In that sense, there was little competition. Otherwise, Austrian Radio had much more money, it had a much larger staff. It was a much better equipped station in a vast radio building. We broadcast from a large middle-class Vienna apartment. But the content was on our side.

TUCH:

I would imagine that a number of the people, the Americans who worked in Rot-Weiss-Rot, would somehow end up or be seconded after a while by the Voice of America in New York.

BARDOS:

Yes. I was supposed to be transferred to the Voice of America directly. Well, I was supposed to be transferred to various places. In the end it was something totally different.

Mary Seymour Olmsted

Commercial Officer, Vienna, 1951–1955

Interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992

OLMSTED:

I was sent [to Vienna] to go into the commercial section. The Department of Commerce was considerably dismayed that the standard reporting that goes into Commerce, trade lists, trade opportunities, various forms that had to be filled out—WTDRs—had been quite neglected. And when I got there they put me to work cleaning up a backlog of nearly two years duration, and it was pretty dull work, I can tell you. As soon as I would finish one bunch of things, I would sigh, and think, “Now I can turn to something interesting,” only to have someone open another drawer, and say, “And here we have …” …

KENNEDY:

How did you find the trade situation, the commercial situation in Austria while you were there?

OLMSTED:

… The trade situation was affected by the general malaise that still covered the country under Soviet occupation, the military very much in evidence. People being too afraid of the future to want to paint their houses and refurbish things, and wear their best clothes, or anything like that. Sort of a depressing atmosphere….

KENNEDY:

Did you get out from under the trade reports and be able to observe the Austrian scene as a whole later on?

OLMSTED:

Well, I moved into a very interesting job in another part of the economic section. The economic section was very large, but another part of it was being expanded to deal with problems concerning Austria's economic relations with the Soviet bloc. A couple of the people in that section were working on such matters as permits to export things to the Soviet bloc. I was not involved in that work but I was following the broader economic picture. I was following the trade agreements that Austria was signing with the Soviet bloc countries, analyzing them, each one as it came along. I was following the questions of trade and economic penetration. It was a very interesting job. I depended quite heavily on the CIA for information, but in addition to that I was talking to people as well. And we had quite a bit of statistical information which I analyzed…. We were concerned that the Soviets would try, and perhaps succeed, in establishing domination over the Austrian economy through these trade agreements, and through these special arrangements that were made in bolstering certain types of firms. That was the main concern. There were intelligence concerns as well but this is what people were really focusing on.

KENNEDY:

When you arrived there, did a peace treaty of a particular kind that would turn Austria into a relatively neutral country seem at all in the cards?

OLMSTED:

No, no. It looked as though it were a long, long way down the road. Nobody was talking about a peace treaty when I went there. I remember the night I arrived, I went into the Hotel Bristol where I was supposed to stay. I was met at the door by an American army infantryman who put up his rifle and told me I couldn't enter without proper credentials, and it took quite a bit of argument before I set my foot in the American hotel there. There was a very, very strong military atmosphere around the place at that time.

KENNEDY:

In your work did you run across spies … I mean were you warned in having problems with the Soviets as far as compromising or following you, or anything like this? Was it a difficult place to work in because of that sort of thing?

OLMSTED:

Every now and then I would get very uneasy about things. I often worked after hours. My office was facing the street, I think I was on the third floor, and I can remember my phone would ring when I was working late and I might be the only person in that whole area of the building … my phone would ring, and when I would pick it up there was nobody at the other end. That always gave me a creepy feeling. And I usually left right then, I just felt I didn't want to stay around any longer….

KENNEDY:

What about the Austrians? What sort of contacts did you have with them, and how did they feel about the situation?

OLMSTED:

I didn't have a great deal of contact with the Austrians. That was a job that kept me in the embassy to a very large extent. I knew some of them socially, but I think I probably had fewer dealings with the local population in Austria than I had in any other post that I served in. Of course, the Austrians were cold and hungry, and depressed, and uncertain, and all the rest of it, and even though they liked us better than they liked the Soviets, they weren't all that happy with us either….

KENNEDY:

Again, you had a specific viewpoint looking at the economy. Did you find the Austrian business enterprises were beginning to respond as this thing went?

OLMSTED:

Something happened before that. In '52 the stabilization program was enacted. Dean Acheson, then the Secretary of State, and his wife paid an official visit to Austria. That was while Walter Donnelly was still the ambassador. Secretary Acheson held talks with the government of Austria and he made it clear at that time that the United States was going to stay in Austria, and was going to support the Austrians in every way that we could. A stabilization program was announced, I guess it was a little after that, in which the shilling was devalued but was backed by American loans. That was what put the economy on a firm footing. There were these two things: the renewal of confidence that came, stemming out of Acheson's visit, and what he said to the Austrian government, and the stabilization program. That was when the black market started to die out and when prices went up, but then they stabilized.

Robert J. Martens

Assistant Secretary, Allied High Commission, Vienna, 1953–1954

Assistant Secretary, Allied High Commission, Salzburg, 1954–1955

Interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1991

KENNEDY:

… You went to Vienna from 1953 to '55.

MARTENS:

Actually a year in Vienna, and six months in Salzburg. The first year was in the old Allied High Commission building. I was Assistant US Secretary. The job of US Secretary, which was held by Al Puhan, was merged with another position because of a tremendous cutback in personnel that occurred early in the Eisenhower administration, and Al went over to the embassy building to take on other responsibilities which took up most of his time. So he let me take over basically what he'd been doing before, and I reported to him once a week, but he gave me a lot of room to do the work.

KENNEDY:

What was your work?

MARTENS:

The Allied High Commissioners met once every two weeks. Tommy Thompson was the Ambassador and US High Commissioner. On the Fridays in between, the Deputy High Commissioners met—that was Charlie Yost, later Ambassador to the United Nations; and all through each intervening week there were various committee meetings on a number of subjects where lower-level officials of the Four Powers met. My job was not substantive; my job was to arrange the meetings. I controlled three American—controlled is the wrong word—but I managed the assignments of three trilingual interpreters, various secretaries that took the minutes of the meetings. Then we had to meet with the other allied secretaries and compare our minutes so as to come to an agreed set of minutes. So there would always be two sets of minutes, the US set, and then an agreed Four Power set. The agreed set was not necessarily the verbatim record as the other was, but was putting down what the Russians and others—particularly the Russians—would have agreed to because people like to change their minds, just as Congress does with respect to the Congressional Record. So there were a lot of meetings going on of an administrative nature that brought out substance as well. Before the Allied Commission meetings, for example, I used to meet with Ambassador Thompson and tell him things that I knew would come up suddenly in the Allied Council meeting because I had heard it from the other country representatives. There would accordingly be some forewarning as to what might happen in the coming debates that took place. I also was manager of the building for the Four Powers. That responsibility had always been given to the US side, and I had about forty Austrian personnel that cleaned up the building, and set out the flowers, or whatever had to be done.

KENNEDY:

From your point of view, how did this commission work, and what were the issues involved? Again, as you saw it.

MARTENS:

Well, as you know, up until the period just before the Austrian State Treaty was signed—that was on May 15, 1955, by which time I had already left—until that breakthrough, the relationship between the Soviets and United States was extremely bleak. This was also true for Austria itself since the Eastern Zone had been occupied by the Soviets. There was a totally hard line Soviet posture on all kinds of issues and we had given more freedom, more rights, to the Austrians in the western zones. We were generally on the side, as were the British and the French, of gradually decreasing the controls over the Austrian population. There were very rigid postures being taken by both sides, by the Soviets particularly. So little was being accomplished. On rare occasions the Soviets would give way….

KENNEDY:

What was your second job?

MARTENS:

I went to Salzburg in August 1954. Salzburg was the headquarters of the American zone at the time, so it was both a consular post and a POLAD [Foreign Policy Advisor Program]. The man nominally Consul General there, Tully Torbert, was also the Political Adviser to the Commanding General of American forces in western Austria, a Lieutenant General. Torbert's office was in the military headquarters building across from the Consulate and he left the running of the Consulate itself to his deputy, a man named Oscar Holder. I was also in the headquarters building with Tully Torbert and was the political officer with responsibility for political reporting in western Austria. It was not a terribly inspiring job from the standpoint that most significant events, as in most countries, were going on in the capital. One of two subjects of interest in the Salzburg area was the third party, the VdU, which many thought of as a neo-Nazi party, but which was basically a conglomeration of pan-German nationalists, neo-Nazis, and a certain number of people who were conservative but were opposed to the Catholic Church aspect of the People's Party, which was the leading conservative party. So the VdU was sort of a mishmash, and it was interesting to follow it, in part because I had a very good contact, namely the head of the VdU. He turned out to be a man who had been in a prisoner-of-war camp that I began guarding at the end of World War II, and we found it interesting to talk about his view from the inside, and my view from the outside. That common experience provided a basis for rapport.

The second subject of interest in Salzburg, although it was not a major feature of Austrian politics, was the Monarchist movement and this was also centered in Salzburg. There was a local brewery owner who was simultaneously the “Stellvertreter” or representative of Otto von Hapsburg in Austria. Otto himself was banned from entering Austria. I also got to know him pretty well, and it was kind of fun to follow the Monarchist movement. So these two right-wing movements were centered in Salzburg, and my job was to follow them.

KENNEDY:

Just to get a feel about it, was there much concern in the early '50s about a resurgence of Nazism or fascism, in Austria?

MARTENS:

I think US concern over that possibility was much reduced by that time. I think US concern over a possible neo-Nazi or neo-Fascist revival had been somewhat greater in my earlier period in Naples, but by 1955 that was not as much of a concern anymore. There was some concern, but I think no one really thought that Austria was going to go that route….

Lloyd Jonnes

Economic Analyst, Economic Cooperation Administration, Vienna, 1953-1956

Interviewed by W. Haven North in 1986

JONNES:

… My first task in Vienna was to do the balance of payments forecast for six months of 1953 for the Austrians. Lo and behold, their balance of payments had completely turned around and they received their last allotment of Marshall Plan aid in June 1953. That was the end of the actual Marshall Plan as such. We continued on with a small mission for several years thereafter, primarily to wind up a number of programs, but more importantly to maintain a watching brief that the Austrians were making the transition out of occupation to independence.

NORTH:

How did you find the Austrian economy at the time you started there?

JONNES:

It was booming in 1953 for a variety of reasons. There was a high degree of domestic political stability. Second, the Germans had made substantial investments there during the war for obvious reasons. Third, the nation had received a large volume of American aid. The rest of Europe, too, by 1953 was growing rapidly which reflected itself in Austria's exports and tourism industry.

NORTH:

Was it not so badly damaged as other countries?

JONNES:

Not so badly. Yes, some parts had been bombed and fought over, but the physical damage was not at all that bad. One of the real shocks for the Austrian economy was the seizure by the Russians of all significant industrial establishments in the Russian zone after they had moved in. This conglomeration was called the USIA complex, having nothing to do with our USIA…. It was an abbreviation, in Russian I believe, for the former German-owned industrial plants seized by the Russians in 1945. Consistent with anything that offered a chance for profit the Russians moved a great deal of machinery out to Russia. It was all part of the indemnification of the Russians for the damage inflicted upon them by the Germans, and Russians were determined they would make good from anything they could make good from.

In 1954 one of our princip[al] operations in Austria were the sales under the Public Law 480 programs which had just come into being. One of my principal functions was working out these programs with the Austrians. Then, quite suddenly at the end of 1954, it was becoming fairly clear that there were going to be serious negotiations on the political status of Austria. There had been a series of negotiations in the immediate postwar period on an Austrian state treaty. These had come to naught because basically the Russians were not prepared to agree. But quite suddenly toward the very end of 1954 or very early in '55, the Russians indicated that they would be prepared to negotiate seriously, and mirabile dictu the negotiations resulted in a state treaty which came into effect May 15, 1955, and Austria was independent in the most meaningful sense of the word.

One critical question for us as we were looking at the economic side was what would be the impact of the state treaty on Austria. Our colleagues in Washington people were quite concerned lest the successes of the Marshall Plan in Austria might be jeopardized by the tremendous costs of undoing the damage done by the Russians in their zone. We did a study of the economy that suggested Austria's economy should have little difficulty in the transition. We had lots of information available from miscellaneous sources on what was going on in the Russian zone economically, and the conclusion was Austria had reached economic viability….

NORTH:

Living in Vienna, you were describing that as being …

JONNES:

We enjoyed our years there. Perhaps the adversity of being off on the edge of Western Europe under unsettled conditions added zest. The music of Vienna was marvelous even though the opera did not move back into its permanent home until 1955. In that same year our modus operandi changed significantly after the State Treaty. The American aid mission came to an end as such, and what had been the US High Commission in Austria was transformed into the embassy. In effect in those days under the High Commission, the High Commissioner had been our ambassador….

NORTH:

There must have been massive amounts of counterpart monies? … You were programming this?

JONNES:

We were not programming, we were looking at it after the Austrians programmed it. You know we would take our 5 percent, I guess it later became 10 percent, under the Zablocki Amendment. The real question was where control of this should lie and obviously it had to be in the first instance with the Austrians. As long as inflation was under control I think we would not be too concerned.

NORTH:

We were not dealing with the allocation by sector or anything?

JONNES:

I think that in a country as sophisticated as Austria, there are so many devices to achieve effective allocation of financial resources that there was little point in debate. On the margin, perhaps our recommendations might have had some effect, for example, in the amounts of local resources going to new tourist facilities….

NORTH:

Why were we providing any assistance for them … food shortage?

JONNES:

We were providing food aid largely because of our domestic concerns with surplus grain supplies, i.e., simply as a US interest. The Austrian interest was in minimizing the foreign exchange costs of commodities they needed—they were a large importer of wheat at that time from the United States. They were delighted to get it without spending dollars even though their foreign exchange situation had improved markedly. I would add parenthetically that one of the critical questions for all of the European countries was that once they reached a reasonable balance of payments how should they dismantle this great complex of import regulations designed to cope with the previous balance of payment problems. How do you liberalize? One of our constant concerns with the Austrians was to have them recognize our legitimate interests in exporting to them.

NORTH:

Were there other conditions that you were implying in conjunction with your balance of payments?

JONNES:

Not really. Until 1953, in that period from 1945 to 1953, the United States High Commission had been remarkably involved with the Austrian economy in extraordinary detail because of the universal view that the Austrian economy was a basket case.

A personal note. In May 1945 I ended up the war in Austria and even then it was very clear that there were serious, serious problems with the economy. We provided aid under the Government Assistance to Occupied Areas (GAOA) programs immediately after the war and then through the Marshall Plan. In part because of this, we had kept the economy going. Then we made the discovery that really the Austrian economy was in very sound shape. Tourism is also one of the great pluses because this is what put their balance of payments in order in the short run. As Europe began this slow process of recovery, tourism took off….

NORTH:

In our current parlance about graduate countries, was Austria a success?

JONNES:

Yes, the Austrians believe it and we believe it. It worked very, very well for a variety of reasons. To my mind our aid certainly was a necessary condition for the rapid development of Austria, but the predominant reason for Austria's economic success was in the political stability they achieved in sharp contrast to the 1920s and 1930s when civil war had erupted. Another element explaining this success concerned the Austrian economy after annexation by Germany. The Germans considered Austria as an excellent site for much of its war production and invested heavily in these facilities, in steel-making, metal-working, and machinery. Many of the investments made by the Germans remained in place after the war. Yet another factor in Austria's economic rapid growth lay in the simple fact that the other European economies had revived, and Austria benefited substantially from growth in demand for its exports and the phenomenal increase in tourism….

NORTH:

How did you find working with the Austrians?

JONNES:

Always instructive. There is a long tradition of imperial power in the Hapsburg Empire, one of the great empires of history.

Hendrik Van Oss

Economic Officer, Vienna, 1953–1956

Interviewed by Lillian Mullins in 1991–92

VAN OSS:

I was assigned to Vienna right after Kuala Lumpur, arriving there in November 1953. We stayed there until November 1956. I was assigned there as Transport and Communications Officer which was somewhat of a mystery to me because I never thought I knew anything about either transport or communications. I questioned the assignment and was assured that the powers to be knew what they were doing. I am not sure to this day that they did, but in any event the assignment stuck. So as an unwilling economic officer I went off to Vienna….

In Vienna I was one of about several hundred members of the US High Commission. Our Ambassador, Tommy Thompson, was High Commissioner. My exact position was Alternate Representative on the Quadripartite Signals (Communications) Committee, Transport Directorate and Air Directorate. That meant in effect that I sat in on Four Power Directorate meetings in those three categories of activities. As I say, I had no previous knowledge about any of these spheres. On civil air, in the early days, I was under a chap named Tom Carter, a very experienced civil aviation attaché. I learned a lot from him. But on transport and communications, railroads, post offices, etc…. I was on my own. My only consolation being that nobody else at the embassy knew much about these subjects either. Also, I had US military people who were in theory under me, but who actually ran the operations in those respective areas in the US zone of occupation.

Dealing first with the one I knew the least about, the Quadripartite Signals Committee, I don't remember too much about the details. I had a local employee, an Austrian national, who knew all about the subject and helped me greatly. I remember going to see the Austrian Post Office Director and being given a book of Austrian postage stamps, which I still have to this day. The only thing worth reporting is that we had, by Quadripartite agreement, the right to inspect the telephone underground terminals which were in the Soviet zone under guard of the Soviet occupying powers. I remember going down with an American colonel who was my deputy for this activity and an expert on communications … going down into the bowels of the earth under Vienna and seeing what seemed like mile after mile of cables and all sorts of electronic terminals and other equipment. I was trying to look knowledgeable. We “inspected” these facilities in order to retain our legal right to do so. If we had not exerted this right on occasion the Soviets might have tried to prevent us from doing it at all on the grounds that we hadn't shown any interest. So we inspected periodically.

On the Transport Directorate, the main thing we had to worry about was the Austrian railroad system. Here also I was in complete ignorance of what I was doing, except what I could pick up on the spot. Again I had military people helping me, people far more experienced in railroad management than I. But I was the representative of the Quadripartite Committee so in theory any negotiating that was done on the subject of railroads was my responsibility. We used to take inspection trips on the railroad. We would get the Austrian Director of Railroads' personal, private car and go tootling all over the railroad lines in the American occupied zone. There wasn't too much to inspect because all you see were railroad tracks and if the train slowed down for some reason or other I would try to look knowledgeable as if I knew what was happening, but I didn't….

I might digress a little bit and say something about the occupation … about our experience during the occupation when we were there. As I say, we got to Vienna through the Soviet zone via train and had to carry “gray cards,” which were identification documents. Soviet officials would board the trains from time to time and check on these cards. After arriving in Vienna we were housed in the Bristol Hotel right across the street from the State Opera House and one of the finest hotels in Vienna. We had a small son at that point so the three of us had one large double room and one adjoining single room with two massive bathrooms, each with a seven-foot bathtub. We had a refrigerator. Our rooms had velvet brocaded wallpaper and full room service. For these magnificent accommodations we paid the princely sum of 50 cents per room per day. The Bristol was an American occupying army billet, I suppose. We were there for at least six months.

After that we moved to a small house out near Grinzing, one of the famous wine villages on the outskirts of Vienna. The house was really too small for us, but we were ready for anything after six months in a hotel. Although the hotel was wonderful in its way. We had full maid service and babysitting service. We had concierges who knew all the casts of the operas, could advise us of the best operas to see, and could procure excellent seats. In those days in Vienna you could get the best opera seat in the house for something like $2.50. If you went to the best restaurant in town you could get the finest meal you could eat for about the same price. So it was really, in a fiscal sense, paradise. We enjoyed Vienna very much as a place to live and it was also very interesting culturally.

Another thing worth mentioning is that our two youngest children, our second son and our daughter, were both born in Vienna. There was an American Club with a swimming pool and tennis courts; there was a PX—the Army took care of its own very well. The High Commission was really part of the military structure so we benefitted from all these perks.

The other occupying powers administered their section in typical fashion. The American section of Austria took on an air of a pseudo–United States with lots of activity, business and reconstruction. The French concentrated more on the hotels and the food and that sort of thing. The British, well, there was nothing really worth noting about their section. But the Soviet section … you could go into the Soviet section with a blindfold, and when you took it off you would know at once that you were in the Soviet section, because it was drab, gray, buildings had not been repaired, the atmosphere was repressive. Perhaps it was that way because we expected it to be that way, but I think we were perceptive enough to see what was actually happening.

Another thing about the occupation, the three Western powers, France, Britain and the United States, were trying to build Austria up and bring it back to economic and political viability. We were always trying to persuade the Soviets to negotiate an end to the treaty and loosen up their regulations. This really was the bulk of my work. Eighty percent of my work was with civil aviation. Most of the work was trying to train Austrians to take over their civil air activities after the end of the occupation. The Soviets opposed this all the way because they feared that the Austrian air force would be built up and would lead to the restoration of the Austro-German Luftwaffe. This was the excuse they used to keep a tight clamp on all civil air activities by Austrians. There were several airfields in the American zone, both civil and military, which in theory were under my aegis. One of them was in Linz, another in Salzburg, another in Tulln, right outside Vienna….

The eventual turning over of the airfields and installations to the Austrians after the State Treaty was signed, and I will go into the treaty itself later, was a very intricate business. We had to keep in mind at all times that there were two factions, each trying to get complete control over the airfields and the incipient Austrian airline. I spent almost all of my time trying to work out a process whereby we could give over these airfields to both sides so that they could all share equally in the turnover. Once the air facilities were in Austrian hands it was up to them to finally resolve their differences…. The turnover was all going to be symbolically done at the main American airbase near Vienna at a predetermined time in the afternoon. The Ministry of Finance was going to send representatives. There was to be a ceremony at which the signing over of air facilities would take place and the Austrian flag raised. To my horror, on the morning of the day that this was supposed to take place, I got a phone call from my Air Force colleague who was in charge of operations at Tulln airbase, saying that they had “done it.” I asked, “Done what?” Well, he said, “We turned everything over to the Austrians.” I was astounded and horrified and said, “How could you have done this? We are supposed to do it this afternoon.” He said, “Oh, well, the Ministry of Finance sent some people over this morning and we turned everything over to them.” I said, “My heavens, what are you going to do about the Ministry of Transport and Watzek?” “Oh, well,” he said, “we are going to have the flag-raising ceremony this afternoon and he can come to that.” … It was a highly embarrassing situation. He came to the flag raising and they even started that ceremony off without him. It really was a terribly aggravating thing for me and for the embassy and for half of the Austrian people we dealt with. At the time I was extremely angry with our Air Force. I felt that I had been betrayed, that they had gone against what we had all been so careful to arrange…. I certainly reported this to the embassy, but I doubt it ever found its way into the historical archives. But it shows how despite the best efforts of men things can go awry. The saga of the struggle between the two parties as to which would take over the Austrian airline continued long after the occupation ended. The result was that Austria ended up with two airlines. One was Air Austria, the one run by the National VolksPartei and the other was Austrian Airways, which was under the Ministry of Transport and Labor….

The only other thing I want to talk about was the signing of the Austrian State Treaty…. The State Treaty was signed in Vienna, I think in May 1955. Anyway, the negotiations ended successfully, the date of the signing of the State Treaty was set and the great day arrived. We had sent over a tremendous delegation of people led by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and including all sorts of great names like Chip Bohlen, Livingston Merchant, etc. There were at least fifty personages, a large delegation. I remember on the signing day we went in a motorcade consisting of thirteen cars. I was in the thirteenth car, so I am glad there were thirteen. We rode from the embassy over to Belvedere Palace where the treaty was to be signed. The streets were packed with Austrians. It was intermittently raining and sunny … sometimes you could see a sea of umbrellas and other times you could see smiling faces. People were throwing flowers and cheering. I felt as if I were participating in the liberation of Paris or something like that. It was really one of the most heartwarming experiences of my entire time in the Foreign Service.

Anyway, we got to the Belvedere Palace. The signing was to take place in the ballroom on the second floor. The floor of the ballroom was supposed to be weak so the number of people allowed to be in the ballroom was severely limited. There was a long table for the five foreign ministers, including the Austrian Foreign Minister, Figl, and their immediate aides were behind them. The rest of us were supposed to stay in rooms off the ballroom and were allowed to look through the doors. But the minute the big five arrived and took their places at the table, as if by an unheard signal we all streamed in from the antechambers and grouped ourselves around the table. I found myself in the back row within a meter and a half of John Foster Dulles's pen. It was somewhat of a crush.

The signing took place and afterwards the foreign ministers went out on a balcony. There were great crowds in front of the palace. Dulles, in the words of Chip Bohlen or Livingston Merchant, looked like a debutante after her ball because he was smiling and waving at the crowd. Not at all like the dour, rather crusty old fellow that we were used to. Molotov was a short, stubby character. He didn't smile at all but had his hands clasped together over his head in the classic gesture of a winning prizefighter. Macmillan was the ham actor looking over the crowd, pointing and waiving to people. So it was a great performance by everybody.

That night we had a reception and dance in the ballroom at the Schönbrunn Palace, which was opened up to everybody for the occasion, reminiscent of the glorious days of the Austrian empire….

MULLINS:

You have been telling me about the collegial atmosphere at the Embassy in Vienna. I wonder if you would like to put that on the record as well?

VAN OSS:

Yes, I would like to. Posts are different. Vienna, I think, was one of the friendliest posts I have ever been assigned to. A very close spirit of cooperation and friendship developed among all the people who were in my type of work. In other words, the officers at the embassy and their wives. We were all doing work that we thought was important and interesting and, for some reason or other that can't be quantified or described, very warm friendships were made at this post. I think we now have more close friends from our Vienna days than from any other post where we have served. I think other people who were assigned to Vienna at that time would corroborate this. It was most unusual. When Dick Davis, who was the head of the political section, left, he said in his final remarks at his farewell party, “You may not realize it, but this is a special post. The friendships that you have made here will last all of your lives.” He went on in that vein for a few minutes and finally broke down in tears and had to stop. So it was an unusual post.

MULLINS:

Do you think the political situation had a lot to do with that?

VAN OSS:

Yes, I think we were all working hard. We were up against formidable adversaries. We had fine people in charge … the Ambassador, his deputies and senior and junior officers were all able. It was just an unusual amalgam of things that made for a very interesting and friendly post. The gemutlich atmosphere of Vienna, the music, food, and historic buildings, the charm of the countryside, all contributed to the feeling of well-being each of us had.

Alfred Puhan

US Secretary in the Allied Commission for Austria, Vienna, 1953–1957

Interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt in 1990

PUHAN:

… I received my first Foreign Service assignment, to Vienna, Austria. Now, it had never occurred to me that Vienna might be a post I could get. But here I was a German-language expert. I spoke German fluently. And the idea of going to Vienna in the '50s under Four Power occupation—my wife and I discussed this and a decision was made and that was the end of my tie with the Voice of America and the information program.

SCHMIDT:

… When you went to Austria, in precisely what capacity did you go? What was your assignment?

PUHAN:

It was an assignment that was not particularly sought after by Foreign Service Officers…. I think ever since lateral entry into the Foreign Service came into being, the problem has always been: what do you do with a man who has had 900 people working for him, as in my case? Where do you put him, what kind of a job? Yet, he's had no foreign experience except with the Voice of America and he hasn't been a political reporter in the sense in which the Foreign Service use that or an economic officer. So what do you do with them? And I think they've always had a lot of difficulty. And I was assigned to what I thought was probably a sort of an ancillary job which most Foreign Service Officers didn't want. It was held at the time by Hal Ekern. It was US Secretary in the Allied Commission for Austria. Now, the Allied Commission for Austria, as you know, was in its eighth year when I got there. Two more years were to pass before finally the Austrian State Treaty was hammered out….

I was in the Allied Commission Building and the biggest drawback was that I really couldn't have any contact with the Austrians. I enjoyed it. I enjoyed working with the Soviet, British, and French secretaries. And most important of all, it brought me into weekly contact with one of the finest ambassadors the United States ever had, namely Llewellyn E. Thompson. Thompson was a man who did not ask what was your background in the Foreign Service or what did you do? He was interested in people who could help him—and he found me very useful because he found out that I spoke German fluently. So I began to go with him on his calls to see the chancellor or the vice chancellor of Austria. And, of course, I always briefed him before the Allied Commission meeting. So this was a big plus for me. But, as I say, it was not a job which made use of my talents as a German-language officer because I had no contact with the Austrians except when I went as interpreter, as reporter with the ambassador.

SCHMIDT:

I'd like you to make a few comments about what you think the mission accomplished in the years that you were there and do you think that you personally contributed something to those accomplishments? If so, what?

PUHAN:

Well, the Allied Commission was in its last two years beginning its ninth year when I arrived there in June of 1953. It had been a very useful organization in that there was an article in the document which set up the Allied Commission which allowed Austria laws to become law even if there was one veto. It could not stop them from becoming law. It was sort of a shield behind which the Austrians could run their own country even though the Four Powers all had troops there in Austria.

When I arrived there the Allied Commission was marking time. There had been, oh, 300 or more meetings to try and get an Austrian state treaty and they had always broken down. It wasn't until its tenth year that we received a signal that the Russians were prepared to go for a treaty provided Austria would accept neutrality and pay certain reparations.

I learned a great deal about the Russians for one thing. I dealt very closely with the Russian secretary, but not only with him but also with the top Russians in the Allied Commission because after every meeting we had a social reception, cocktail party if you like, and we showed movies to each other. I even took Russian-language lessons at the time.

Well, my contribution to it—I don't want to exaggerate that. I think I probably helped Ambassador Thompson, and even more so after he asked me to become his political counselor there, because I was able to keep him abreast of what the Austrians were saying and planning. The biggest accomplishment was, of course, under the Allied Commission, the final hammering out of the treaty. As you know—you probably have heard from others, how this process worked.

In the morning the American Ambassador or High Commissioner, as the British and the French also were called, would meet at our embassy and we'd have a strategy session. Then in the afternoon we'd meet with the Russians. This is where Ambassador Thompson showed his great skill. When he saw that the Russian was unable to move obviously because his position was hard and he couldn't move beyond it, Thompson would suggest that we have a closed session with only two people from each of the four elements there. This gave the Russian a chance to select whomever he wanted to select from his element and you could find out what was the sticking point.

I learned personally more than I undoubtedly contributed because I watched at close range, worked with Ambassador Thompson on this. He came to accept me sort of as his aide and eventually even though I was not the number two man, I was to all intents and purposes, the last two years I was there, I was the DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission.

But the great accomplishment—the Austrian State Treaty of 1955—I think was still one of the finer bits of diplomacy since the end of World War II, because it got the Russians out of a part of the world that they had occupied, the little bit of Eastern Austria, something they haven't done again until Afghanistan recently where they finally had to pull out. And, of course, even more recently, out of Eastern Europe and East Germany. So I really think that that was a great accomplishment. Now it was Thompson I believe largely, Ambassador Thompson, to whom the credit goes for achieving that treaty….

I was told that, well, when the academicians in Austria studied the files, the American files made available to them dealing with the making of the Austrian State Treaty, they found my name repeatedly on cables. Well, that was because I was the drafting officer and of course the ambassador signed the cable. So they decided that I was sort of a man who was on the inside, had the inside track….

SCHMIDT:

You mentioned that Tommy Thompson wanted you to be his political counselor and that you ended up as virtually DCM. Were you dealing extensively with the Austrians outside the official Austrian government? Or were you primarily dealing with the Austrian government officials? And if you were dealing outside, with whom were you talking?

PUHAN:

Both. I had, of course, contact with, I knew and they knew me personally—I knew Chancellor Julius Raab, the Vice Chancellor, Schaerf. I knew Oskar Helmer. I knew Poldi Figl, Foreign Minister. I knew them all from the top on down. But I had also a wide range of contact with Austrians outside of government. There were the party people I dealt with—mainly with the … CDO—the Christian Democratic people. That's probably the equivalent of our Republican Party, whereas my colleague Alex Johnpoll dealt with the SPO, the Socialist Party—the Socialist Party of Austria. I knew everybody from the Chairman of both parties—the equivalent of the Chairmen of the National Committees here. Then I had a number of friends among the journalists, Fritz Molden, Oskar Pollock and a number of others. I knew a good many of the theater people because I knew German. We went to the opera once a week because you could go to the opera for $4.00 a ticket and sit in the first two rows. And I attended the theater a lot. I got to know the artists, doctors, lawyers as well as the parliamentarians and municipal officials. The Mayor of Vienna was a good friend of mine. So I had a lot of outside contacts.

SCHMIDT:

I ask that question because I had a feeling that perhaps that also influenced the Austrian government in their giving you an invitation to come back for their twenty-fifth anniversary…. Since you said that you had a number of contacts with the journalists there, do you have any feelings or do you have any knowledge of what role the USIS played in the Austrian program …?

PUHAN:

Yeah, I think they were. After all, they ran the Wiener Kurier, which was the first newspaper in Austria under American auspices. Rot-Weiss-Rot, the network, the radio network in Austria was supervised and controlled by USIA operations. Although I didn't have as much to do with them in my Foreign Service duties, I always knew who the responsible people were and what they did. Yes, I think the answer to your question is: yes, I thought they did a very effective job in the post-treaty signing or even pre-treaty signing days in Austria.

SCHMIDT:

It's a well-known fact, of course, that by the time Hitler moved into Austria there was a very pro-Nazi feeling in a large segment of the population among the Austrians. Did you determine to what extent there was any residual of that feeling after—say, during the period you were there? I ask this because it seems under certain circumstances to have resurfaced a little bit in recent years.

PUHAN:

Absolutely not! I say this sarcastically. There were no Nazis when I was there. I can still remember the first time I ever crossed into Austria and that was into Innsbruck in 1945 when I was at Luxembourg. When you crossed the border the Austrian flags were flying and everybody had been in the Austrian underground, and there were no NAZIS! While we all knew the acclaim which Hitler received when he entered Austria—when was it? In 1938. The Austrians thought Anschluss was the best solution for them. There was none of that in 1953 when I got there. There was no antisemitic feeling although antisemitism had been endemic in Austria going back into the nineteenth century. No, there was a complete denial of that.

Editorial note: All interviews have been excerpted. Errors in transcription have been silently corrected, and some punctuation, capitalization, and numerical styling standardized. Paragraph breaks may have been changed for clarity. German terms have been italicized and diacritical marks added.

Interviews

Abbey, Denise, interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt, May 16, 1988. Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (hereafter ADST Oral History Project), https://www.adst.org/OH TOCs/Abbey, Denise.toc.pdf.
Bardos, Arthur A., interviewed by Hans Tuch, January 25, 1990. ADST Oral History Project, https://www.adst.org/OHTOCs/Bardos,Arthur A,toc.pdf.
Ekern, Halvor C., interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, January 19, 1992. ADST Oral History Project, https://www.adst.org/OH TOCs/Ekern, Halvor.toc.pdf.
Jonnes, Lloyd, interviewed by W. Haven North, August 19, 1996. ADST Oral History Project, https://adst.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Jonnes-Lloyd.pdf.
Martens, Robert J., interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, September 13, 1991. ADST Oral History Project, https://adst.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Martens-Robert-J.toc_.pdf.
Olmsted, Mary Seymour, interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy, April 8, 1992. ADST Oral History Project, https://www.adst.org/OH TOCs/Olmsted, Mary Seymour.toc.pdf.
Puhan, Alfred, interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt, January 22, 1990. ADST Oral History Project, https://www.adst.org/OH TOCs/Puhan, Alfred.toc.pdf.
Roberts, Walter, interviewed by Cliff Groce, September 10, 1990. ADST Oral History Project, https://www.adst.org/OH TOCs/Roberts, Walter.toc.pdf.
Stearman, William Lloyd, interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, April 15, 1992. ADST Oral History Project, https://www.adst.org/OH TOCs/Stearman, William Lloyd.toc.pdf.
Van Oss, Hendrik, interviewed by Lillian Mullins, February 8, 1991. ADST Oral History Project, https://www.adst.org/OH TOCs/Van Oss, Hendrik.toc.pdf.
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